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Abstract of the Thesis 
 
The banking sector has been under public scrutiny since the credit crisis of 2007/8, and 
a range of diagnoses and cures have been offered, particularly in terms of regulatory 
and financial structures.  In the public media, much comment has been made about 
ethics in the sector, but this has provoked surprisingly little response from academic 
researchers.  This thesis explores the crisis in banking as a moral one, taking Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s account of virtue ethics as a framework for understanding the careers of 
Scottish banking leaders. 
The method used for the study is narrative, and depends both on MacIntyre’s 
philosophy of tradition-constituted enquiry, and on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics.  Conversations were held with ten leaders of Scottish banking whose 
careers typically span between 25 and 40 years, and the record of those conversations 
forms the primary data set for the research.   
The resulting narratives are frank, rich descriptions of deeply felt changes in a 
particular mode of working life.  This was a way of life characterised up until the 1980s 
by a well-defined status within local communities, professional expertise and a well-
ordered tradition.  The deregulation of banking and subsequent structural and 
technological changes to retail banking services eroded that professional tradition, and 
replaced it with new modes of work dominated by institutional priorities of sales, profit 
and growth, rather than by an ethic of professional expertise and customer service. 
The thesis finds that there are structural barriers to the recovery of a professional ethic 
in banking.  It offers new perspectives on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, particularly in 
the application of his idea of traditions to mainstream economic activity.  It also 
explores common ground between Gadamer and MacIntyre, proposing ways in which 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
A great deal of importance has been attached in public policy and public media to 
ethical problems in the banking sector in the UK (Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards, 2013).  Policy discussions have been directly connected with the 
banking crisis of 2007/8, and have concerned particularly questions of how the banks 
are run, their professional ethics, structures and regulation.   
The level of interest among the public and politicians concerning ethics in banking has 
not been matched by academia, and in the period since the financial crisis, academic 
output on the topic of marketing in banking has outweighed output on the topic of 
ethics in banking by a factor of fifty to one.  This research focusses on the history of 
ethics in the banking sector in the years leading up to and since the crisis, particularly 
from the perspective of professional ethics. 
1.2 The aim and objectives of the research 
The aim of this research is: 
To explore the moral narratives of Leaders in Scottish banking from the perspective of 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s Aristotelian philosophy. 
This aim is developed further in the following objectives: 
 To review the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, his critics and supporters, in respect 
of the applicability of his work to empirical research in professional ethics.  To explore MacIntyre’s philosophy in relation to Aristotelian virtue ethics more 
broadly, in order to generate an approach to ethics in empirical research which 
is both Aristotelian and MacIntyrean.  To theorise a synthesis of MacIntyre’s moral philosophy and Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics in order to gather and interpret empirical evidence in practical 
ethics.  To interpret empirical data in order to explore the moral thinking of banking 
leaders through a framework of Aristotelian ethics as developed by MacIntyre. 
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 To propose practical contributions to policy concerning professional ethics in 
banking, based on Aristotelian premises.  To examine whether empirical findings may contribute to the development of 
MacIntyrean enquiry. 
The aim and objectives are further focused by a central research question: 
‘Is Scottish banking a corrupted practice?’ 
The development of this question is explored further at Section 3.10 on method. 
1.3 Context 
The practical context of this research is the professional lives of Scottish bankers over 
the last thirty years.  The research looks at the way that leaders in Scottish banking 
understand how it has changed over a period that includes the relative stability of the 
1970s, deregulation in the 1980s, radical restructuring of Scottish banks in the 1990s 
and the credit crisis and consequent collapse of banks in the 2000s.  The participants 
in the research are or were themselves leaders in Scottish banking, and most have 
more than 25 years of experience to draw on.  Their accounts are therefore first-hand, 
detailed and authoritative.   
As a profession, banking is still in turmoil as result of the crisis of 2007/8 and 
subsequent continuing ethical scandals, and questions are being asked in public 
debate about whether there really is a profession of banking, how trust can be re-
established and how standards can be improved (Gapper, 2014; YouGov-Cambridge, 
2013).  This is of particular concern to the Chartered Banker Institute, based in 
Edinburgh, and several senior Members and Fellows of the Institute have been helpful 
in conducting the research. 
The theoretical context of this thesis is the application of MacIntyre’s Aristotelian 
philosophy to empirical research in the banking sector.  The literature review 
concentrates on MacIntyre’s philosophy directly, offering some criticism of his work 
where appropriate, and the design of the research method is based on MacIntyre’s 
epistemology together with a reading of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics.  Since 
the objectives of the research include a specific goal of applying MacIntyre’s 
philosophy to empirical research, there is no reliance on the many often conflicting 
constructs available for applied business ethics in organisation theory.  The intention is 
to run a coherent tradition of moral philosophy straight into the primary data, so to 
speak, rather than relying on intermediate theories in social science. 
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1.4  Rationale 
The rationale for investigating the field of ethics in Scottish banking through the 
framework of MacIntyre’s philosophy is partly a matter of the existing state of the 
literature and partly a matter of the personal history of the researcher. 
Since the publication of After Virtue in 1981, MacIntyre’s version of practical philosophy 
has been much discussed, and a number of commentators have produced valuable 
work in interpreting and developing his ideas, particularly from the perspective of 
philosophy, ethics, politics and sociology.  A list of references here could be very long, 
but particularly influential in this research have been those who have either sought to 
understand MacIntyre’s work comprehensively, or to focus on his Aristotelianism or his 
applicability to organisation theory.  They include: Beadle (2002), Beadle and Moore 
(2011), Knight (2008a), Lutz (2004) and Moore (2008). 
The field of empirical enquiry in organisation studies following MacIntyre’s philosophy 
is more recent, but growing, with studies being produced on working practices in 
circuses, high street pharmacies and health services (Beadle, 2013; Moore, 2012a; 
Conroy, 2009).  Much work remains to be done to develop this aspect of MacIntyrean 
enquiry, and there are two broad goals to be achieved in relation to theory and to 
practice.  In relation to theory, MacIntyre (2013) at all times emphasises that practice 
leads ethical theory, and that moral philosophy is founded in our everyday moral lives.  
It follows that reflection on practice has the potential to enhance our understanding of 
MacIntyre’s work, to critique it and to develop it further.  The current thesis aims to 
contribute in this way by providing data from empirical research in the mainstream 
economy.  In relation to practice, although there has been some academic writing on 
banking ethics in general, there has been very little work conducted on professional 
ethics in banking.  Two of the very few papers directly related to the topic are 
MacIntyrean ones (Graafland and van de Ven, 2011; van de Ven, 2011), and they act 
as a point of departure for the current research. 
The personal history of the researcher is relevant both to the choice of theoretical 
perspective and to the choice of empirical context.  The author of this thesis undertook 
a first degree in Classics at Oxford in the early 1980s, around the time that After Virtue 
was published.  The degree majored in philosophy and in Greek and Latin literature.  
The philosophy taught in the final two years of the course aimed to cover a) key 
ancient texts, including Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, b) Logic, 
including Metaphysics and Epistemology, c) Moral and Political Philosophy (University 
of Oxford, 1980).  This meant that the author had a philosophical grounding at least 
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partly in Aristotle, and it meant that he was trained in the practice of hermeneutics, 
even though hermeneutics as philosophy was not taught in the curriculum. 
The curriculum included the philosophers of modern liberalism and emotivism and,   by 
the time he graduated, the experience that the author had had of reading moral 
philosophy was similar to that described by MacIntyre (1988, p. 400) of the humanities 
in general.  ‘So the student characteristically emerges from a liberal education with a 
set of skills, a set of preferences, and little else, someone whose education has been 
as much a process of deprivation as of enrichment.’  The judgement is harsh, but 
nevertheless perceptive1.  MacIntyre himself followed a curriculum of Latin and Greek, 
literature, philosophy and history at school and university, and he articulates the theme 
from a more personal viewpoint in an interview with Giovanna Borradori: 
‘The reading that first my undergraduate, and then my graduate studies 
required of me only accentuated the incoherence of my beliefs.  I read 
Aquinas as well as Aristotle.  Sometimes I would find myself thinking about 
justice in an Aristotelian or Thomistic way, sometimes in a modern liberal 
way, without recognizing the full extent of my own incoherence.’ (MacIntyre 
1998c, p.257) 
The author is therefore in sympathy with the basic problem of modern moral philosophy 
as MacIntyre experienced it and with the solution to that problem which he finds in a 
specific tradition. 
The career history of the author is also relevant.  After graduating he worked in the 
finance sector for several years before leaving that work to teach.  His time in finance 
in the 1980s included working for a Japanese bond trading operation in the City of 
London and for a pension fund management company in Edinburgh.  Neither of these 
contexts were considered to be ‘banking’ at that time, though now both jobs could be 
undertaken in the central offices of most large banks and the general public now uses 
the term ‘banker’ to describe these and similar jobs as well as the more traditional high 
street retail and commercial bankers of the past.  This phase of the author’s career 
does not make him part of the group being researched, but it does give him some 
                                               
1
 My point of agreement with MacIntyre here is that at the end of four years of study of the 
humanities, with a particular emphasis on western philosophy, I was in no way better able to 
make overall sense of my moral reasoning than when I had started.  I could dissect it, analyse it 
and argue it forwards and backwards better than I could before, but no overall answers had 
been discovered.  Moreover, one thing at least was made clear to me, that the only way for me 
to decide between the various competing systems of moral reasoning on offer was through 
personal preference.  No amount of additional study would change this basic state of affairs, 
and philosophy could be of no further help to me as a practical discipline.  This was as much 
true of epistemology and metaphysics as it was of ethics. 
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degree of insight into their professional lives, some experience of the finance sector in 
Edinburgh, and some understanding of at least the basics of financial language. 
1.5 The form of the argument 
This thesis is intended to offer an exploration of the way that ethics operates in banking 
which is an alternative approach to much research in applied business ethics.  There 
is, for instance, no attempt in this thesis to use constructs of organisational theory 
regarding ethics and leadership such as authentic leadership (Gardner, Avolio, 
Luthans, May, Walumbwa, 2005; Gardner, Cogliser, Davis and Dickens, 2011) or 
transformational leadership (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999; Christie, Barling and Turner, 
2011).  Rather the research explores ethics in banking directly through the framework 
of Aristotelian ethics, and particularly MacIntyre’s articulation of that tradition. 
Consequently, rather than giving space in the literature review to a survey of competing 
theories of business ethics or ethical leadership, this thesis concentrates in its opening 
chapters on key concepts in MacIntyre’s philosophy and other aspects of Aristotelian 
tradition.  This includes an exploration of Gadamer’s hermeneutics.  The emphasis 
throughout is on attempting to understand well a particular philosophical position, and 
to apply it directly to the research, in respect of theory, method and discussion. 
Participants in this research were knowledgeable and frank in their views, and the data 
gathered through interviews has been rich.  As far as possible that data is used directly 
in the chapters on findings, though there are limitations due to the space available and 
for reasons of confidentiality.  A history of professional ethics emerges which is 
complex and coherent, despite the sometimes chaotic and rapidly changing structural 
environment through which it moves. 
The procedure of the research is interpretive and hermeneutic, and its content is 
gathered and presented in narrative form.  Arguments are made, particularly in the final 
chapters of the thesis concerning both practice and theory.  In other words, what has 
been learned about practical moral lives through empirical research is used to inform 
reflection on moral theory, and moral theory is used to reflect on practical ethical 
issues.  Conclusions are drawn which are provisional in nature, in keeping with 
MacIntyre’s understanding of the status of social theory. 
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1.6 The structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 on MacIntyrean enquiry aims to review and position MacIntyre’s philosophy 
as a guide to empirical research in ethics.  This includes discussion of Aristotelian 
concepts of goods and virtues together with MacIntyre’s specific developments of 
practices and traditions.  A justification is given of the choice of MacIntyre’s work as the 
theoretical base for the research. 
Key topics include traditions and practices, the way that goods are understood within 
practices and the way that practices relate to institutions.  Consideration is given to 
MacIntyre’s critics, particularly from an Aristotelian perspective, and this is used to 
position his work in relation to the broader field of Aristotelian philosophy.  Further 
Aristotelian concepts are introduced including the unity of the virtues and the distinction 
between virtues and skills.  When Gadamer is introduced later, in Chapter 3, it is as a 
fellow Aristotelian, also engaged in practical philosophy and also with a fundamental 
interest in tradition.   
Chapter 3 develops a method based on MacIntyre’s epistemology and on Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics.  The sections of the chapter dealing with epistemology are organised as 
‘six principles of enquiry’: 
 Moral enquiry is constituted in relation to particular traditions;  Narrative is both a medium of discovery and a medium for reporting;  Plain persons are also moral philosophers;  Claims to truth are provisional;  All understanding is conditioned by culturally established prejudgements;  Conversation is a paradigm for understanding. 
The sections on method develop the implications of these six principles for the design 
and implementation of the research including data collection through genuine 
conversations, and the role of hermeneutics and narrative in interpreting and 
presenting findings. 
Chapter 4 presents findings in the form of a chronological narrative, beginning with 
banking before the impact of the deregulation of the UK banking system in the 1980s 
and charting the transition from traditional banking in Scotland – ‘old banking’ as it is 
termed here – to a new style of banking which developed in the 1990s.  This narrative 
falls into three phases:  ‘old banking’ which is recounted by the participants from the 
1960s through to the 1980s; the ascendency of ‘new banking’ in the 1990s; and the 
crisis in new banking in 2007/8. 
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Chapter 5 provides a number of interpretive narratives of the same material, this time 
based on key themes of MacIntyre’s moral philosophy:  tradition, practice and virtue.  
These are over-arching concepts which provide a context for the exploration of other 
themes such as conflict, resistance and constancy.  The implications of this 
interpretation for theory and practice are introduced. 
Chapter 6 takes the themes which have been evident Chapters 4 and 5, and explores 
them from the perspective of MacIntyre’s writing, drawing out their applicability to the 
empirical data and the way that the concepts work together to enhance our 
understanding of the moral narratives of this group of bankers.  It also considers a 
number of questions related to virtue ethics which are more generally Aristotelian, 
including the unity of the virtues and the relationship between virtues and skills.  The 
current state of banking in Scotland as a practice is discussed, its apparent decline and 
possible futures. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a summary of the main argument and discussion 
of key contributions to theory and practice.  Tradition is proposed as the ground not 
only of moral enquiry but also of empirical research in a MacIntyrean mode.  The 
applicability of MacIntyre’s philosophy to the context is discussed, along with the 
progress made in viewing MacIntyre’s work alongside Gadamer’s hermeneutics.  The 
findings on the state of ethics in banking in Scotland are summarised and the practical 
implications discussed.  Finally the limitations of the research are explained and some 
future avenues for further research proposed. 
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Chapter  2: MacIntyrean enquiry 
  
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, his critics and 
supporters, in order to understand how his work can be applied to empirical research in 
professional ethics and how it is positioned in relation to Aristotelian ethics more 
broadly.  This brings into the foreground of the thesis core Aristotelian concepts of 
goods and virtues viewed together with MacIntyre’s work on practices and traditions, 
and asks how these concepts help us to understand the narratives of leaders in 
Scottish banking. 
Most of the chapter which follows is therefore devoted to MacIntyre.  Sections 2.2 and 
2.3 examine the appropriateness of MacIntyre’s work as an approach to the current 
research and position his moral philosophy in relation to academic ethics generally and 
Aristotelian ethics more specifically.  Sections 2.4 to 2.8 then cover key topics in 
MacIntyre’s thought which are relevant to empirical enquiry, including the notion of a 
practice, the way that goods are understood within practices and the way that practices 
relate to institutions. The topic of traditions is introduced briefly (and explored further in 
Chapter 3).  These sections are closely focused on MacIntyre’s own writings, and 
attempt to adhere as much as possible to key passages from his work.  In order to do 
so, extended quotations are given which are then discussed in the relevant section and 
further quotations introduced as appropriate.  These quotations are rather long in some 
cases, but this is necessary because MacIntyre’s language is precise and technical, 
and his arguments, like his sentence structures, are at times intricate and closely 
connected over an extended passage. 
Section 2.9 deals with some of MacIntyre’s critics, noting where critics have already 
been answered by MacIntyre’s supporters and discussing some other criticisms more 
directly where these are less answered in the existing literature.  The current enquiry 
remains an Aristotelian one and criticisms of two leading Aristotelians in particular, 
Terence Irwin and Julia Annas are explored.  In Section 2.10, some further concepts in 
Aristotelian ethics are summarised which have less of a profile in discussions of 
MacIntyre’s work, but which are essential as background to this research.  Section 2.11 
then gives a brief overview of the current state of empirical research in MacIntyrean 
enquiry, and relates the field to the context of ethics in banking. 
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2.2 Why MacIntyre? 
‘The manager represents in his character the obliteration of the distinction 
between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations... The manager 
treats ends as given, as outside his scope; his concern is with technique, 
with effectiveness in transforming raw materials into final products, 
unskilled labor into skilled labor, investment into profits.’  (MacIntyre, 2007, 
p.30) 
This research project aims to explore the professional ethics of leaders in Scottish 
banking from the perspective of MacIntyre’s Aristotelian philosophy.  The purpose of 
doing so is to provide a firm grounding in virtue ethics, and thereby to avoid some of 
the conceptual confusion which sometimes surrounds social science approaches to 
ethics in leadership studies and in business studies more widely (Ciulla, 1998; Ciulla, 
2005; Kellerman, 2004).  Consequently this chapter focuses on MacIntyre’s work, 
rather than, for instance, reviewing the literature of any broad field in organisation 
theory such as ethical leadership (Brown, Trevino and Harrison, 2005; Neubert, 
Carlson, Kacmar, Roberts and Chonko, 2009), which is a large literature in its own 
right, or ethics in banking (Paulet, 2011; Watkins, 2011), a large topic and a 
surprisingly small literature. 
But why MacIntyre?  Why start here, with a philosopher so apparently hostile to the 
business manager? 
Alasdair MacIntyre is a key figure in ethics.  His most widely read book, After Virtue, 
has attracted a great deal of academic attention, and has made him one of the most 
influential contemporary Anglophone moral philosophers (D’Andrea, 2006; Solomon, 
2003).  He has had a major influence on the development of virtue ethics in 
management theory (Beabout, 2012; Beadle, 2002; Beadle, 2006; Horvath, 1995; 
Moore, 2008).    A search of Web of Science conducted on 29 April 2014 returned 22 
academic papers on the topic of ‘Alasdair MacIntyre’ in the research area of Business 
and Economics.  This compared with 55 for John Rawls, 9 for Martha Nussbaum and 8 
for Peter Singer.  A range of perspectives on MacIntyre’s work are available in 
organisation studies, including several contributions from those specifically engaged in 
MacIntyrean empirical enquiry (Beadle, 2013; Moore, 2012; Kempster, Jackson and 
Conroy, 2011), as well as critical voices (Dobson, 2009).  What is not in dispute among 
these authors is the very significant impact that MacIntyre has had on academic 
approaches to business ethics. 
MacIntyre’s stance towards management, particularly management in a commercial or 
bureaucratic sense, is deeply critical (Beadle, 2002; Kavanagh, 2012; Moore, 2008), 
10 
and for some unrealistically hostile or pessimistic (Holt, 2006; Moore, 2008).  
MacIntyre’s (1994) Kinesis interview leaves no room for doubt about the severity of his 
views, which extend to all manner of business management, and particularly the 
management of money.  ‘Financial management, together with a great many other 
business and commercial practices, generates illusion. […] [This is] not only an area in 
which people are systematically deceived, it’s an area in which people are 
systematically corrupted’ (MacIntyre, 1994, p.40).  He goes on to say that one financial 
manager, who was jailed for a misdemeanour and protested that he was just doing his 
job, was quite right.  ‘That doesn’t mean to say he shouldn’t be in prison.  It probably 
means that many other financial managers should be there too’ (MacIntyre, 1994, 
p.40). 
Rather than being a barrier to basing research on his philosophy, this critical stance in 
fact proves to be a significant strength, particularly in the context of banking.  In the 
aftermath of the banking crisis of 2007/8 there has been a wave of public criticism of 
banking, banks and bankers (Whittle, 2012).  MacIntyre not only provides a sound 
basis in moral philosophy for criticism, but is one of the few moral philosophers who 
holds the prospect of distinguishing between these three: banking, bankers and banks.  
Many of the questions of public criticism of the banking sector as a whole revolve 
around the question of exactly what is being criticised.  Is it bankers who are the 
problem? Is it deregulated and overly complex global banks that are the problem?  Is it 
a particular variety of capitalism (Keat, 2008b) which is to blame?  These questions are 
frequently formulated as moral issues in political debate and in the academic press 
(Fourcade, Steiner, Streeck and Woll, 2013), but very few academic authors have 
addressed these problems with clarity and fewer still have focused to any meaningful 
degree on the link between ethics in banking and banking as a profession.  The only 
authors to focus on this link with any clarity are van de Ven (2011) and Graafland and 
van de Ven (2011), who write explicitly from a MacIntyrean perspective. 
It seems, on a first view, that MacIntyre may enable a fresh perspective to be taken on 
problems of ethics and leadership in banking, and one which is well founded in moral 
philosophy.  The question then arises: What kind of moral philosophy is that? 
MacIntyre as Aristotelian 
One of MacIntyre’s great strengths as an author is that he fits neatly into no ready-
made category. His thought has developed over more than a half century of publishing, 
and has spanned Marxism, Aristotelianism and Thomism (Knight, 1998; Lutz, 2014).  
These movements in his thought can strike even his admirers as ‘surprising’ (Solomon, 
2003), and MacIntyre himself has no hesitation in correcting himself when his views 
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change (Preface to Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre, 1988).  Even the 
genre of his work is something of a challenge, being a mixture of analytical philosophy 
and history, which can leave both analytical philosophers and historians frustrated 
(D’Andrea, 2006). 
Since MacIntyre (1998c) has repudiated Marxism, it is as an Aristotelian and a Thomist 
that he must be approached in his major works.  His development from secular 
Aristotelian to Thomistic Aristotelian is most evident in the move from After Virtue to 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?.  A problem of interpretation is therefore created for 
those wishing to make use of MacIntyre’s work;  he is most obviously a Thomist (Lutz, 
2004) but can also still be approached as a secular Aristotelian, and his writing is for 
the most part directed towards the articulation of an ethics based on Artistotelian 
notions of a good life lived in human society, not one dependent on a theistic world 
view.  This was his position in Can Medicine Dispense with a Theological Perspective 
on Human Nature? (MacIntyre, 1977a) and, even though his own religious affiliation 
changed and he has since written freely on theological topics, his mature work in moral 
philosophy maintains this position.  As a moral philosopher, he is available alike to 
theist and atheist.  What does not change, from whichever angle one approaches 
MacIntyre, is that he is controversial.  This is certainly true for MacIntyre’s position as 
an Aristotelian.  Leading Aristotelian scholars including Nussbaum, Irwin and Annas 
have taken issue with MacIntyre in a number of respects and most especially in 
response to his book, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, and this is explored further 
in Section 2.9 below. 
The current thesis aims to approach MacIntyre as an Aristotelian.  Where relevant, it 
seeks to ground MacIntyre’s thought in Aristotle, and only refers to Thomas Aquinas 
where this adds clarity (for instance on the question of the unity of the virtues).  This is 
an important qualification on the scope of the study: approaching the research from the 
perspective of Thomism would lead to a very different project.  This thesis also aims to 
approach MacIntyre critically, and to that end the work of a number of other 
Aristotelians is used in constructing a theoretical framework for empirical enquiry.  
Broadly these authors fall into three main groups. 
First, the theoretical basis of this thesis draws on Aristotle directly, together with 
contemporary secular Aristotelian philosophers and commentators, including Julia 
Annas, Philippa Foot, Bernard Williams, Roger Crisp and Hans-Georg Gadamer.  
Crisp’s (2000) translation of the Nicomachean Ethics is used throughout, and 
Gadamer’s Truth and Method provides an important second strand for the foundation 
of the methodology of this research alongside MacIntyre.  This thesis also draws on 
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Thomistic Aristotelians including Peter Geach, Christopher Lutz and Jean Porter.  For 
the purposes of this research no great difficulty has been encountered in comparing 
the views of secular and Thomistic Aristotelians.  Aristotelians are a broad church, and 
on the few occasions where Aquinas is referred to directly in this study, this is usually 
in response to Foot, who describes herself as ‘card carrying atheist’ (Foot, 2009, p.93) 
but draws almost as much on Aquinas as on Aristotle.  Lastly, there are a number of 
commentators and students of MacIntyre writing from perspectives of sociology and 
particularly organisation theory who have been influential in understanding how to 
apply MacIntyre’s thought to empirical enquiry; these include particularly Ron Beadle 
and Geoff Moore. 
The bulk of the literature review which follows is structured around key concepts, rather 
than key groups of authors.  This is primarily for the purpose of exploring and 
articulating MacIntyre’s thought and the relevant thought of Aristotle on which it rests.  
There is no attempt here to review a field which could be denoted by a general 
descriptor, whether that be virtue ethics, particularism, social constructionism, or any 
other broad identifying category, only to focus on some key authorities in a particular 
tradition, and seeing MacIntyre as such an authority in an Aristotelian tradition. 2 
2.3 Moral reasoning and rationality 
‘It is a distinctive feature of the social and cultural order that we inhabit that 
disagreements over central moral issues are peculiarly unsettlable.  
Debates concerned with the value of human life such as those over 
abortion and euthanasia, or about distributive justice and property rights, or 
about war and peace degenerate into confrontations of assertion and 
counter-assertion, because the protagonists of rival positions invoke 
incommensurable forms of moral assertion against each other.’ (MacIntyre 
1984a, p.69) 
Standard textbooks on management or on business ethics tend to offer students short 
menus of alternative ethical systems (Boatright, 2012; Bowie, 1999; Crane and Matten, 
2012; Fisher and Lovell, 2006; Hartman and DesJardins, 2011; Shaw, 2000), without 
always making it clear that these competing systems of modern ethics (the systems for 
instance of Kant, Mill or Rawls) are locked in unresolvable disagreement because each 
sets out to provide a universal normative theory applicable to any society and 
                                               
2
 It would perhaps be appropriate to adopt a narrative style for the literature review, in keeping 
with MacIntyre’s own style of exegesis, but this style is reserved for the central chapters on 
findings.  To attempt a narrative of MacIntyre’s work in this chapter would be impossible in the 
space, and would risk duplicating some excellent narratives already available of exactly this 
kind (Knight, 1998; Lutz, 2004; Lutz, 2014). 
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purportedly based on no particular society, and each provides thereby a different 
universal theory which excludes the others.  Reactions against this movement towards 
universal systems might then include such alternatives as emotivism which proposes 
that moral utterances are essentially expressions of approbation (e.g. Mackie 1977), 
postmodern ethics which champions the specific response of the individual agent to the 
moral demands of the other (e.g. Bauman 1993), and MacIntyre who sees moral 
enquiry as a tradition-constituted historical process. 
To anyone familiar with MacIntyre’s work, and in particular the opening chapters of 
After Virtue, the above paragraph may read oddly, because it bears some resemblance 
to  one of MacIntyre’s main lines of argument up until the point at which MacIntyre 
himself is included alongside such categories as emotivism and postmodern ethics, 
movements which he defines himself over against.  What does this inclusion imply 
here?  It implies first that MacIntyre’s work shares with these other alternatives to 
modernist ethics a basic disenchantment with the modernist search for universal moral 
rules, and second that MacIntyre is deserving of a category in his own right alongside 
these broader movements.   
The first implication can be argued from within MacIntyre’s own work.  The twentieth 
century witnessed a disintegration of the appearance of ethical universality, a 
recognition of the failure of the enlightenment project, and a range of reactions to that 
recognition.  Those reactions included a radical turning away from the idea that ethical 
debate concerns anything objective at all (Mackie, 1977), and the rejection of the idea 
or moral rationality per se and an embrace of the broadest possible principle of moral 
agency through a complex situational and personal response (Bauman, 1993).  
MacIntyre’s work is likewise a response to that basic sense of disenchantment 
(MacIntyre, 1992b). 
The second implication rests on an argument for MacIntyre’s uniqueness.  MacIntyre 
seeks not to discover beyond the assumptions of the enlightenment project a new 
understanding of ethics, as for instance does postmodern ethics, but to rediscover an 
understanding which has been lost and to help to rebuild what is in effect a premodern 
tradition.  However, it would not suffice to place, say, Thomism in MacIntyre’s stead in 
a sentence which lists reactions against modernist ethics such as, ‘... postmodern 
ethics and Thomism’.  Thomism clearly can’t be a reaction to modernism because it 
has been there all along, and the same is true of Aristotelian virtue ethics.  MacIntyre’s 
historical and Aristotelian diagnosis of the failure of modern ethical theories in their 
attempts to transcend tradition, and his arguments from that diagnosis to tradition-
constituted enquiry and thence to a more specific development of Thomistic 
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Aristotelianism are unique.  They set him apart from both Thomists in general and 
Aristotelians in general (D’Andrea, 2006).  One sign of this is the great difficulty that 
others have in placing MacIntyre in one pigeonhole or another (Nussbaum, 1999). 
The unifying theme of MacIntyre’s books, After Virtue, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry is this topic:  How can we make 
sense of moral philosophy now that the enlightenment project has failed?  His answer, 
roughly paraphrased, is: 
The enlightenment project was bound to fail, because it proceeded from the false 
assumption that universal and timeless moral truths could be discovered or fashioned 
outside of, or independent from, any particular historical tradition (MacIntyre, 2007).  
Once this assumption has been brought to light, then it becomes possible to re-
describe moral enquiry in terms, not of absolute arguments, but historical debates, in 
which one tradition rubs up against another, in which some traditions are defeated, 
compromises are reached, or new traditions are developed from old ones (MacIntyre, 
1988).  When this kind of process is understood we also understand that we have no 
basis for rational moral argument and no basis for practical moral decision making 
except that which is provided by some tradition or traditions (MacIntyre, 1990).  We are 
thus faced with choices not between one version of absolute truth and another, but 
between contending arguments within and between traditions, and within and between 
the practices which constitute or move among those traditions (MacIntyre, 1990; 
MacIntyre, 1994).  And these ways of reasoning and acting always do come down to 
practicalities because our moral reasoning originates in and returns to practice; we 
learn our morality from practice and our moral reasoning issues in practical acts 
(MacIntyre, 1987; MacIntyre, 1992a). 
If this picture is adequate in outline it follows that any moral enquiry which also claims 
to be a MacIntyrean enquiry will be rooted in the concepts of tradition and practice, will 
be cognisant of conflict between traditions, and will be interested in the way that moral 
agents live in and amongst competing traditions and practices and the social structures 
to which they give rise. 
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2.4 Practices, goods and virtues 
‘By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended.’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p.187) 
The above is perhaps the most quoted passage from MacIntyre’s writing.  It is widely 
quoted partly because this idea of a practice is pivotal to MacIntyre’s contribution to 
moral philosophy, partly because his usage of the word ‘practice’ here and throughout 
his work is deliberately specific, precluding several other usages in ordinary and 
philosophical languages (Knight, 2008a), and partly because there is a great deal more 
than the description of a term packed into this passage, which extends to other key 
ideas in his thinking including the notion of goods internal to a practice.  He illustrates 
his idea of a practice first through the example of a child learning to play chess, and 
describes a process whereby the child might be given reasons to learn how to play 
chess first by means of rewards, such as candy, which are extraneous to the game of 
chess; if the child then persists and learns to play the game moderately well, it is to be 
hoped that he or she will learn to enjoy the game for its own sake.  This process of 
learning to enjoy the game for its own sake involves beginning to recognise certain 
goods which are specific to chess, a ‘particular kind of analytic skill, strategic 
imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now not for 
winning on a particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the game of 
chess demands’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p.188). 
The example is chosen by MacIntyre to illustrate several key concepts, not just to help 
to define what he means by a practice.  So here we find illustrated the idea of 
apprenticeship or initiation into a practice; we don’t simply land in practices, we grow 
and learn our way into them.  Such learning is a social process involving following 
rules, understanding conventions and following examples shown by well established 
practitioners.  A key part of what is learned is not just a set of skills, but an ability to 
understand and value certain goods which are internal to the practice, internal in the 
sense that they can only be fully understood through participation in the practice and 
similarly can only be achieved and enjoyed through such participation.  Integral to this 
learning is the idea that cheating becomes self-defeating.  If the motive for playing a 
game such as chess is simply to earn a prize by winning through any means, then 
cheating is a rational strategy.  If, however, the motive is to excel at the game, then 
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cheating becomes irrational since to cheat is to frustrate one’s own pursuit of 
excellence. 
Following this passage MacIntyre fills out the idea of a practice with examples of 
portrait painting, fishing, farming and so on, emphasising the idea of goods internal to 
the practice which people may achieve only by their involvement in the practice.  He 
then draws attention to some key differences between internal and external goods.  
‘It is characteristic of what I have called external goods that when achieved 
they are always some individual's property and possession. Moreover 
characteristically they are such that the more someone has of them, the 
less there is for other people. This is sometimes necessarily the case, as 
with power and fame, and sometimes the case by reason of contingent 
circumstance as with money.  External goods are therefore 
characteristically objects of competition in which there must be losers as 
well as winners.’  (MacIntyre, 2007, pp.190-191) 
A key difference then between internal and external goods of this kind is that external 
goods are in limited supply and competition aims at particular distributions or 
redistributions of those goods among winners and losers, whereas internal goods are 
not limited in supply in the same way; as participants in the practice excel in the 
practice they benefit not only themselves but others in the practice, and many or all can 
develop such excellence at the same time.  This outline of practices and goods internal 
to practices enables MacIntyre then to make the final key move in this chain of 
reasoning, by proposing a ‘first, even if partial and tentative definition of a virtue:  
‘A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which 
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices 
and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such 
goods.’  (MacIntyre, 2007, p.190-191, italics in original) 
These few pages of After Virtue contain the kernel of MacIntyre’s practical ethics and 
his development of Aristotle.  MacIntyre’s key innovation over Aristotle here is to 
replace Aristotle’s distinction between goods internal and external to the possessor of 
those goods, with a new distinction between goods internal and external to the 
practices which yield those goods (Knight, 1998; Knight, 2008b).  The relationship 
between these two versions of internality and externality is complex and not always 
well understood by those using MacIntyre’s ideas of internal and external goods in 
empirical enquiry3.  MacIntyre has here rejected a foundation for moral philosophy 
                                               
3
 Kempster et al. 2011 is a good example.  Although their overall project is clearly Aristotelian in 
intent and they have used MacIntyre to develop their thinking of the goods of leadership as 
providing purpose for the institution, the authors are confused about what is meant by internal 
goods.  So for instance they cite ‘reduction of the company’s carbon footprint’ as an internal 
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resting on Aristotelian metaphysical biology in favour of one which rests on sociological 
premises (Knight, 1998).  This is something which changes in MacIntyre’s later 
philosophy (Knight, 2008b) particularly in Dependent Rational Animals, but the locus of 
goods relative to practices does not change (Lutz, 2014) and for the purposes of the 
current research project questions of metaphysical biology are deferred until the 
closing chapter (see Section 7.3). 
This rejection has far reaching implications.  In order to be clear, Aristotle recognises 
three basic categories of goods : external goods, goods of the soul and goods of the 
body (Aristotle, NE, I.8)4.  Goods of the soul and goods of the body are presumably 
both ‘internal goods’ in contrast to external goods, though Aristotle does not generally 
use the phrase, and he is most concerned with goods of the soul.  So the idea of 
external compared to internal goods in Aristotle is one which is articulated relative to 
the possessor of those goods, and the grouping of those goods is tripartite.  The most 
important goods which we can possess are the goods of the soul, most obviously the 
virtues, and other goods - goods of the body such as health and beauty and external 
goods such as property and status - are required in order to enable those higher goods 
of the soul (Aristotle, NE, I.8).   
MacIntyre’s notion of goods internal or external to practices does bear some 
resemblance to Aristotle’s categories and Knight (2008b, p114) thinks that there is 
‘conceptual elision’ in the sense that ‘MacIntyre’s usage of “internal goods” denotes 
goods internal to practices but connotes goods internal to human beings qua 
practitioners’.  However, this glosses over some important categories of goods which 
are differently described between the two schemes.  Most significantly, virtues are 
internal goods in Aristotle’s scheme, but they are not goods which are internal to 
practices.  They are goods which are required for and encouraged by the pursuit of the 
internal goods of practice, but they are not in MacIntyre’s scheme identified as internal 
                                                                                                                                         
good, because it is an example of ‘goods for humans’, along with ‘alleviating poverty, sustaining 
communities’ and ‘liberation through education’ (Kempster et al. 2011, p.325).  Alleviation of 
poverty and reduction of CO2 emissions are goods of course, but they are external goods on 
Aristotle’s scheme and for the most part also on MacIntyre’s scheme unless a clear explanation 
is offered of a particular practice within which CO2 reduction can be located as an internal good.  
‘Liberation through education’ on the other hand is clearly an internal good on Aristotle’s 
scheme for the person liberated. 
4
 References given to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are given in the form ‘Aristotle, NE, IV.3’ 
to signify Book IV, Chapter 3.  This form of notation, without quotation, refers to the text of the 
1894 edition of Ethica Nicomachea (Aristotle, 1894).  The main translation used is Crisp’s 
(Aristotle, 2000),and this has been compared with Thomson’s (Aristotle, 1976) translation to 
check the meaning of the text where appropriate.  Where quotation is given of Aristotle it is in 
English and the translation used is Crisp’s unless specified otherwise. 
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goods themselves.  This remains an area of difficulty which is taken up again in 
Section 6.6.   
For current purposes it is enough to emphasise that the basis for these categories of 
internal and external goods has changed between Aristotle’s usage and MacIntyre’s, 
and along with it our means of determining which is which.  For MacIntyre, material 
goods (a car, a bicycle or a loaf of bread) are in most circumstances external goods, 
not because they are physical objects separate from any person, but because they are 
goods which can be purchased by someone independently of involvement in any 
particular practice.  This distinction then requires careful application as we enquire into 
particular practices.  In the practice of rock music, for instance, the achievement of a 
great performance by the Rolling Stones may be an internal good for many of the 
performers and supporting technicians, while attendance at that same performance 
might remain an external good, represented by a ticket which can be bought and sold. 
By linking the concepts of practices, internal goods and virtues in this way, MacIntyre 
has articulated a theory of moral development, in which practices act as ‘schools for 
the virtues’ (Knight, 1998), and in the light of which we learn to rank goods.  
2.5 Practices and institutions 
In After Virtue, MacIntyre articulates the distinction and the relationship between 
practices and institutions.  His notion of the way that practices and institutions 
characteristically combine to form a single causal order is the last element of a number 
of key ideas located in the same chapter of After Virtue which are of the first 
importance for bringing MacIntyre’s sociologically grounded philosophy to bear on 
empirical moral enquiry (Beabout, 2012; Beadle and Moore, 2011; Coe and Beadle, 
2008; Moore, 2008).   
‘Practices must not be confused with institutions. Chess, physics and 
medicine are practices; chess clubs, laboratories, universities and hospitals 
are institutions. Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned 
with what I have called external goods. They are involved in acquiring 
money and other material goods; they are structured in terms of power and 
status, and they distribute money, power and status as rewards. Nor could 
they do otherwise if they are to sustain not only themselves, but also the 
practices of which they are the bearers. For no practices can survive for 
any length of time unsustained by institutions. Indeed so intimate is the 
relationship of practices to institutions — and consequently of the goods 
external to the goods internal to the practices in question — that institutions 
and practices characteristically form a single causal order in which the 
ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the 
acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for common 
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goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the 
institution.’  (MacIntyre, 2007, p.194) 
This passage is of particular interest for moral enquiry in organisation studies, and is 
again quoted at length for that reason.  It summarises key themes for a MacIntyrean 
enquiry, themes such as practices, institutions, goods and virtues, and summarises the 
nature of the relationships between them.  MacIntyre does not, either here or 
elsewhere, give further precision to the idea of an institution.  However, his list of 
examples given above seems clear; he does not mean in this context institutions in the 
sense of established customs or procedures, but in the other common language sense 
of organisations (though see the discussion below regarding Beadle and Moore’s 
interpretation).  That he does not go on to define or describe further exactly what he 
means by institution seems intentional; MacIntyre is interested in locating and exploring 
in depth the ideas of virtues, goods, practices and traditions, but not the idea of an 
institution.  He prefers to leave the latter to organisation theorists, and for the purposes 
of MacIntyre’s work, a common language understanding of institution as organisation is 
sufficient and sufficiently flexible to serve its function here.5 
It is worth unpacking some key aspects of the passage. 
Institutions are not only characteristically involved with practices, they also in certain 
respects contrast and conflict with them.  Institutions characteristically pursue external 
goods, that is to say different goods from those which are proper to the practice.  
Those two sets of goods can be and often are found to be competing for priority, in 
which case the institution will tend to champion its own goods of money, assets, status, 
and so on at the expense of the goods of the practice.  This is therefore a model of a 
single causal order in which there is an inbuilt tendency towards internal conflict 
concerning the ranking of goods.   
We encounter here a potential difficulty arising from MacIntyre’s departure from 
Aristotle noted in the previous section. It is reasonably clear in Aristotle why goods 
which are external to the person should be ranked as less valuable in themselves than 
goods internal to the person, because external goods are more ephemeral or more 
easily removed, and because they play a supporting role to the goods of the soul, 
which are the highest goods, being most deeply connected with the person (Aristotle, 
NE, I.7) and least alienable (Aristotle, NE, I.10).  With MacIntyre it is less clear.  There 
                                               
5
 MacIntyre is at pains to delineate what he means by a practice as being of a certain degree of 
complexity, together with other criteria of coherence and cooperation. The same criteria are not 
required of relevant institutions or organizations, which can be small or large, complex or 
simple. 
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seems to be an assumption that because practices are valuable (and there does seem 
to be a common sense intuition that they are) then goods internal to the practices are 
similarly valuable, and following this line, that goods external to practices are less 
valuable than internal ones.   What is not attempted is to run this same equation from 
the perspective of institutions:  there is also a case for saying that if institutions are 
valuable (again there is a common sense intuition that they are), then goods internal to 
the institution such as pay and status are similarly valuable.  This line would then 
continue:  if there is one set of goods proper to the practice and one set of goods 
proper to the institution, by what standard do we judge the goods of the practice to be 
the more important?  If the response is that practices are more fundamental to human 
flourishing than institutions, then we seem to have reached an impasse, because such 
a claim for the practice is quite naturally made from the practice, but the contrary claim 
is equally naturally made for the institution from the institution.  It seems likely that both 
practices and institutions are equally fundamental to human well-being.   
It is possible that the intuitive force of the phrases ‘internal goods’ and ‘external goods’ 
in helping us to rank those sets relative to each other derives more from Aristotle’s 
original idea of goods internal and external to the person, than from MacIntyre’s idea of 
goods internal and external to the practice.  Kuna (2008) makes the argument that 
MacIntyre does in fact fail to provide a purely sociological account of goods, that his 
position in After Virtue is implicitly dependent on some form of metaphysics, and that 
as MacIntyre’s thought develops in later work, particularly Dependent Rational 
Animals, it becomes clear that he returns to a metaphysical understanding of the good 
for human beings. 
The nature of this internal conflict is described in terms of a conflict between goods, 
goods which are differentiated in two ways.  They are differentiated by belonging.  One 
set of goods is internal to the practice: these goods belong to the practice, are 
particular to the practice, can be understood, appreciated and achieved only from 
within the practice.  The other set is external to the practice: these goods belong to the 
institution, are promoted by, developed by and distributed by the institution.  They are 
also differentiated by their respective characters.  The goods of the practice are 
characterised by ‘cooperative care for common goods’, where the goods of the 
institution are characterised by ‘competitiveness’.  This theme of cooperation compared 
to competitiveness requires careful handling, because it can cause confusion; many 
practices have strongly competitive elements to them (MacIntyre, 2007; Feldman, 
1986).  The notion of common goods here is crucial.  The goods of the institution as 
described by MacIntyre are typically exclusive rather than common.  For someone to 
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win, another must lose, and this form of competition is characteristic of advanced 
western capitalist economic models (Keat, 2008a; Pharo 2005). 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘organisation’ is aligned with the term 
‘institution’, rather than with the phrase ‘practice-institution combination’6, in keeping 
with MacIntyre’s usage in After Virtue.  This is mainly for practical reasons of language 
use.  In the empirical enquiry to follow, we need to be able to distinguish between talk 
of practices and institutions.  It can be difficult to discern the talk of the institution as a 
separate phenomenon from the organisation, whereas it is generally straightforward to 
discern talk of practices as separate from the organisation or the institution.  So, for 
instance, in conversations with bankers ‘the bank’ refers to the organisation and/or to 
the institution - no great distinction is obvious between those two ideas - but it very 
clearly does not refer to the practice of banking.  There are also some more theoretical 
and procedural reasons for not re-describing organisations as practice-institution 
combinations just yet.  At this stage, it seems important to allow the possibility that 
organisations and practices can to some extent operate independently of each other, 
even if they do characteristically come together to form single causal orders of the kind 
which MacIntyre describes.  Beadle and Moore (2011) make the point that practices 
can be institutionalised independently from organisations.  However, it also may be the 
case that organisations do not necessarily form practice-institution combinations in any 
strong sense; a hedge fund, for instance may not support any practice recognisable by 
MacIntyre (1994).  Insomuch as an organisation involves human beings, it perhaps 
automatically involves practices to some degree, because human activity tends 
towards the development of practices, but this is a rather weak version of the practice-
institution combination.  If MacIntyre is right about the parlous state of much Anglo-
American business practice, then Beadle and Moore’s ideal of an organisation in which 
an institution supports a core practice may be the exception rather than the rule. 
The way in which practices and institutions are then approached in empirical enquiry is 
largely determined by this framework of single causal order characterised by tension.  
The nature of the tension has been clearly explored further in theory and in empirical 
research by those following a MacIntyrean enquiry in organisation studies (Beadle, 
2013; Moore, 2008; Moore, 2012).  Less attention has been paid to the nature of the 
causality involved in this single causal order.  It tends to be assumed as a backdrop to 
                                               
6
 The idea of practice and institution as a single causal order is taken up by Beadle and Moore 
who believe that ‘any organization may be re-described as a practice-institution combination’ 
(Beadle and Moore, 2011).  The current research project adopts the term ‘practice-institution 
combination’ to refer to the way that practices and institutions interact, but does not use this as 
a re-description of the organization in the way that Beadle and Moore do.   
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research, but there is perhaps a need to explore the idea more fully.  To say that, for 
instance, a theatre is a single causal order, in the sense that events related to the 
institution (a chandelier falls down) causes events in the practice (an unusually realistic 
performance of Phantom of the Opera is achieved), is one aspect of such a causal 
order, and it is of some relevance.  But it may be more directly relevant to view the idea 
of single causal order, as MacIntyre illustrates in the passage quoted above 
(MacIntyre, 2007, p.194), as a nexus of agent causation (Bishop 1983), in which 
events are caused by the agents within the practice-institution combination on the 
basis of motivations enabled by their adherence to practice, institution or both.  This 
idea of ‘single causal order’ is perhaps something which can be articulated further 
through empirical enquiry. 
Of particular interest are the role of the virtues.  Immediately following the above 
passage from After Virtue, MacIntyre states: ‘In this context the essential function of 
the virtues is clear. Without them, without justice, courage and truthfulness, practices 
could not resist the corrupting power of institutions’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p.194).  This 
statement is remarkable in three ways.  First, it states an essential function of the 
virtues as the protection of practices, which seems to be another development beyond 
Aristotle, who recognised no such function of the virtues7.  Second, it places a primary 
emphasis on virtues as a means of resistance to corruption.  Third, it lists three virtues 
in particular which are required for this resistance, the virtues of justice, courage and 
truthfulness.   
2.6 Traditions 
If the pivotal notion of After Virtue is the idea of a practice, then the idea of a tradition 
holds a similar place in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?.  Tradition and practice 
operate in MacIntyre’s philosophy as linked through the social structures which give 
rise to them and to which they in turn give rise. 
‘A tradition is an argument extended through time in which certain 
fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of 
conflict: those with critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject 
all or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those 
internal, interpretative debates through which the meaning and rationale of 
the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by whose progress 
a tradition is constituted.’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p.12) 
                                               
7
 Perhaps the response from MacIntyre would be that Aristotle could not have formulated the 
thought, since such institutions as MacIntyre intends here were not part of the social fabric of 
4th century Greece. 
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MacIntyre is particularly concerned with a special kind of tradition, traditions of moral 
enquiry which support and express forms of moral reasoning and argumentation (Lutz, 
2004).  The question of what he means by tradition-constituted moral enquiry is taken 
up in more detail in Chapter 3 on research design and method.  At this point in the 
thesis it may be helpful to frame a different and narrower question:  To what extent is 
MacIntyre’s idea of tradition relevant to organisational behaviour?  Or to put the 
question in a more pointed form: Is MacIntyre’s notion of tradition solely a grand 
structure of moral enquiry, applicable to great movements in the history of human 
thought, such as those represented by Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Hutcheson or 
Hume (MacIntyre, 1988), and not applicable to lesser and more local traditions in an 
ordinary language sense, such as the tradition of trade unionism in the UK, or the 
tradition of crofting in the Scottish highlands and islands? 
Clearly not any minor custom will count as a tradition in the sense MacIntyre discusses 
it, since traditions in this sense are social structures substantive enough to offer a basis 
for the development of rational thought, so that it makes sense to speak of inhabitants 
or adherents of such traditions.   However, there are good reasons for keeping an open 
mind concerning exactly where the boundary might be drawn.  In recognising the close 
link between traditions and practices, MacIntyre also recognises that there are greater 
and lesser traditions, since ‘the traditions through which particular practices are 
transmitted and reshaped never exist in isolation [from] larger social traditions’ 
(MacIntyre, 2007, p.221).   
Traditions are not always self-conscious, and for those that inhabit them ‘the facts of 
tradition, which are the presupposition of their activities and enquiries, may well remain 
just that, unarticulated presuppositions which are never themselves the objects of 
attention and enquiry’ (MacIntyre ,1988, pp.7-8).  MacIntyre is repeatedly emphatic that 
his is a philosophy of practice, and this is thoroughgoing (MacIntyre, 1978; MacIntyre, 
1992a).  Practical rationality is developed and can only be developed in the context of 
practices and traditions and their attendant social structures.  A hill farmer in 
Northumberland has just as much claim to practical rationality as a professional 
philosopher in Oxford.  If MacIntyre’s discussion of traditions is to be consistent with his 
views on moral reasoning in practice, then it must hold meaning for the practical 
tradition of farming to which the hill farmer belongs and from which he or she draws 
their reasons for action just as much as it does for the theoretical tradition to which the 
professional philosopher belongs and from which he or she consciously articulates 
arguments.   
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We might therefore venture that where people speak in an ordinary language sense of 
their own traditions, then we should regard the same sort of principles as applicable to 
those traditions as are applicable to MacIntyre’s paradigmatic examples of major 
philosophical traditions, so long as the local traditions in question have sufficient 
complexity to provide a sense of belonging and to form a context in which practical 
rationality can be developed. 
Some other key concepts need to be kept in mind in understanding and applying 
MacIntyre’s notion of tradition.  First is the idea that traditions tend forward.  As is made 
clear in the extended quote above, MacIntyre is interested in traditions not only as 
historical artefacts, but as living and forward-moving forces in human development.  
Equally important are the ideas of conflict and narrative.  It is through narrative that 
progress in practical reasoning is to be understood, and such progress is generally 
achieved through some form of conflict (MacIntyre, 1990).  So in applying MacIntyre’s 
thought to empirical moral enquiry there is a consequent emphasis on stories, including 
stories of conflict.   
It is through stories of conflict and the resolution of conflict, particularly in the form of 
moral argument, that we can see traditions and practices operating, changing and 
moving forward.  He relates histories of conflicts between traditions, particularly those 
large traditions of enquiry which he traces back to the division of the post-Homeric 
inheritance in Athens and the emergence there of two ‘radically incompatible 
conceptions not only of goods and of justice and other virtues but also of politics and of 
practical rationality’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p.46).  He also relates the history of the 
emergence of Thomism as a crowning achievement of the resolution of conflicts 
between traditions.  So, MacIntyre’s concern is not only to explore the theme of conflict 
between traditions, but also to show how best such conflicts can be resolved.  He 
addresses this most directly in Three Rival Versions, where he seeks to explain the 
processes by which one tradition might prove itself to be rationally superior to another 
in the absence of any broad consensus of values (MacIntyre, 1990).  These processes 
demand tolerance and patience, including a willingness to learn the ways of thought of 
a rival tradition from the inside. 
That these processes are so potentially demanding in terms of intellect and effort 
raises some points of caution for the kind of enquiry envisaged for this thesis.  The kind 
of traditions which MacIntyre returns to again and again in his own writing are 
principally the large traditions of enquiry which he describes in his major works 
(Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Hume and so on), not the smaller more local traditions 
of practice, which he understands as dependent on them.  The researcher should be 
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cautious about investigating traditions of practice as if they were grand theories.  
Further, although we might expect to witness conflict within and between traditions at 
any level, the researcher in an empirical enquiry should likewise be cautious about 
approaching any particular tradition from the perspective of conflict.  For this reason, 
Gadamer (1975), with his emphasis on coming to agreement rather than conflict, is a 
useful adjunct to MacIntyre’s vision of rival enquiry (Section 3.8). 
2.7 Aristotelian virtues and other virtues 
Traditions of virtue ethics become traditions partly by developing and arguing over 
shortlists of canonical virtues: 
‘Homer, Sophocles, Aristotle, the New Testament and medieval thinkers … 
offer us different and incompatible lists of the virtues; they give a different 
rank order of importance to different virtues; and they have different and 
incompatible theories of the virtues. If we were to consider later Western 
writers on the virtues, the list of differences and incompatibilities would be 
enlarged still further; and if we extended our enquiry to Japanese, say, or 
American Indian cultures, the differences would become greater still.’  
(MacIntyre, 2007, p.181) 
Traditions tend towards canonical lists, but at the same time no list is definitive in the 
sense that it closes the door and admits no further virtues to that tradition.  So, in the 
Aristotelian tradition, the virtues of courage, self-control, justice and practical wisdom 
are commonly accepted as the cardinal virtues (Foot, 2002).   However, in addition to 
those four which have become central to the tradition, Aristotle himself acknowledged a 
wide range of virtues (Aristotle, NE, II.7) and counselled against a false precision in 
articulating matters which are complex and variable (Aristotle, NE, I.3).  To the four 
Aristotelian cardinal virtues, Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q62, a.3) added the 
three theological virtues of faith, hope and charity to create a canonical set of seven 
(Geach, 1977).  Likewise in the Thomistic tradition, virtues such as patience and 
humility all have a place alongside those virtues which most centrally characterise the 
tradition (MacIntyre, 2007).  As MacIntyre argues in After Virtue, this leads to a 
proliferation of conflicting virtue lists even within relatively well defined traditions, before 
we start adding entirely different lists from Hume or from Franklin. 
There are two possible responses to this kind of proliferation of virtue sets.  One 
possible response is to collect, sift and amalgamate into some overall system all the 
significant sets which can be discovered.  This is the approach taken by positive 
psychology (Peterson and Seligman, 2005).  It is clearly a non-MacIntyrean approach 
because it seeks to transcend tradition, but it is also interestingly an approach which is 
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in a sense non-normative.  That such an approach might be non-normative may not at 
first be obvious, since what is being collected up, sifted and re-presented is a meta-set 
of normative values.  However, when all the collecting up has been done and a great 
range of virtues assembled, all that has been undertaken is a descriptive exercise: 
these are the virtues which were found in the survey.  In response to that description, it 
is then possible to ask the honest question:  ‘So of all these many virtues, which ought 
we to prioritise in our lives?’  A normative recommendation is still sought.  This is not to 
say that such descriptive compendia are not valuable, but they imply an approach 
which is incompatible with MacIntyre (Section 2.11). 
A second, MacIntyrean response is to decide to which tradition one belongs and to 
proceed from the basis of that tradition.  The present research is based in an 
Aristotelian and MacIntyrean tradition, but this does not mean that it is then closed to 
other voices.  Part of the challenge of the research is to understand and account both 
for virtues which have clear links to an Aristotelian and MacIntyrean tradition, such as 
truthfulness and constancy, and for other virtues or qualities whose links are less clear, 
such as industriousness or authenticity.  However, since a wide range of virtue and 
virtue-like language comes up in everyday speech no less with bankers than with any 
other group, we still need to set up some kind of standard or schema in order to avoid 
either on the one hand dogmatically excluding virtue-like language that does not fit an 
Aristotelian list, say, or on the other hand simply cataloguing their occurrence from 
some apparently neutral standpoint.  A three part mechanism is proposed for doing 
this, which comprises core set, extended set and alternative systems. 
First, a well described list of cardinal virtues is needed.  In the context of the current 
MacIntyrean enquiry, a suitable set has been provided by Geach (1977).  Geach’s 
handbook, derived from his Stanton Lectures delivered in 1973-4, is appropriate in 
several respects.  Geach’s view of the virtues is explicitly and self-consciously in the 
tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, his overall understanding of those traditions is 
endorsed as such by MacIntyre (2002), and Geach gives a clear exposition of the 
seven pre-eminent virtues in the Thomistic tradition, distinguishing between ‘theological 
virtues of faith, hope, and charity’ and the cardinal virtues of ‘prudence, temperance, 
justice, and courage’ (Geach, 1977, p.1), in respect of their function and their basis in 
rationality.  The core understanding set out by Geach will then need to be 
supplemented with the work of other Aristotelians such as Annas (2004), Foot (2002) 
and Crisp (2000) as well as MacIntyre.  The current thesis will be more concerned with 
the four Aristotelian cardinal virtues than with the theological virtues, but the clarity 
which Geach provides about both sets and the relationship between them is important 
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for a MacIntyrean line of enquiry.  These then provide us with a core set of virtues for 
reference, within which the four cardinal virtues will be most central. Foot is a helpful 
source in this respect as a secular Aristotelian who has been deeply influenced by 
Aquinas (Foot 2002), because her project is sympathetic to Geach’s and MacIntyre’s 
whilst still being distinct in its metaphysical assumptions.  This is in contrast to 
Nussbaum (1989), also a secular Aristotelian, but more hostile to any form of 
Thomism. 
Second, an expanded set of virtues which are consistent with that core set and 
particularly with the cardinal virtues needs to be admitted.  These include virtues which 
have been explored by MacIntyre himself and those following MacIntyre, and virtues 
which have been explored by other philosophers who are self consciously following an 
Aristotelian or Thomistic tradition.  These include virtues such as truthfulness (Geach, 
2002; MacIntyre, 1994; Williams, 2002), patience (MacIntyre, 2007), integrity and 
constancy (Beadle, 2013; MacIntyre, 1999b; Maletta, 2011).  This expanded set may 
include other virtues which appear in either Aristotle or Aquinas such as friendship or 
humility.  It is an important point of principle that this list should not be closed; the core 
set of virtues may always be extended through other virtues which depend on them.   
Third, the research needs to be sensitive to alternative systems which may be spoken 
of in virtue-like language, even if an Aristotelian tradition might not recognise them as 
virtues.  So for instance, one contemporary social theory, authentic leadership 
(Gardner, Cogliser, Davis and Dickens, 2011), champions the quality of authenticity 
and, as components of authenticity, qualities of self-awareness and transparency 
(Kernis and Goldman, 2006).  This thesis, following a MacIntyrean enquiry, does not 
need to acknowledge such qualities as virtues, but does need to be able to detect and 
articulate them where appropriate. 
2.8 Social structures and moral agency 
Although a great deal of attention amongst commentators on MacIntyre has been given 
to the notions of practice and tradition as core elements of his thinking, MacIntyre’s 
writing is equally concerned with social structure, and it is on the basic idea of moral 
enquiry as a socially embodied pursuit that his whole project is based: 
‘[It] is not just that different modes of practical reasoning are specific to 
certain types of social context.  It is also that in respect to each of these 
social contexts they fulfil two distinct, albeit closely related functions. 
Practical reasoning guides and directs action.  But to understand the 
structure of some particular mode of practical reasoning specific to some 
social order is not only to have learned some particular way of guiding and 
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directing action. It is also to have learned how actions are and are not to be 
interpreted by others inhabiting that same social order.  […]  Every mode of 
practical reasoning is also a mode of social interpretation.’  MacIntyre (1987 
p.120) 
MacIntyre has at times been regarded as a communitarian (Bauman, 1996; Cohen, 
2000), and has directly disavowed that description (MacIntyre,1991).  It is therefore 
important to try to understand what his view really is, a view which perhaps can be 
represented in two movements, a movement towards the dependence of moral agency 
on social structures and a counter movement towards the independence of moral 
agency from social structures. 
The extended quotation above contains the nub of the first movement, the assertion, 
based on the kind of historical narratives found in After Virtue and Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality?, that all modes of practical rationalities (and therefore all normative 
ethical theories) are formulated in the context of some particular social structure or 
other.  This anchoring of particular modes of practical rationality to particular social 
contexts contains within it three key thoughts.  First, any particular moral agent learns 
his or her own mode of practical reasoning within a particular social context, and there 
is nowhere to locate such learning outside of some particular context.  So there is a 
relationship of dependency through learning: insomuch as anyone learns to exercise 
moral agency, they learn from within some particular social context.  Second, the 
modes of practical reasoning learned in this way guide action; what appears to me to 
be good or right to do will be in the first instance dependent on the social context in 
which I have learned to reason.  Third, our own modes of practical reasoning are at the 
same time modes of interpretation of the reasoning of others, and this ability to 
interpret the actions and intentions of others is basic to our social lives, allowing us to 
interact with others and to some degree predict their actions. 
This movement towards the dependence of the agency on social structures is 
something which Bauman takes issue with; he complains that to a communitarian 
(notably MacIntyre in his view), ‘the good choice is the choice of what is already given - 
the discovery and giving a conscious expression to “historical identity” transmitted 
through birth’ (Bauman 1996), and Bauman takes this to be a modernist ideology.  In 
some sense, Bauman would be right on this last point if MacIntyre’s philosophy could 
in any way be aligned with one in favour of the modern nation state, though of course it 
cannot. However, the more interesting bone of contention here is not the types of 
social structure (modernist or otherwise) in question, but rather the pairing in MacIntyre 
of the underlying movement towards the dependence of moral agency on social 
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structure, which Bauman recognises and laments, and the corresponding counter 
movement towards independence which Bauman (1996) appears not to recognise. 
This counter movement is equally important for MacIntyre, because he acknowledges 
also the threats to moral agency which social structures can create.  This is expressed 
vividly in the article ‘Social structures and their threats to moral agency’ (MacIntyre, 
1999b) in which he compares the moral reasoning of a railway manager ‘J’ in Nazi 
Germany with the moral reasoning of utilities executives in contemporary America.  In 
this context he is particularly interested in the way that practical reasoning may be 
fenced off within a particular role in a given social structure; if a person reasons only 
qua manager or only qua bureaucrat without applying the broadest standards of 
rationality directed to one’s whole life, the result is compartmentalisation, a state in 
which wider moral standards may be suspended for the optimum execution of a 
particular role.   
In order to assert our autonomy as moral agents and independent practical reasoners, 
we are often obliged to resist the particular social structures in which we find ourselves 
(MacIntyre, 1999a).  Once this counter-movement is recognised (Keat, 2008a), it then 
becomes clear that in fact much of MacIntyre’s writing is taken up with the question of 
how practical rationality can exercise freedom from the constraints of particular social 
structures.  This involves the critique of social structures at the level of the local and 
specific, through to much broader critiques of social structures, including modern 
institutions and the modern nation state itself.  How such critique of particular social 
structures comes to be enabled by a practical rationality which itself is founded in 
particular social structures is exactly parallel to the way in which the critique of 
traditions is enabled.  That topic is covered more fully Chapter 3. 
The importance of the place of social structures in MacIntyrean enquiry can hardly be 
overstated.  ‘It is insufficiently often remarked that deliberation is by its very nature a 
social activity, that the central deliberative questions are not of the form “What should I 
do here and now?” and “How should I live?” but of the form “What should we do here 
and now?” and “How should we live?”’  (MacIntyre, 2009, p.15).  This move by 
MacIntyre exemplifies a basic current in his thought which is different from the 
assumptions of a great many other moral philosophers, even those who are also virtue 
ethicists in an Aristotelian mode.  Crisp (1996, p.1) gives his version of these 
paradigmatic questions as: ‘“How should I live?”’ or ‘“How should I act?”’. Hursthouse 
(1996, p.19) in the same volume gives similarly ‘“How sort of person should I be?”’ and 
‘“What should I do?”’ 
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It is puzzling that this very basic difference in the starting point for moral enquiry is not 
highlighted more often.  MacIntyre complains that Aristotle does not explain himself 
further when he asserts that ‘“In important matters we deliberate with others […] not 
relying on ourselves for certitude”’ (Aristotle, NE, III.3, quoted in MacIntyre, 2009, p.15; 
the translation is MacIntyre’s).  Presumably Aristotle does not explain because he feels 
no need to: he is appealing to common sense.  However, the distinction is 
fundamental.  The starting point ‘How should I live?’ naturally has different outcomes 
compared to the starting point ‘How should we live?’  Not least, debates concerning the 
benefit to the individual of certain virtues or principles such as courage or truth telling 
have a quite different status depending on which starting point is chosen. 
 2.9 MacIntyre’s critics 
MacIntyre has many critics, from the point of view both of his history and his philosophy 
(D’Andrea, 2006).  This review does not attempt to cover the former and covers the 
latter only in respect of those criticisms which seem particularly relevant.  Many 
questions have been answered by MacIntyre’s supporters and here they are grouped 
into two broad categories, those related to the application of MacIntyre’s work to 
empirical social science, and those concerning questions of relativism and faith.  These 
two broad topics are dealt with first.  A further two critics, Irwin and Annas, are then 
given particular attention because their criticisms are especially relevant to MacIntyre 
as an Aristotelian. 
Empirical work in organisation studies 
One type of misunderstanding mainly arises in the pursuit of empirical work in 
organisation studies.  Beadle (2002) has particularly addressed the question of 
misrepresenting MacIntyre in this regard, and his article raises two important 
questions.  The first is the idea of management as a practice.  He takes issue with 
Brewer’s (1997) idea that management can be regarded as a practice with its own 
internal goods, because Brewer has ignored some key aspects of MacIntyre’s thought, 
most conspicuously the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative 
relationships and the distinction between the cooperative activity of practices and the 
competitive activity of the institution.  Having said this, Beadle and Moore then go on in 
a later article to describe the ‘practice of making and sustaining the institution’ (Beadle 
and Moore, 2011, p.97), a practice which admits of its own internal goods.  This must 
strike Brewer as sounding a lot like the practice of management, but there is an 
important difference of approach.  For Beadle and Moore, the practice of making and 
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sustaining the institution can only maintain its status as a practice insomuch as it 
maintains a clear connection to the core practice or practices which the institution 
exists to support.  This leads to Beabout’s (2012) idea of management as a domain-
relative practice.  The second issue raised by Beadle (2002) is rather broader in scope, 
and is a response to those such as Warren (1996) who try to use elements of 
MacIntyre’s thinking (for instance on internal goods) in a conventional process of 
applied business ethics.  Beadle emphasises that MacIntyre’s approach to 
management as such is inevitably critical and involves a disavowal of standard notions 
of applied business ethics.  The activity and justification of management ‘concentrate 
on the pursuit of goods external to practices and consequently it excludes the 
possibility of management qua management involving the pursuit of internal goods and 
the virtues required to achieve them’ (Beadle, 2002, p.53). 
Relativism and faith 
The second type of misunderstanding or objection (in some cases these are genuine 
differences of position) concerns questions of relativism and faith.  These are complex, 
and there is no intention in the current review to address these issues in any 
substantive way, only to note the discussions and the responses articulated by Lutz 
(2004), or to direct the reader where appropriate to later sections of the thesis which 
explore some issues in more detail. 
First, there are those such as Feldman (1986) and Wachbroit (1983) who think that 
MacIntyre cannot avoid a slide into relativism.  These and similar criticisms are dealt 
with by Lutz (2004) who articulates the distinction between relativism and what Lutz 
calls ‘relativity’ following Krausz (1984).  This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, 
and the principle of this distinction is used in the argument against Irwin in the section 
which follows below.  Second, there are those Thomists who object to MacIntyre’s 
version of Thomism; these are not dealt with here, since the current research is 
focused on MacIntyre as an Aristotelian rather than as a Thomist. 
Third are those who object to MacIntyre’s turn towards Thomism as a turning away 
from rational philosophy.  These also are dealt with by Lutz (2004), particularly the 
objections of Nagel (1997) and Nussbaum (1989).  Lutz pares away some of the 
misunderstandings that appear in both authors concerning MacIntyre’s project to leave 
core substantive questions concerning the role of faith in supporting the argument for 
Thomism, and the legitimacy of combining theology with philosophy.  The answer to 
the latter issue is to reverse the question.  If the question raised by Nussbaum (1989) 
regarding theology may be formulated as, ‘How can MacIntyre justify bringing 
principles of theology into moral philosophy?’, then the question can be reversed as, 
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‘How can Nussbaum justify excluding principles of theology from moral philosophy?’  It 
then becomes clear that the exclusion of theological questions from moral philosophy 
is an ideological tenet of just the kind which Nussbaum objects to.  The question which 
is raised by Nagel is perhaps harder to answer.  Lutz formulates it as: ‘How can we be 
certain of Augustinian Christian moral enquiry without religious faith?’ (Lutz, 2004, 
p.173).  He thinks that there is a partial answer in the idea that ‘we can have some 
confidence in certain features of Thomistic or Augustinian Christian moral enquiry 
without religious faith insofar as those features are entirely available to human reason 
without any dependence on what Christians take to be revealed truth’ (Lutz, 2004, 
p.178), but he also admits that some sort of faith is required to pursue such a moral 
enquiry in practice in any thoroughgoing sense as a means of the ordering of a whole 
life. 
A fourth group are those Aristotelian philosophers, who, like Nussbaum, find 
MacIntyre’s work to be eccentric in its Aristotelianism.  Since the current research 
project is directly concerned with MacIntyre as an Aristotelian, any significant gaps 
between MacIntyre and mainstream Aristotelian scholarship need to be understood.  
The following paragraphs consider MacIntyre as an Aristotelian moral philosopher and 
take two papers by Irwin and Annas for detailed consideration. 
Irwin on historicism and absolutism 
Irwin (1989) takes issue with several aspects of MacIntyre’s thought as he finds it to be 
expressed in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?.  As a whole, he takes issue with the 
kind of ‘historicist’ project in which MacIntyre is engaged, and deals first with broad 
problems of principle, ‘a priori’ issues as he terms them, before going on to deal with 
specifics in MacIntyre’s account of Aristotle and the history of the development of 
philosophy at the time in Athens.  Broad criticisms which Irwin raises include the 
following:  that MacIntyre rejects ‘absolutism’; that his idea of socially embodied 
rationality undermines the possibility of fundamental critique; and that Aristotle and 
Aquinas hold to the kind of absolutism which MacIntyre wishes to reject.  These are at 
least three distinct objections in principle to the arguments of Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality?; there are several others, but these seem the most serious. 
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a. MacIntyre rejects the ‘absolutist’ claim that ‘there are good arguments, and their 
goodness consists not in their counting as good within a tradition, but in their adequacy 
to their subject matter’ (Irwin, 1989, p.52). 8 
Irwin may have misunderstood what MacIntyre is trying to reject, and a response can 
be formulated from MacIntyre’s (1998b) article ‘Moral Relativism, Truth and 
Justification’.  MacIntyre is not denying that there is some external reality to which 
arguments might be more or less adequate.  Irwin has used language which is not an 
exact fit with MacIntyre.  It would be better to say with MacIntyre that one theory is 
better than another just if it more closely approaches the truth, where truth is 
understood as the adequacy of mind to its object (MacIntyre 1998b).  MacIntyre is not 
denying an external reality in relation to which one argument may be better than 
another, only doubting our claims to have direct knowledge of the universal, the 
absolute or the essence of things9.  That Irwin’s argument misses MacIntyre’s point is 
not just a question of language, as Irwin’s development of the theme makes clear:  ‘In 
trying to understand MacIntyre’s claim, I have introduced a distinction between what is 
subjectively rational for a particular person and what is in fact rational (or let us say 
“objectively rational”)’ (Irwin, 1989, p.53).  Herein lies the problem.  MacIntyre is 
interested neither in the idea of ‘objective rationality’, which he denies is possible if that 
means a form of rationality independent of some tradition or other, nor in the idea of 
‘subjective rationality’, if that means anything similar to an emotivist or perspectivist 
view of moral utterance.  A claim to subjective rationality is not a claim to a tradition-
constituted one, and the judgement by person A that person B’s reasoning is bizarre or 
outlandish is precisely a judgement by A that B’s arguments fall outside of the scope of 
the most basic assumptions of rationality of that tradition to which A belongs.  
Tradition-constituted rationality is in this sense distinct from either ‘objective’ or 
‘subjective’ reasoning.  
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 Irwin does not appear to mean ‘absolutism’ in the sense of a belief that there are specific 
‘moral rules or prohibitions that stand whatever the context’ (Coady 2011), but rather the 
broader thesis that can be defined as a strict alternative to relativism.  If a relativist account of 
moral statements is one which explains such statements by reference to the speaker or the 
speaker’s situation, then an absolutist account is one which does not.  Firth (1952) has a clear 
explanation of ‘absolutism’ in this sense.  The difference between the two is that the second 
broader sense of absolutism allows for the idea that specific moral rules X and Y may conflict, 
and that may affect one’s judgement about whether X is wrong or right in some given context.  
So Rawls’ theory of justice would be absolutist in this second broader sense, but not in the first 
and narrower one. 
9
 ‘The perfecting of the mind’s understanding is a movement towards a comprehension of the 
genuinely universal, but it does not of itself yield a knowledge of true essences’ (MacIntyre, 
1990, p. 90) 
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b. MacIntyre’s claim that rationalities are socially embodied implies a ‘significant 
restriction on the rational justifiability of fundamental philosophical criticism’ (Irwin, 
1989, p.51).  
 This is a somewhat similar objection to that raised by Habermas against Gadamer 
(Mendelson, 1979).  If the limits of our reasoning are described by the prejudices of the 
tradition in which we find ourselves, then how can we adequately critique the tradition?  
However, MacIntyre is much better placed to answer that question, because his 
narrative philosophy is dedicated to showing how conflicts within and between 
traditions do generate critique.  MacIntyre (1988) does not deny that traditions may in 
fact go along for generations with many aspects of their most fundamental 
assumptions unchallenged.  This is not an argument for the status quo, only an 
acknowledgement that rational argument always proceeds by some set of explicit or 
implicit assumptions and rules of engagement and that such sets of assumptions and 
rules of engagement are socially embodied.  The interest here for the current research 
project is what is meant by social embodiment; the answer seems to be not just a 
sense of being vaguely situated in a social milieu, but rather being more concretely 
embodied in quite definite social structures, structures for instance, like universities and 
business corporations.  This is one of the reasons that MacIntyre thinks that the 
institutions of advanced capitalism are capable of such corrosive power.  They embody 
forms of rationality which disable their members from approaching the truth. 
c. Aristotle and Aquinas hold to the kind of absolutism which MacIntyre wishes to 
reject, since they believe firmly in justice-as-such and rationality-as such; indeed that is 
just the sort of thing that they hope to give an account of in a successful philosophical 
inquiry’ (Irwin, 1989, p.57). 
Once we have understood that MacIntyre is not trying to reject an external reality to 
which one’s thought might be more or less adequate, then this objection by Irwin 
seems to come back to the question of historicism:  the procedures of argument used 
by Aristotle and Aquinas were not historicist, so MacIntyre, in following a historicist 
procedure himself, is at odds with those whose thought he wishes to champion.  A 
number of answers to this complaint have already been provided by different 
commentators in different ways, often concerning MacIntyre’s position as a Thomist 
(Lutz, 2004; D’Andrea, 2006), and particularly a break with naturalism in After Virtue.  
Aristotle and Aquinas both founded their ideas of ethics on their ideas of the nature of 
human beings, which implied in each case a (different) metaphysical biology.  After 
Virtue in rejecting any appeal to metaphysical biology breaks significantly with the 
Thomistic Aristotelian tradition.  In his later writing, MacIntyre then does adopt a 
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naturalism of his own, explicitly so in Dependent Rational Animals.  Since the current 
thesis is primarily concerned with MacIntyre’s position as an Aristotelian, rather than as 
a Thomist, I have followed Knight (2008a) who sees MacIntyre’s later position as 
significantly different in respect of naturalism, rather than Lutz (2004) who argues for 
MacIntyre’s consistent approach to the natural law.  The specific point about the 
rejection of metaphysical biology in After Virtue has been discussed above in Section 
2.4 and is taken up again later at 7.3. 
Irwin goes on to take issue with a number of different points in MacIntyre’s 
understanding of Aristotle.  Irwin is here on surer ground, and even if sometimes he 
might still misunderstand MacIntyre, his understanding of Aristotle is secure.  Irwin 
agrees with MacIntyre’s basic thesis that tensions between the goods of excellence 
and the goods of effectiveness are largely concealed in Homer’s narratives, ‘and that 
the possibility of conflict comes out clearly in post-Homeric society’ (Irwin, 1989, p.59).  
But he finds that MacIntyre has distorted some aspects of the way that 5th century 
Athenian democrats thought of justice, and in particular that he over-emphasises the 
importance of desert or merit in Aristotle’s notion of justice10.  Irwin agrees with 
MacIntyre’s basic point that Aristotle supports the idea that practical rationality can only 
be developed within particular kinds of social structure.   However, he points out that 
Aristotle does not deny rationality to people who are akratic (incontinent, weak-willed), 
or vicious; they still have reasons for acting, but the more virtuous agent is the more 
rational. 
Irwin also makes a point about MacIntyre’s understanding of practical syllogisms, partly 
on the basis of Charles’ (1984) discussion of the practical syllogism in Aristotle.  The 
point in dispute is whether for Aristotle the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a 
proposition or an action.  However, Charles’ discussion seems rather to reinforce 
MacIntyre’s point that ‘in the conclusion of a practical syllogism the agent in acting 
confirms that this action qua such and such is to be done’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p.139).  All 
of the examples which Charles (1984) quotes in his exegesis conform to the idea that 
the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action unless some external force prevents 
the agent from it.  This is an important issue for the current research project, because it 
directs the enquiry to narratives of action.  The questions that arise for the narratives of 
action here are first and foremost: What did the agent do, and why did he or she do 
that?  An account which proceeds along the lines, ‘I didn’t agree with what the bank 
                                               
10
 Annas (1989) has a similar complaint. 
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was doing at that time, because…’ will be of less interest than an account which 
proceeds, ‘I left the bank at that time because…’. 
Irwin makes other detailed criticisms of MacIntyre’s Aristotelian scholarship, and the 
degree of unanimity between Aristotelians such as Annas, Irwin and Nussbaum that 
MacIntyre is sometimes selective in his use of Aristotle in order to emphasise aspects 
of his overall narrative should be taken as a fair warning that MacIntyre’s 
representation of Aristotle can on occasion be eccentric.  Irwin’s broader criticism of 
MacIntyre’s key themes is less convincing, but still valuable in helping to clarify exactly 
what MacIntyre is or is not saying.  Of the three broad issues highlighted above, the 
notion of social embodiment is the most contentious, and Annas has given a rather 
more constructive and telling critique of that theme.   
Annas on social embodiment 
Annas (1989) is interested in MacIntyre’s development of the idea of a tradition, and 
particularly in what it means for a tradition to be socially embodied.  She argues that 
when MacIntyre says ‘Aristotle’s conception of justice and practical rationality 
articulated the claims of one particular type of practice-based community, partially 
exemplified in the polis’, (MacIntyre, 1988, p.389), he cannot mean ‘that Aristotle’s 
ideas are an elaborate expression of what most ancient citizens thought about justice’ 
(Annas, 1989, p.390), and she goes on to specify a number of ways that Aristotle’s 
ideas were in conflict with many ordinary views on justice in 4th century Greece, and in 
conflict in particular with the assumptions of the polis.  It ‘would be a mistake to take 
Aristotle as typical of ancient theories of justice’ (Annas, 1989, p.390). 
Annas offers an extended critique of MacIntyre’s account of Hume in Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality?, and in doing so she formulates two possible versions of the idea of 
social embodiment of a tradition which she sees as to some degree in tension in the 
book.  One version, the weaker of the two, she terms ‘the thesis of historical 
understanding’ (Annas,1989, p.394).  This is the idea that we cannot understand what 
count as good reasons to Aristotle as compared to what count as good reasons to 
Hume, unless we understand the overall structure of their respective ways of reasoning 
and understand also the way in which their most basic assumptions are grounded in 
their historical social contexts.  The other version, the stronger of the two, she terms 
‘the thesis of essential location.   On this view a tradition of reasoning is essentially 
located in a particular historical setting, and depends on that setting for its defining 
features. […]  The coherence of the intellectual tradition’s social embodiment stands or 
falls with the coherence of the reasoning the tradition produces’ (Annas, 1989, p.394).  
Annas goes on to argue that MacIntyre’s portrayal of Hume’s subversion of the 
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Scottish Enlightenment is flawed, and that he has not put a good case for this latter, 
stronger claim.11 
What is of particular interest for the current research project is the way that Annas has 
clarified these two possible forms of the idea of social embodiment.  Without by any 
means claiming that these two theses of ‘historical understanding’ and ‘essential 
location’ adequately describe MacIntyre’s wider argument, they nevertheless seem 
helpful.  In particular, the latter stronger claim brings out an important connection 
between social institutions and traditions.  It is not just that traditions depend on social 
structures for their coherence, but also that social structures depend on traditions for 
theirs.  This stronger thesis has obvious appeal in the context of empirical research in 
banking.  If we can describe the tradition of Scottish banking in terms which bear some 
resemblance to MacIntyre’s idea of a tradition, then questions can be formulated as to 
the causal mechanisms which operate not only within practice-institution combinations 
but also within those more wide reaching causal orders which are comprised of 
traditions and social structures.  We can, for instance, ask the question, ‘How did the 
national restructuring of banks in the 1980s and 1990s affect the tradition of banking in 
Scotland?’  But we can also ask, ‘How did the subversion and diminution of the 
tradition of banking in Scotland affect the institutions of banking in Scotland?’  In 
Annas’ phraseology this latter question could be re-expressed in this form:  ‘To what 
extent did the institutions of banking in Scotland stand or fall with the coherence of the 
reasoning that the tradition of banking produced?’  This question is revisited at Section 
6.10. 
2.10 Some further principles of Aristotelian ethics 
The foregoing sections have given an outline of some key principles in MacIntyre’s 
thought.  Necessarily that survey is selective and limited.  It does not cover a number 
of principles which are important for Aristotelian virtue ethics and which feature in 
different ways in MacIntyre’s writing, but which are not particularly in the foreground of 
his work.  This section aims to fill in some of those gaps.  Again it must do so 
selectively and briefly, and an attempt has been made to select those principles which 
are most immediately relevant to this empirical enquiry. 
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 She does make a very convincing case.  A less expert reader might have a sense of unease 
at the way MacIntyre deploys questions of national identity in order to undermine Hume’s 
arguments; Annas shows in more detail how such questions might be misleading. 
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It is acknowledged by many virtue ethicists that Aristotelian virtue ethics are 
‘eudaimonistic’ and that this is can be an alien way of thinking about morality for many 
modern readers (Annas, 1993), especially those accustomed to Kantian notions of 
morality.  To call Aristotle’s ethics ‘eudaimonistic’ is to say that his enquiry is an 
exploration of the pursuit of the good for human beings, and that eudaimonia, which is 
generally translated as either ‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’, names the good for human 
beings.  Aristotle (NE, I.4), however, acknowledges that there are disagreements 
‘about substantive conceptions of happiness, the masses giving an account which 
differs from that of philosophers’.  The bulk of the Nicomachean Ethics is then given 
over to an exploration of what human flourishing consists of.  This assumption, that, 
although we might disagree over content, we do not disagree over the basic idea that 
happiness or flourishing is what we aim for in a life well lived, is partner to a second 
basic idea of ancient virtue ethics, that morality is teleological: it is concerned with 
rational choice aiming at some good purpose or end (telos) for human life.  Aristotle 
himself (NE, I.10) is careful to stress that this should be thought of as life lived as a 
whole, not some notional end point or destination. 
The difference between the view of the philosophers and the view of the masses is one 
that Irwin (1996) uses to highlight one particularly controversial tenet of Aristotelian 
ethics, the unity of the virtues.  The idea that one cannot truly be courageous without 
also being temperate, or that one cannot be wise without also being courageous, 
strikes many, both ancient and modern, as odd because we are accustomed to 
‘recognising many virtues, corresponding to different social roles and different aspects 
of life’ (Irwin, 1996, p.52, following Plato’s Meno).  This is a common sense view with 
which modern psychology is in broad agreement (Wolf, 2007).   
The doctrine of the unity of the virtues is expressed clearly in Aquinas (Summa 
Theologiae, I-II, Q.65, A.1, co.)12, though in the main he does not refer to ‘unity’ but 
rather ‘connection’ (connexio).  According to Aquinas, the cardinal virtues are 
connected, particularly in respect of the link between virtue of intellect and character.  
Practical wisdom cannot be acquired without virtues of character also being in place, 
and virtues of character are not able to aim at the good without practical wisdom 
(Porter 1993).  This is consistent with Aristotle (NE, VI.13), who states that full moral 
                                               
12
 References to Aquinas are given in the conventional form, ‘Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q.65, 
A.1, co.’.  The translation used in this thesis is by A. Freddoso, published on line by the 
University of Notre Dame (Aquinas, 2013) 
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virtue is not possible without practical wisdom to direct action and in this way 
differentiates full virtue from natural virtue. 
In After Virtue, MacIntyre follows Geach (1977) in disagreeing with both Aristotle and 
Aquinas in respect of the unity of the virtues, preferring rather to emphasise the idea of 
the unity of a life.  He subsequently reverses this view (Lutz, 2004; MacIntyre, 1988).  
The current thesis (Section 6.8) follows Lutz (2004) and retains, contra MacIntyre 
(1981) and Geach, a broad idea of the unity of the virtues, but without trying to specify 
at this point exactly what this means since that is an area of some contention (Penner, 
1973;Wolf, 2007). 
It will be argued later in this thesis (Section 6.9) that this requirement for reciprocity 
between practical wisdom and virtues of character is also something which helps to 
differentiate virtues from skills.  A skill can be used well or badly, but virtues are 
established character traits which always work to the good because governed by 
practical wisdom.  If we attempt to split off individual virtues, then ‘we tend to degrade 
each virtue to an asset which can be used well or badly […]: and the more we treat the 
virtues as mere assets, the less they seem to qualify as virtues’ (Irwin, 1996, p.53). 
The relationship between skills and virtues also causes difficulties for modern readers, 
partly because of difficulties in translation. In Aristotle’s usage the words arete 
(excellence, virtue) and techne (skill, craft, technical expertise) are each wider in 
meaning than their common English translations, and both closer together in meaning 
than the words virtue and skill are in English.  In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
uses the word techne in a number of different ways in relation to arete.  Virtues are like 
skills (Aristotle, NE, II.1), but distinct in several respects: 
 Skill or craft is concerned with the production of something which counts as 
skilled in respect of the quality of that product, but the quality of the product is 
not a matter of certain psychological states of the producer.  Virtue results in 
action which can only be counted virtuous ‘if the agent acts in a certain state’ 
which includes ‘rational choice’. (Aristotle, NE, II.4)  Rational choice in turn implies two further conditions for the virtues as opposed 
to skills: that the actions are chosen ‘for their own sake’, and that they are 
chosen from a ‘firm and unshakable character’; these two conditions are ‘all-
important’ (Aristotle, NE, II.4).  Commensurate with the condition of rational choice is the link to the will.  As 
Foot (2002) points out, Aquinas (I.II, Q57, a.4) follows Aristotle (VI.5) in drawing 
the distinction that for someone to make an intentional mistake in exercising a 
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skill is not in itself a sign of deficiency in the skill, whereas the opposite is true 
for a virtue.  As Foot (2002, p.9) puts it:  ‘If a man acts unjustly or uncharitably, 
or in a cowardly or intemperate manner, ‘I did it deliberately’ cannot on any 
interpretation lead to exculpation.  So we may say, a virtue is not, like a skill, a 
mere capacity: it must actually engage the will.’  
Beadle (2011) summarises the distinction between virtues and skills as being 
concerned with motive and disposition.  ‘It is to move from the ‘knowing that’ and 
‘knowing how’ of skill to the ‘knowing why’ of virtue’ (Beadle, 2011, p.11). 
These and other features of the structure of Aristotelian ethics can present difficulties 
of translation for modern readers.  They have been covered briefly here because 
without such structures, empirical enquiries into virtue ethics can too easily descend 
into analyses of lists of virtues as character strengths in the style of positive 
organisational scholarship (POS).   
The following section gives a summary of the current state of empirical enquiry 
following MacIntyre’s philosophy, and highlights some key differences from alternative 
programmes such as POS. 
2.11 MacIntyrean enquiry in organisation studies and in banking 
The application of MacIntyre’s philosophy to empirical organisation studies is a young 
field of enquiry.  It has been pioneered by Geoff Moore and Ron Beadle in particular, 
who have produced a number of studies of organisations or occupations.  Beadle has 
tended to focus on circuses as a practice-led, economically marginal way of life 
(Beadle and Konyot, 2006; Beadle, 2013), while Moore has researched churches as 
practice-led organisations and mainstream retail pharmacies (Moore, 2011; Moore, 
2012a).  They have collaborated with each other and with other authors to provide a 
well-defined conception of how a MacIntyrean perspective can be brought to empirical 
work in organisation studies (Beadle and Moore, 2006; Moore and Beadle, 2006; Coe 
and Beadle, 2008; Beadle and Moore, 2011; Beadle and Knight, 2012).  Their most 
cited paper (Web of Science at 29 April 2014), Moore and Beadle (2006), sets out their 
understanding of the practice-institution framework and how it can be applied in the 
context of business organisations.  These commentaries on the nature of MacIntyrean 
empirical enquiry have formed the starting point for design of the research method of 
the current thesis. 
The consistent approach of Beadle and Moore has been to interview people in 
organisations directly to gather sufficiently rich qualitative data for interpretive and 
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narrative enquiry.  Few other researchers have followed this direct pursuit of 
MacIntyre’s philosophy into the everyday lives of workers, managers and their 
organisations.  Conroy (2009) investigates leadership ethics in health services using 
interviews and narrative, but without the same conceptual clarity as Moore and Beadle 
show in their work and his study is admittedly a pilot.  This is despite growing interest in 
virtue ethics and particularly Aristotelian ethics in organisation studies (Solomon, 2004; 
Crockett, 2005; Whetstone, 2005; Grint, 2007; Hartman, 2011;McPherson, 2013). 
Although there have been several discussions of how MacIntyrean ethics can be 
applied to business or to the market economy more widely (Horvath, 1995; Keat, 
2008b; Dobson, 2009;Breen, 2012; Beabout, 2012), there have been relatively few 
empirical studies either in MacIntyrean enquiry specifically or Aristotelian ethics more 
widely.  One reason for this might be general scepticism about how applicable either 
MacIntyre or Aristotle are to business ethics (Morrell, 2012), something which is best 
answered by actually conducting the research.  Another reason might be the rise of 
positive organisational scholarship (POS) (Cameron, 2011; Rego, Kuna and Clegg, 
2012) as a way of measuring virtue-like behaviours without committing to any particular 
virtue ethics.  Since the current thesis is explicitly an Aristotelian study, POS falls 
outside of its remit, but it is nevertheless important to understand why it does so. 
POS is an approach to the study of virtues from a social science perspective, 
amenable to quantification (Chun, 2005; Thun and Kelloway, 2011) and focused on the 
observation of positive behavioural patterns (Bright, Winn and Kanov, 2014).  The POS 
movement arose in response to work in positive psychology particularly by Martin 
Seligman, which culminated in the publication of Character strengths and virtues: a 
handbook and classification (Peterson and Seligman, 2004).  This compendium of 
strengths and traits from a wide range of different ethical and religious traditions is in 
some senses exactly the opposite of the work undertaken by MacIntyre.  Where 
MacIntyre has explored why the cultural context of any given moral philosophy is vital 
to an understanding of its content, positive psychology attempts to bypass any such 
consideration by simply compiling available lists of virtues and strengths to form a 
global set which is supposedly free of local assumptions.  By definition the POS 
approach is not Aristotelian, since Aristotelian virtues are only one contributor to a 
global list.  Equally importantly, this approach carries with it few of the deeper 
structures of the moral philosophy of Aristotle; there is, for instance, no underlying 
concept of the good which can explain what makes the virtues worth attaining or which 
can disentangle real virtues from counterfeit ones. 
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MacIntyrean enquiry is at this stage of its development less amenable to quantification 
than is POS and much more concerned with underlying structures and contexts.  There 
has, for instance, been considerable interest in whether management is a practice, and 
if so, of what sort (Moore, 2008; Beabout, 2012).  This concern with practices is a 
distinguishing feature of MacIntyre’s work and those who have followed him, and it has 
produced a remarkable result in the context of banking as a field of practical ethics. 
MacIntyrean enquiry has apparently produced the only academic study into 
professional ethics in banking.  If ‘banking professional ethics’ is searched for in Web 
of Science (29 April 2014) and medical ethics (related to blood banks, for instance) are 
excluded, only one research-based article is returned, a MacIntyrean study by 
Graafland and van de Ven (2011) entitled ‘The Credit Crisis and the Moral 
Responsibility of Professionals in Finance’.  The only other article is a transcript of a 
conference paper by Cowton (2002), which scopes out three aspects of banking ethics, 
of which one, integrity, is to a degree related to professional ethics.  This apparent lack 
of interest amongst most academics is in marked contrast to the levels of interest in 
professional conduct and standards in banking in public media, in the profession itself 
(Chartered Banker Institute, 2011b) and among politicians (Parliamentary Commission 
on Banking Standards, 2013).  In fact, there seems little appetite in academia for the 
subject of ethics in banking at all.  In the period since the financial crisis (publication 
dates 2009-2014), a search more generally on Web of Science (29 April 2014) for the 
topic ‘Banking’ and ‘Ethics’ returned just 70 articles, compared to 3,595 articles on the 
topic ‘Banking’ and ‘Marketing’.   
Graafland and van de Ven (2011) are concerned with themes of professional conduct, 
and the gaps between codes of conduct and actual behaviour in banking.  They focus 
particularly on virtues such as honesty, due care and accuracy.  The principal limitation 
on their study as an empirical investigation is that they use only the evidence base of 
published mission statements of banks for their empirical work.  A parallel article by 
Van de Ven (2011) considers the question of understanding banking as a practice in 
MacIntyre’s sense of that word.  The discussion is in some ways provisional, and 
weight is given to the idea of a profession (Kasher, 2005) as a similar concept.  The 
idea of professional virtues is explored, but there is no concerted effort to argue, for 
instance, for the internal goods of the practice of banking.  Although they do not 
provide a model for empirical research in the same way as the articles by Beadle and 
Moore cited above, these two papers by Graafland and van de Ven do provide a point 
of departure for the topic of the current research.  In particular they open up 
consideration of banking as a practice. 
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2.12 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter has reviewed MacIntyrean enquiry and outlined the position of 
MacIntyre’s philosophy in relation to the Aristotelian tradition of ethics and as a guide to 
empirical research.  A justification has been offered for the choice of MacIntyre’s work 
as the theoretical base for the research. 
MacIntyre’s concept of practices has been summarised, together with the way that 
goods are understood within practices and the way that practices relate to institutions.  
The idea of traditions has been introduced and traditions of moral enquiry have been 
shown to give foundations for canonical virtue sets.  A discussion of MacIntyre’s critics, 
particularly from an Aristotelian perspective, has been used to help position his work in 
relation to the broader field of Aristotelian philosophy.  A brief description of some 
further relevant Aristotelian concepts has been given including the unity of the virtues 
and the distinction between virtues and skills. 
Finally a short review of progress in empirical research based on MacIntyre’s work has 
been given and this has been contrasted with positive organisational scholarship as a 
research discipline founded in social science. 
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Chapter 3: Research design: epistemology and 
method 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to theorise a synthesis of MacIntyre’s moral philosophy and 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics in order to gather and interpret empirical evidence in practical 
ethics.  It argues13 for a method of research which is consistent with MacIntyre’s ideas 
of tradition-constituted enquiry.  The argument is largely built on MacIntyre’s work, but 
the approach will still be critical, bringing in the work of other philosophers and 
sociologists as appropriate, and particularly the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
The chapter falls into two main sections.  The first concerns epistemology and is 
characterised as ‘six principles of enquiry’, and the second concerns the method 
pursued, based on those six principles.  The chapter is constructed this way because 
the research design follows MacIntyre’s criticism of social science methodology 
(discussed in Section 3.2), and avoids building a methodology based on one or another 
‘ism’ or standardised research procedure.  Rather, this research design is intended to 
identify key principles which arise directly from MacIntyre and Gadamer as leading 
philosophers of social science in an Aristotelian tradition, and to build a method which 
is derived quite directly from their work. 
The six principles identified under ‘epistemology’ are: 
1. Moral enquiry is constituted in relation to particular traditions (Section 3.3); 
2. Narrative is both a medium of discovery and a medium for reporting (Section 3.4); 
3. Plain persons are also moral philosophers (Section 3.5); 
4. Claims to truth are provisional (Section 3.6); 
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 With the exception of this footnote, this chapter is written in the third person voice.  Where I 
have referred to the role of the researcher in the third person, and a pronoun is necessary, a 
masculine form is used in order to avoid repeating such phrases as ‘him or herself’.  My 
intention in speaking of ‘the researcher’ in this voice is that it should at least apply directly to 
me, hence a masculine form is appropriate, but it is also intended to be generalisable.  So, for 
instance, phrases reading “the researcher needs to bear in mind …” should be understood as 
applying to me as the author and to any researcher engaged in a project of this kind, from an 
Aristotelian perspective.  By using the third person voice in this way I am claiming that the 
research methods and stances I am adopting follow from the philosophical and other sources 
which I discuss, and not simply from my own preferences.  On those occasions where a first 
person plural form appears in the chapter, as elsewhere it usually denotes author and reader, 
as in, “We can see from this that…” 
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5. All understanding is conditioned by culturally established prejudgements (Section 
3.7); 
6. Conversation is a paradigm for understanding (Section 3.8). 
Sections 3.9 to 3.11 develop the implications of these six principles in practice for the 
design and implementation of the research.  A method of collecting data through 
genuine conversations is described.  Methods of interpreting data and presenting 
findings are discussed which are both hermeneutic and narrative. 
3.2 MacIntyre and the suspicion of methodology 
In his article ‘Social Science Methodology as the Ideology of Bureaucratic Authority’ 
MacIntyre (1998a) (originally published 1979) not only gives forthright expression to his 
deep suspicion of the whole idea of methodology in social science, he also opens up a 
discussion about the role of tradition which is taken up in full in Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry.  It is therefore worth 
summarising here some of the key points from the earlier article before proceeding 
further, at least as far as it is directly relevant to research design.  Whilst MacIntyre is 
strongly critical of the pretensions of social science methodology, this does not prevent 
him engaging in discussions of epistemology which have direct relevance to empirical 
enquiry.  Generally, he avoids describing his own work as epistemology, preferring to 
speak of rationality, belief, truth or interpretation rather than knowledge, and this overall 
stance is in keeping with his insistence on the provisional nature of our claims in moral 
enquiry (MacIntyre, 2002b).  However, this does not mean that he is not actually ‘doing 
epistemology’ insomuch as that category is relevant to social science method, and this 
chapter is intended to set out a method of enquiry which is consistent with MacIntyre’s 
position. 
Reality in social and physical sciences 
MacIntyre draws a sharp distinction between the way that beliefs relate to realities in 
the physical sciences and the way that beliefs relate to reality in the social sciences. 
“Beliefs about the concepts of physical realities are always secondary to 
those realities; the physical world does not require us to have any particular 
beliefs about it or concepts of it, for it to exist.  But with social reality it is 
quite otherwise.  Social practices, institutions and organisations are partially 
constituted by the beliefs and concepts of those who participate in, have 
transactions with and attitudes towards them.” (MacIntyre, 1998a p.57) 
This argument can be extended in a number of directions.  For instance, it is implicit in 
it that the status of beliefs in these two spheres of social science and physical science 
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are different, and therefore that what we can say of knowledge, truth and all that goes 
with them under the broad head of epistemology may be different in the case of social 
science compared to physical science.  Also implicit is the idea that it still makes sense 
to speak of social reality (and MacIntyre uses the expression here in the singular).  
One could say, further, that insomuch as social practices are one element of that 
reality, it follows that moral principles, if based on social practice as they are in 
Aristotelian thought, are part of that social reality.  This still begs the question of how to 
deal with the difference between saying, “This is how people behave in this society”, 
and saying “This is how people ought to behave in this society”, but it at least indicates 
what sort of reality we might be talking about if we speak of realism in the context of 
ethics. 
MacIntyre draws attention to the ubiquity of conflict within social structures and 
considers this to be an essential feature of all social and particularly institutional life, 
such that social reality is characterised by being debatable.  Again, this is drawn in 
contrast to physical science.  Generalisations about human concepts such as 
marriage, tragedy or education are always inherently debatable in a way that 
generalisations about lugworms or amino acids are not.  Social science research 
therefore needs to be able deal with such uncertainty and such conflict.  “What 
objectivity requires in the study of such subject matters is an awareness of the 
contestable and argumentative character of what is going on.” (MacIntyre, 1998a, p.58)   
Pseudo-science 
MacIntyre’s (1998a) complaint, that social science is engaged in pseudo-science, was 
particularly directed at a methodology which at the time of writing (1979) was narrowly 
quantitative;  the curriculum as he experienced it involved methodology as a required 
element of social science research and at the heart of that methodology was statistical 
method.  In MacIntyre’s view, this notion of methodology had replaced in the curriculum 
precisely those disciplines of philosophy and history which might have enabled 
students to understand the role of conflicts - and traditions - in the social phenomena 
they were studying.  The point being made is not that quantitative research is not 
valuable, but only that it should be held in the right relationship to other modes of 
enquiry and that excessive claims should not be made for it. 
Nevertheless, the whole notion of methodology remains suspect from a MacIntyrean 
perspective.  This thesis therefore avoids the term methodology from this point forward.  
Instead, the topics addressed are primarily epistemology and method, and method is 
as far as possible directly related to larger philosophical concerns as the argument 
proceeds.  What would otherwise be entitled a chapter on methodology is here entitled 
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‘Research Design’, not simply out of deference to MacIntyre, but partly in recognition 
that a reliance on textbook methodologies can still be used to displace a proper 
openness to the inherent contestability of the subject matter of this research, and partly 
in the hope of following MacIntyre’s thought directly through from his discussions of the 
structure of our moral beliefs to the development of a research method that is in 
keeping with those discussions. 
There is a tendency in some books of advice concerning research method (for 
instance, Johnson and Duberley, 2000, pp.2-3) to speak of a person’s or a group’s 
epistemological stance as if it were one thing, rather than allowing that within the 
overall epistemological view of a person or group, there might be a range of theories of 
knowledge, understanding  or truth operating in practice, with regard to physics, 
aesthetics, humanities, ethics, religion and so on.  This is a potential source of 
confusion, because what we mean by truth, knowledge or understanding and the 
standards which we apply to those concepts may be different in these different 
spheres; it is possible, for instance, for a person to hold a coherent overall 
epistemology in practice which could be described as positivistic with regard to 
knowledge about the physical world and relativistic with regard to moral reasoning. 
Avoiding ‘–isms’ 
Such a way of speaking, as if a person’s epistemological stance is inevitably held in 
one style or another is bound up with another assumption about doctoral research, that 
the doctoral student in social science should choose an epistemological stance from an 
available menu (Cresswell, 2012), or in other cases simply conform to the prevailing 
epistemological stance of the discipline which they are joining.  This can lead to some 
odd ideas.  For instance, Trafford and Lesham advise: 
“if your doctorate is located in the science-related disciplines...your 
research design will take a deductive approach towards enquiry and 
epistemological issues.  In the social sciences, you are faced with a choice 
of paradigms - the testing of theory through deductive approaches, the 
development of theory through inductive approaches or a combination of 
deductive and inductive approaches.”  (Trafford and Lesham,2008, p.97) 
Together with the implication that social science is not a science-related discipline, a 
more surprising implication is that science-related disciplines do not need inductive 
approaches because they do not develop theory. 
In order to avoid the pitfalls of reliance on the kind of methodological conventions 
which MacIntyre criticises, this chapter is focused on MacIntyre’s and Gadamer’s 
seminal works.  There are some respects, for instance, in which MacIntyre’s thinking 
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could be construed as social constructionist insomuch as he sees moral codes as 
developed within traditions and social practices, but the term ‘social constructionist’ is 
so wide (Burr, 2007) as to be perhaps more misleading than helpful, especially when 
MacIntyre himself has already taken the trouble to articulate his own position in some 
detail.  Similarly, MacIntyre has been described by some as a critical realist 
(Achtemeier, 1994), but MacIntyre does not choose to describe himself in those terms, 
and again, a discussion of critical realism will not necessarily help in developing a 
research method in tune with his thinking.  
3.3 MacIntyre on tradition-constituted enquiry (principle 1) 
Any research project which claims to be ‘MacIntyrean’ must at least conform to 
MacIntyre’s most central ideas on rationality and moral enquiry.  A good starting point 
for this is to understand MacIntyre’s idea of tradition-constituted enquiry, and to 
understand this, as MacIntyre does, in contrast to other rival modes of enquiry.  In 
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, MacIntyre (1990) seeks to delineate his own 
position relative to what he sees as two other radically opposed methods of moral 
enquiry, which he terms encyclopaedia and genealogy, both of which he argues are 
inadequate in certain respects.  He characterises the two contrasting positions of the 
encyclopaedist and the genealogist by investigating particular exemplars, these being 
on the one side primarily the editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, particularly the 
Ninth Edition and the academic mainstream which they represented, and on the other 
side primarily Nietzsche and Foucault. 
‘The encyclopaedist’s conception is of a single framework within which 
knowledge is discriminated from mere belief, progress towards knowledge 
is mapped, and truth is understood as the relationship of our knowledge to 
the world, through the application of those methods whose rules are the 
rules of rationality as such.  Nietzsche, as a genealogist, takes there to be a 
multiplicity of perspectives within each of which truth-from-a-point-of-view 
may be asserted, but no truth-as-such, an empty notion, about the world, 
an equally empty notion.  There are no rules of rationality to be appealed 
to, there are rather strategies of insight and strategies of subversion.’ 
(MacIntyre, 1990, p.42.) 
MacIntyre regards the two sides as irreconcilable with each other, each locked into 
their own ways of thinking and speaking. The encyclopaedist emphasises a unity of 
truth and reason where the genealogist emphasises plural views and truths which are 
always relative to one view or another; the encyclopaedist stresses synthesis and 
progress towards agreement where the genealogist emphasises conflict and struggle 
between rival perspectives; and the encyclopaedist regards statements as expressing 
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a warranted fixity of belief where the genealogist regards them as passing moments in 
the development of one position against another. (MacIntyre, 1990, pp.37-38.) 
Encyclopaedia 
The failings of encyclopaedia in the sense described here as a type of moral enquiry 
claiming  a universal appeal from a neutral standpoint but ending in intractable 
disagreement are a recurring theme of MacIntyre’s writing (MacIntyre, 2007; MacIntyre, 
1977; MacIntyre, 1978) .  Despite all the aspirations and efforts of the enlightenment, 
no unity of moral theory has emerged or seems likely to emerge; there is no measured 
progress towards agreement and no fixity of belief. Instead there are a number of 
competing meta-theories, a continuing series of newly emergent theories to set aside 
the older ones, and a fluid context for evaluation in practice.  For MacIntyre, no lengthy 
refutation of encyclopaedia is needed on his part, because the modernist project of 
universal reason has already disintegrated into postmodern factions: 
‘The transformation of the moral enquirer from a participant in an 
encyclopaedic enterprise shared by all adequately reflective and informed 
human beings into an engaged partisan of one such warring standpoint 
against its rivals is an accomplished fact, any adequate recognition of 
which results in the dissolution of the encyclopaedist’s standpoint, a 
dissolution evident in the current Fifteenth Edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica.’  (MacIntyre, 1990, p.56) 
Genealogy 
The failings of genealogy are less obvious and MacIntyre spends some time arguing 
for them. His arguments are of two types, which may be summarised as follows. 
The first argument concerns the genealogist him or herself.  The projects of the 
genealogist are essentially iconoclastic and mutating.  They are designed to show how 
accepted theories and assumptions can be reinterpreted and thus shown to be not as 
securely founded as previously thought.  The genealogist does this, not by providing a 
counter-argument in the style of encyclopaedia, appealing to some acknowledged 
shared standard or by providing an alternative theory to be supported and defended as 
a new fixed position, but rather by a process of masking and unmasking, adopting one 
stance and then moving onto another.  However, this stance-less stance is, MacIntyre 
argues, ultimately self-defeating, because it cannot account for that enduring and 
substantive self which stands behind the various personae adopted.  (MacIntyre, 1990, 
pp.54-5).   
The second argument concerns agreed rules of rationality.  Insomuch as the 
genealogist is writing for him or herself or for any other reader, and insomuch as the 
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genealogist engages in a project, evaluates, re-evaluates and moves on, these 
processes of argument, engagement and evaluation are dependent on a number of 
quite ordinary and generally agreed rules of rationality, such as the rule of non-
contradiction or appeals to evidence.  In doing so, the genealogist inevitably falls back 
into a non-genealogical mode, a necessary compromise with encyclopaedia. 
(MacIntyre, 1990, p.55) 
Genealogy, of course, is a highly variable term;  we should not imagine that MacIntyre 
has addressed ‘genealogy-as-such’, and MacIntyre’s own argument suggests that 
genealogy-as-such is an empty term by its own standards.  So we find, for instance, 
Williams (2002), a self-avowed genealogist, approving of much of MacIntyre’s criticism, 
and defining his own project very differently from those of other genealogists, including 
the iconoclastic enterprises of Foucault (1977).  In this regard Williams captures the 
sense of MacIntyre’s chief criticism of a certain kind of genealogist vividly: 
‘they are obsessionally concerned with their own status, and they hope, in 
particular, systematically to efface the marks of a writer asserting 
something to a reader.  Alasdair MacIntyre has used the word [‘genealogy’] 
to apply to such a project and has also brilliantly expressed its difficulties, 
spelling out the awkwardness that inescapably catches up with the writer, 
however quick on the turn he may be, who holds up before the reader’s 
lens a sign that something is true or plausible or worth considering, and 
then tries to vacate the spot before the shutter clicks.’ (Williams, 2002, 
pp.18-19.) 
Tradition as a mode of enquiry 
What matters for current purposes is not whether MacIntyre achieves a knock-down 
argument against genealogy, but whether the particular form of genealogy he 
describes successfully acts as a foil against which his own conception of tradition-
based enquiry can be understood.  Against what he argues are the inadequacies of 
both genealogy and encyclopaedia as methods of moral enquiry, MacIntyre (1990) 
presents an alternative approach which is based on his reading of Thomas Aquinas’ 
solutions to the disagreements between two traditions of philosophy, one based on an 
affiliation to Aristotle, the other based on an affiliation to Augustine, and both 
apparently intractably and fundamentally opposed to one another.  This gives 
MacIntyre a model for what he terms tradition as a mode of enquiry. 
MacIntyre characterises a living tradition as “an historically extended, socially 
embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which 
constitute that tradition” (MacIntyre 2007, p.222). He sees a thriving tradition as one 
which is always open to challenge, from the outside and from the inside, and it is 
through the process of challenge, conflict and resolution that traditions develop the 
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modes of reasoning which are particular to each.  In order to develop a research 
method that fits with MacIntyre’s notion of tradition-constituted enquiry, it is important 
for the researcher to be able to understand the implications of that model and to avoid 
some possible misunderstandings. 
Tradition-constituted enquiry is a linguistic one: the language of one tradition confronts 
the language of another, and our ability to understand other traditions is a limitation to 
such enquiry.  This has led some to focus on what MacIntyre describes as the idea of 
learning a ‘second first language’ (Lutz, 2004).  If we cannot understand the language 
of another speaker as they do, then we cannot understand fully the concepts which 
they might be trying to communicate, since those concepts do not necessarily translate 
into our own language.  Lutz (2004), however, warns against misinterpreting the idea of 
a second first language as a recommended research procedure.  In fact it is only under 
particular, perhaps quite unusual circumstances, that anyone is in a position to learn a 
second first language in this sense.  The notion is not intended to suggest a specific 
programme for research, but to highlight problems of translatability in any research 
which operates across the boundaries of different traditions. 
At this point we might note some of the following implications for the research which 
arise most immediately from MacIntyre’s insistence that moral enquiry should be seen 
as tradition-constituted: 
 The researcher must declare his own affiliation to some tradition; in the case of 
this research project, that affiliation is clearly to Aristotelian virtue ethics.  The 
position of the researcher as a rational agent in this respect should be explicit at 
all stages of the enquiry.  Such an affiliation must be thoroughgoing.  It would not amount to an affiliation 
at all if, in the style of genealogy, the researcher tried out one tradition or stance 
for this project, a different tradition for the next one, and so on.  Similarly, there can be no question of the researcher assuming some form of 
supra-traditional neutrality, with an accompanying claim to argue from universal 
principles of rationality in the style of encyclopaedia.  The researcher needs to be sensitive to problems of translation, particularly 
when gathering primary data.  Such problems might be relatively obvious in 
some instances where unfamiliar or technical terms are used, but much less 
obvious when ordinary language disguises differences in deeply rooted, 
unspoken assumptions. 
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It is also worth noting with respect to this last point that it carries with it some further 
implications about the degree to which the researcher needs to be able to speak in a 
technical jargon.  Since this research project involves interviewing bankers about their 
careers and their views of ethics and leadership in banking, the researcher needs to 
have a sufficient understanding of the terms in which that group speak.  However, this 
comes with two important qualifiers.  First, it is much more important that the 
researcher understands the moral language of the group than that he understands their 
technical language.14  Second, a large aim of the research is exactly to gain an 
understanding of the group’s moral thinking.  Inevitably, therefore, the researcher 
begins the process with an imperfect understanding of the way that the group thinks 
about ethics, an understanding which he aims to improve as the research progresses. 
Just as the position of the researcher relative to Aristotelian tradition is important for 
this mode of enquiry, so is the position of the researcher’s supervision team.  The lead 
supervisor for this research has been Prof. Ron Beadle and the second supervisor, Dr. 
Johan Coetsee.  Prof. Beadle is a noted supporter of MacIntyre and an authority on 
empirical enquiry in a MacIntyrean mode, whose work is cited throughout this thesis.  
He has been able to offer guidance on MacIntyre’s thought and critical reflection where 
appropriate on the researcher’s interpretation of primary data.  Dr. Coetsee has had an 
important role in ensuring that the approach taken is balanced from the wider 
perspective of organisation studies. 
3.4 Moral enquiry as narrative (principle 2) 
Bearing in mind the foregoing account of MacIntyre’s thought, one might draw the 
conclusion that MacIntyre’s own method of enquiry is tradition-constituted and that this 
is what particularly defines his work. It might then also be thought that for a researcher 
to follow a MacIntyrean line of enquiry, his or her research design should likewise be 
characterised by being tradition-constituted.  But this would be only part of the story. 
It is, by MacIntyre’s account, all but impossible for anyone to undertake any enquiry 
whatsoever which is not tradition-constituted, whether that tradition be Foucauldian 
postmodernism, Husserlian phenomenology or British empiricism.  We could say, 
perhaps that MacIntyre insists that the enquirer declare from within which tradition they 
                                               
14
 For instance, by the word ‘integrity’ bankers mean something very different thing from what 
Aristotelians mean, and an understanding of this is essential to the research.  It is not similarly 
essential for the researcher to understand the formulae by which the statistics of the M3 money 
supply are calculated. 
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are making their enquiry, but then this would be no more than is normally required of 
any PhD in social science.  The language varies, of course.  Cresswell (2004, p. 5), in 
offering researchers a menu of five ‘approaches’ appropriate for qualitative research for 
them to choose amongst, says that he used to call them ‘traditions’.  A central part of 
MacIntyre’s thesis is that enquiry is as a matter of historical fact tradition-constituted, 
whether we like to think so or not, and it seems mainstream social science agrees with 
him in this respect. 
What is distinctive about MacIntyre’s own procedure of enquiry and argument is not 
just that it is undertaken from the standpoint of some tradition or other, but that it is 
philosophy in the form of narrative enquiry.  The core thesis which he seeks to develop 
in his major works is that enquiry which is consciously tradition-constituted is superior 
to either encyclopaedia or genealogy.  His means of developing that thesis is narrative.  
Tradition-constituted enquiry is always historically situated and can only properly unfold 
through the telling of a sequence of events, which give a context for interpretation. 
The narrative procedure of MacIntyre’s philosophy 
This is made very clear in the opening chapter of After Virtue, in which he sets out what 
his method will be, and it is a method which he continues to pursue in his next two 
major works, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Enquiry.  At the start of After Virtue, MacIntyre (2007) sketches out his well-known 
apocalyptic scenario of a world which is intellectually so disordered that it cannot detect 
its own disorder.  He paints a picture of a fictional future, in which, due to a global 
catastrophe, the resources of natural science have been lost.  In time, an attempt is 
made to restore them but, by this point, knowledge of those sciences has been so 
eroded that only fragments remain.  No one has a sufficient understanding anymore to 
be able to reconstruct those fragments into a restored whole, so that people debate the 
merits of this or that theory or principle, but with no real idea of how the whole system 
originally functioned.  Disputes are rendered both irresolvable and futile.  Any 
philosopher of science in this state of affairs will offer no more resources than anyone 
else; without a knowledge of the original system which made sense of the fragments 
now in play, all that philosophers will be able to do will be to analyse and articulate the 
status quo.  MacIntyre compares this fictional future for the natural sciences with what 
he diagnoses as the actual state of moral philosophy now; we do in fact now live with 
and debate with the fragments of what used to be a coherent whole moral system, and 
because we do not understand the way that those elements once fitted together into a 
whole and functioning system, we live in a state of intellectual chaos in which we can 
neither resolve our disputes nor recognise that chaos for what it is. 
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In this context, MacIntyre not only portrays moral philosophy as incoherent, but also 
portrays contemporary philosophy more generally as unable to offer any resolution, 
since both analytical and phenomenological approaches to philosophy are capable 
only of describing and articulating what they encounter in contemporary language and 
in social life.  It is only through a historical and narrative approach to philosophy that 
any adequate diagnosis can be offered: 
‘In the real world the dominant philosophies of the present, analytical or 
phenomenological, will be as powerless to detect the disorders of moral 
thought and practice as they were impotent before the disorders of science 
in the imaginary world.  Yet the powerlessness of this kind of philosophy 
does not leave us quite resourceless.  For a prerequisite for understanding 
the present disordered state of the imaginary world was to understand its 
history…[in a sense which] Hegel called philosophical history and what 
Collingwood took all successful historical writing to be… We shall have to 
ask whether we can find in the type of philosophy and history propounded 
by writers such as Hegel and Collingwood - very different from each other 
as they are, of course - resources which we cannot find in analytical or 
phenomenological philosophy.’ (MacIntyre, 2007 pp2-3) 
In Chapter 1 of After Virtue the primary device used to make MacIntyre’s argument for 
the method of argument which he then proceeds to employ is itself a fictional 
narrative15, and this is explicitly self-referential.  MacIntyre is using a narrative method 
to argue for the strength of that method. 
Without further preamble, MacIntyre then writes After Virtue in exactly this way, 
combining history and philosophy in order to present his argument about the current 
state of moral philosophy.  MacIntyre’s own procedure does, of course, very directly 
concern history in an academic sense, but this does not exclude narratives of other 
kinds, including biography, autobiography, fiction and drama.  All of these are 
legitimate sources of understanding, and in After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? MacIntyre uses different types of narrative to suit his purpose at 
appropriate points, whether that  be Jane Austen’s novels, Sophocles’ tragedies, 
Thucydides’ history or Homer’s poems.  In each case, he is interested not only in the 
story which first presents itself, but also the stories behind the story:  Why did 
Thucydides write his History of the Peloponnesian War the way that he did?  What was 
it in the changing social structures of 5th Century Athens that enabled Sophocles to 
write the dramas that he wrote, and what changes to social structures did Sophocles 
enable in writing the way that he did?  MacIntyre is always interested in situatedness, 
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 It is striking in this context how close his procedure is to what Williams (2002) describes as 
his own method of fictional genealogy. 
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so much so that when he considers and criticises Hume in Chapter XV of Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?, he spends as much time on Hume’s biographical story as 
on Hume’s philosophical writing. 
Narrative in empirical enquiry 
It follows that any researcher wishing to follow a MacIntyrean line of enquiry must 
employ a narrative technique in some respect.  This does not have to be history in an 
academic sense, but it does need to involve the hearing and telling of stories.  In a 
research interview, the researcher will be interested in their interlocutor’s story and the 
context in which that story unfolds; and in the presentation of findings, narrative will 
play an important part in explaining and justifying any theses which emerge. 
It follows also that the questions which are characteristically MacIntyrean are not 
strictly the questions of phenomenological philosophy concerning personal lived 
experience nor the questions of analytic philosophy concerning linguistic structures, 
although MacIntyre is concerned with these questions too.  Rather, MacIntyre’s 
characteristic questions are ones of narrative causation and meaning in the context of 
the unity of a human life:  ‘I can only answer the question “What am I to do?” if I can 
answer the prior question “Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?”’ MacIntyre 
(2007, p.216).  We rightly think of questions of practices and institutions, excellence 
and effectiveness, traditions and rationality as being characteristic of MacIntyre’s 
project, but these more specific questions only arise as they do after the basic 
questions of life narratives have been pursued.  
3.5 Plain persons and moral philosophers (principle 3) 
In Chapter VI of Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, MacIntyre explains that 
philosophy is a craft and as such carries with it forms of learning, discipline and 
conceptions of the good which are typical of any craft.  The philosopher – a category 
which includes the enquirer or researcher – progresses within that craft by learning 
from mistakes, discovering retrospectively the distinction between what really is good 
and what just seemed good at the time.  This process of learning involves 
acknowledging limitations, and understanding the difference between “what is good 
and best for me here and now”, given those limitations, and “what is good and best as 
such, unqualifiedly” (MacIntyre, 1990, p.127). 
Philosophy is theoretical in nature, but always placed in a reciprocal relationship with 
practical social life.  Philosophical theories are developed out of social practice, and in 
turn the theories which emerge affect the development of social practice.  This is true 
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not only of traditions and societies but also of individuals.  ‘The history of the moral life 
and the history of moral enquiry are aspects of a single albeit complex history’ 
(MacIntyre, 1990, p.129). 
Insofar as MacIntyre’s view is now Thomistic and Catholic, he endorses the idea of 
natural law, and that includes a theistic world view.  However, we can still understand 
the implications of naturalism for moral epistemology without assuming a theistic 
stance.  Moral truths are real and they can be understood by ‘plain persons and 
philosophers or theologians alike’ (MacIntyre, 1990, p.136). 
The position of the author 
The attention paid by MacIntyre to the enduring self of the author is of some 
significance for his description of his own position.  He is continually interested in the 
author’s stance, and it is a central complaint against Foucault that ‘”the author” for him 
names a role or function, not a person’ (MacIntyre, 1990, p.51).  MacIntyre is interested 
not only in what an author says they think, but what they actually think, as it shows up 
in what they do, and most especially in where they belong in terms of tradition, 
community or practice.  It seems that MacIntyre is always liable to ask the question; 
“Where do you stand?”  “To which tradition do you belong?” 
There is perhaps a temptation at this point to skip over the importance attached to both 
author and reader in MacIntyre’s account and move straight to discussion of 
communities and traditions, but this would by-pass a radical feature of MacIntyre’s 
argument which has a direct implication for research method in a MacIntyrean mode.  
He is in effect saying that arguments ad hominem are not only legitimate, but 
indispensable, and in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry he uses ad hominem 
arguments to undermine the arguments of Nietzsche and Foucault.  This is remarkable 
in several respects.  It traces the lineage of ideas through authors, their works and their 
lives in a way which is itself strongly reminiscent of genealogy.  That an account of the 
genesis and development of genealogy could be delivered by tracing the personal 
histories and careers of some of those protagonists in such a way as to undermine the 
claims of genealogy-as-such bears more than a passing resemblance to Foucault’s 
own description of some aspects of genealogy, including the idea of mockery of 
pretensions to grandeur – ‘Zarathustra himself is plagued by a monkey who jumps 
along behind him, pulling at his coattails’ (Foucault, 1977, p.143). 
In MacIntyre there is a call, both explicit and implicit for the reader to go beyond the 
text, to the author of the text.  In terms of hermeneutics, this implies that the 
hermeneutic circle does not only rotate between reader and text, but also between 
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reader and author.  “Texts are always moments in conversations.” (MacIntyre, 1990, 
p.196)  For MacIntyre, the words pronounced are only part of the story.  Equally 
important are questions of who uttered them, in what circumstances and for what 
reasons.  And of course, this mode of argument, which pays close attention to the 
history of other arguments, is exactly the mode of argument of MacIntyre’s own major 
works.  By extension, with regard to moral enquiry, not only does the identity and 
situation of the author matter, but so does his or her moral character; and the same 
things are true of the enquirer.  This is because all moral enquiry is a form of practical 
rationality.  It is thus dependent on one’s situation in some community and is further 
dependent on one’s virtues of character as well as of intellect. 
Plain persons 
A similar emphasis on the practical and socially involved nature of rationality is at the 
root of MacIntyre’s interest in ‘plain persons’.  MacIntyre’s idea of the relationship 
between plain persons and moral philosophers is implicit in Three Rival Versions, and 
spelt out more fully in the article ‘Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues 
and Goods’ (MacIntyre, 1992a).  He takes it as obvious that moral philosophers are “of 
course themselves in most of their lives everyday plain persons”, but argues that plain 
persons are also inevitably moral philosophers, and that “on an Aristotelian view, the 
questions posed by the moral philosopher and the questions posed by the plain person 
are to an important degree inseparable.”  (MacIntyre, 1992a, p.3) This is because each 
of us as plain persons in everyday life, when confronted with the question ‘What should 
I do here?’, are naturally led to more general questions such as ‘What is good for 
people to do in this kind of situation?’, and thence to more fundamental questions such 
as ‘What sort of life should I lead?’ and ‘What sort of lives should people lead?’  
(MacIntyre, 1992a, pp. 3-4).16  Elsewhere, speaking of medical personnel dealing with 
day to day decisions in medical ethics, he says, ‘Medical men and women have as 
much chance of not being philosophers as M. Jourdain17 has of not speaking prose.’ 
(MacIntyre, 1978, p.40).  It is a recurring theme of his work (MacIntyre, 1977b; 
MacIntyre, 1984b; MacIntyre, 1990) that plain persons are in just as good a position as 
moral philosophers are, and sometimes better, to answer key questions of moral 
                                               
16 MacIntyre phrases these questions in terms of ‘goods’ and ‘the good’, making the argument 
in the article that plain persons are proto-Aristotelian.  This latter claim is of course of interest, 
and could be explored through qualitative research.  However, for the present, it is an additional 
argument over and above the more basic proposition that plain persons are also moral 
philosophers of whatever stripe.  
17
 M Jourdain is the eponymous hero of Moilere’s play ‘Le Bourgois gentilhomme’, in which he is 
delighted and impressed to discover, in the course of taking lessons in aristocratic manners, 
that he has been speaking prose all his life. 
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philosophy, because they are forced to achieve a coherence in practice, for instance 
with regard to medical ethics, which professional philosophers have failed to achieve.  
He stresses that he strongly sympathises ‘with any businessman who thinks it 
something of an impertinence for a professor to lecture businessmen on business 
ethics; if such a businessman were to ask “Why should I not give lectures to professors 
on academic ethics?” the only appropriate reply would be  “Why not indeed?”’ 
(MacIntyre, 1977b, p.99) 
This insistence that we cannot disentangle plain persons from moral philosophers is 
closely related to an insistence that we cannot disentangle theory from practice.  
Practice precedes theory in two ways.  We learn about ethics first and foremost by 
being immersed in social practices -  without some such education, the development of 
a fully human rationality is impossible - and theory articulates and reflects on the 
practice it finds.  At the same time theory affects practice, so that the relationship 
between the two is reciprocal.  Changing practices affect theory and changing theories 
affect practice. 
If we take these two related claims seriously, it follows that not only are plain persons 
moral philosophers in the sense that they may ask deeply rooted ethical questions, but 
also they answer those questions in practice by taking actions which then change 
philosophical theories.  So when the researcher approaches ‘plain persons’ in the 
course of his research, he is also enquiring after people who are developing ethics in 
practice and in theory, even when they are not aware that they are doing so. 
3.6 The provisional status of claims to truth (principle 4) 
One of the significant contributions that Lutz (2004) makes to understanding 
MacIntyre’s thought is to draw attention to the importance of the word ‘rationality’ in the 
title of MacIntyre’s book Whose Justice? Which Rationality?.  Lutz repeatedly points 
out that MacIntyre has developed a thesis which locates rationality within traditions, 
and which recognises that the standards of rationality available to any particular 
persons are dependent on the tradition or traditions in which they have learned to 
reason.  There are thus no absolute standards of rationality.  Rather there are a 
number of different systems of rationality, each with its own internal standards, so that 
it makes sense to speak not so much of rationality, as if it were one thing, but rather of 
rationalities: the rationality of heroic or Homeric society is not that of Aristotle and the 
Lyceum; the rationality of Roman Catholic theology is not that of secular liberalism; and 
so on. 
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Relativity and relativism 
This leads to a position which could be misinterpreted as moral relativism, though that 
is clearly not MacIntyre’s intention.  Lutz (2004, pp.66-69), following Krausz (1984), 
distinguishes two positions, one of which he calls ‘relativity’ and the other ‘relativism’.  
‘Relativity’ is the idea that our means of rational enquiry including our standards of 
reasoning are always dependent on our particular cultural context; this is consistent 
with MacIntyre’s position.  ‘Relativism’ is a wider term referring to a general view that 
moral values are relative to particular cultures including the claim that when two or 
more moral traditions clash, there is no rational basis for deciding between them.  Lutz 
wishes to concede MacIntyre’s relativity, whilst defending him against accusations of 
relativism and he does this by drawing a line between truth and rationality.   
MacIntyre (1998, p.214) understands truth as the adequacy of ‘the intellect to its 
objects’.  He understands rationality as providing a shared stock of resources for 
determining the truth of judgements and choices which is always available in some 
particular form relative to some particular culture.  This description of the status of 
rationality does not in itself imply anything about the status of truth18, and is compatible 
with either the idea that truth is relative or the idea that truth is absolute.  This general 
position is equally at home in moral or in other areas of enquiry.  If we say that Aristotle 
was mistaken in supporting the institution of slavery, we are not also committed to the 
view that his position was irrational. 
This distinction is indispensable in understanding MacIntyre’s idea of tradition-
constituted enquiry.  If one avoids interpreting MacIntyre as a moral relativist, it is still 
possible to interpret him as an authoritarian conservative, in the sense that he might be 
thought to be setting up the authority of tradition as an arbiter of truth.  Again, Lutz’s 
distinction makes it clear that for MacIntyre traditions provide the basis for rationality 
                                               
18
 That rationality and truth are very different can be illustrated with the following simple 
example.  Let us say I believe there is a cat in my neighbour’s garden.  This belief is true if there 
really is a cat in my neighbour’s garden, and rational if I have come to the belief in a reasonable 
way.  These two are not necessarily equivalent.  Let us say that I hold the unreasonable theory 
that a cat comes into my neighbour’s garden whenever a member of the British royal family 
appears on my television.  If a member of that family appears today on the television, then I 
deduce that there is a cat in my neighbour’s garden.  And if, coincidentally, there is in fact a cat 
in my garden, this belief turns out to be both irrational and true.  Conversely, suppose I hold the 
more reasonable theory that, since my neighbour owns a cat and I have frequently seen the cat 
and heard it mewing in her garden, then if I hear the usual mewing in the usual garden, then 
there is a cat in my neighbour’s garden.  Suppose that today I hear the usual mewing in the 
usual garden, and I therefore deduce that there is a cat in my neighbour’s garden, but that on 
this occasion I am wrong.  (On this occasion the cat is in the cattery, my neighbour is away on 
holiday, and she has left an automatic recording of her cat’s meow running intermittently in the 
garden to keep the birds off her raspberries.)  This belief turns out to be rational but untrue. 
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rather than truth.  An appeal to traditional authority as the justification for one’s claim to 
truth is simply to admit failure, and in crucial respects MacIntyre’s claims for rationality 
and for traditions as the basis of rationality are much more modest than his claims 
about truth.  “Tradition is not the arbiter of truth; it is merely the bearer of the tools with 
which its adherents seek the truth, and those tools are subject to improvement.” (Lutz, 
2004, p.84) 
Truth 
MacIntyre favours a perhaps surprising correspondence theory of truth, with the key 
distinction that the correspondence in question is not between statements and the 
world, but between mind and the world, or more accurately, between mind or intellect 
and its object.  In the article, ‘Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification’ (MacIntyre, 
1998) he makes his case mainly in the language of analytic philosophy for this 
conception of truth which he terms adaequatio intellectus ad rem (adequacy of intellect 
to its object).  Elsewhere he has it as the adequacy of mind to its objects.  MacIntyre 
emphasises that ‘mind’ here is not a Cartesian quasi-entity, but is rather a kind of 
activity which thinking animals undertake in engaging with the natural and social world, 
such as:  
“identification, reidentification, collecting, separating, classifying, and 
naming and all this by touching, grasping, pointing, breaking down, building 
up, calling to, answering to, and so on.  The mind is adequate to its objects 
insofar as the expectations which it frames on the basis of these activities 
are not liable to disappointment and the remembering which it engages in 
enables it to return to and recover what it encountered previously, whether 
the objects themselves are still present or not.” (MacIntyre, 1988, p.356) 
This description would be self-defeating if it purported to provide a definition of truth 
which rests outside of any tradition.  It should be understood as being a partial 
description of what it means for someone to hold a true belief formed through some 
tradition based rationality,  but the description nevertheless characterises a notion of 
what it means for belief to be true which goes beyond the question of the internal 
coherence of one tradition or another.  In other words, MacIntyre, from the perspective 
of his own Aristotelian and Thomist tradition, sees an external reality which is beyond 
tradition, and a particular correspondence between people and the objects of their 
beliefs as providing limits to truth which are also beyond tradition.  Other traditions 
(genealogy for instance) may of course see this differently, and this will be part of their 
standards of rationality, just as this particular view of truth is part of MacIntyre’s 
standards of rationality. 
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This notion of the adequacy of mind to its objects given here is primarily an 
instrumental one and, as MacIntyre observes, a primitive one.  It is also one which is 
not presented as a means of arbitrating between the competing theories of one 
tradition or another – it cannot fulfil that function on a MacIntyrean account since it may 
not itself be recognised as valid by those particular traditions – but rather as an 
account of the way that people (and traditions) learn.  Although this characterisation of 
truth is useful, it is important to remember that MacIntyre has not set out to give an 
account of a theory of truth, and that he also characterises truth, following Aristotle, as 
the telos of rational enquiry (MacIntyre 1998).  This appears at first to be a rather 
different kind of object from the res mentioned earlier, which is Thomist and concrete - 
“for example, actual specimens of sodium or chlorine, about which the chemist 
enquires, or the actual strata about which the geologist enquires, (MacIntyre 1998, 
p.214).  The Aristotelian telos includes such objects of enquiry as “the nature and 
status of human goods, duties, virtues and rights” (MacIntyre 1998, p.214). 
Perspectivism and emotivism 
Lutz (2004, pp. 69-71) emphasises that, where relativism can be thought of as a 
general view that there is no rational basis for deciding between two conflicting moral 
traditions, perspectivism is the stronger and more precise claim that moral theses 
should not be thought of as true or false in an ordinary sense. 
This undermining of the truth status of all moral values is a primary target for 
MacIntyre.  It is directly named as perspectivism (MacIntyre, 1988 p.352), but very 
often in After Virtue and elsewhere is equated with emotivism, wrongly according to 
Wachbroit (Lutz 2004, p.82), and in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry with 
genealogy.  Wachbroit’s criticism is that MacIntyre’s target is misplaced, that emotivism 
was the ‘boo hurray’ theory of moral expression which “enjoyed some popularity in 
England and America in the 1930’s and 1940’s” but today “is accepted by few 
philosophers” (Wachbroit, 1983).  Wachbroit may have a point about the term 
emotivism.  However, MacIntyre has not attacked a straw man; ‘perspectivism’ or 
‘emotivism’, by whatever name, as a post-Nietzschean viewpoint and in the sense 
MacIntyre describes it, was at least still alive and well in the 1970s and 1980s in the 
writings of John Mackie (1977) and Simon Blackburn (1984).  Blackburn (1984) 
describes his own position as ‘quasi-realism’ and distinguishes it from ‘projectivism’ 
(which he also supports) in the following note: 
“It is important to be clear about the distinction between projectivism and 
quasi-realism.  Projectivism is the philosophy of evaluation which says that 
evaluative properties are projections of our own sentiments (emotions, 
reactions, attitudes, commendations).  Quasi-realism is the enterprise of 
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explaining why our discourse has the shape it does, in particular by way of 
treating evaluative predicates like others, if projectivism is true.  It thus 
seeks to explain, and justify, the realistic seeming nature of our talk of 
evaluations - the way we think we can be wrong about them, that there is a 
truth to be found, and so on.” (Blackburn, 1984, p. 180) 
A root difference, then, in Blackburn’s account, compared to MacIntyre’s, is that 
Blackburn (and Mackie before him) thinks that our usage of ‘truth’ in evaluative 
predicates is in some way metaphorical or analogous in comparison to truth in ordinary 
predicates.  We might say: ‘When it comes to moral utterances, there is no reality out 
there, but we talk as if there is.’  MacIntyre believes that there is a reality out there, and 
that our thinking (and our speaking) might be more or less adequate to it. 
MacIntyre’s opposition to what he calls perspectivism is theoretical in the sense that it 
is an opposition to a particular type of thesis.   Relativism can similarly be expressed in 
the form of a theory, for instance as a position that moral truths are always relative to 
some particular culture or other, so that some general precept, “Φ-ing is bad”, uttered 
at one time and place is not necessarily incompatible with an apparently opposite 
precept, “Φ-ing is good”, uttered in a different cultural context.  And in this form 
relativism can be opposed as theory.  However, MacIntyre is more interested in 
opposing relativism as practice.  He thinks relativism is lazy (Lutz, 2004, p.67). 
In terms of rational argument, the assumptions of relativism encourage the parties to a 
debate to agree to disagree, where MacIntyre’s assumptions encourage both parties to 
persist in their quest for ‘the truth’, whether that means one tradition abandoning its 
former belief in favour of the other tradition, or both traditions modifying their beliefs in 
the light of the other.  For MacIntyre, there can be no ‘giving up’ on this, because the 
coexistence of two contradictory beliefs, “Φ-ing is bad and Φ-ing is good”, cannot 
express an adequate relationship of mind to its objects.  Hence, MacIntyre 
characterises objectivity in social science as openness to conflict or we might say a 
sensitivity to and a refusal to ignore fundamental disagreement. 
MacIntyre offers a succinct characterisation of this in his article Relativism, Power and 
Philosophy in which he seeks not to refute relativism, but to learn what truths it has to 
offer and to move beyond it.  “Relativism after all turns out to be so far immune to 
refutation…  It does not follow that relativism cannot be transcended.” (MacIntyre, 
1989)  In this argument, relativism is a natural stage for anyone to move through when 
they encounter conflicting beliefs at the border between two traditions or cultures.  
Anyone who has to live with two conflicting cultures may be in the position for a time of 
being unable to make a rational choice between either.  MacIntyre’s concern is that this 
is not where the story should end.  If relativism has the last word, then two possible 
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futures present themselves. One possibility is that one culture will ultimately impose its 
beliefs on the other through the exercise of will and power (imperialism in Lutz’s 
analysis).  The other possibility is an indefinite state of intractable dispute, as MacIntyre 
characterises the current state of moral philosophy.  In other words, for MacIntyre, 
thoroughgoing relativism is an expression of pessimism, a way of giving up on rational 
engagement with another tradition because no hope of rational resolution is held up for 
such an engagement.  MacIntyre’s core project is to propose an alternative procedure 
of rational engagement between traditions so that neither intractable dispute nor 
imperialism win the day.  Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions 
of Moral Enquiry are then full articulations of how that procedure should be attempted. 
The standards of truth 
In recognising the difficulties that are implied by this process of confrontation and 
learning, MacIntyre (1988, p.358) draws attention to the important roles that 
discrepancy, failure and correction have in the journey towards truth.  It is only by 
looking back and identifying the ‘previous intellectual inadequacy’ of ourselves or our 
predecessors in comparison with what we now judge to be how things really are, that 
we have some measure of our progress towards truth.  This leads him to set the 
standard of truth extremely high: 
‘To claim truth for one’s present mindset and the judgements which are its 
expression is to claim that this kind of inadequacy, this kind of discrepancy, 
will never appear in any possible future situation, no matter how searching 
the enquiry, no matter how much evidence is provided, no matter what 
developments in rational enquiry may occur.’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p.358) 
In distinguishing between the achievements of rational argument and the truth, 
MacIntyre appears to set un unbridgeable gap between the best available theory and 
the truth, so that we cannot in practice claim to have discovered the truth, only to have 
moved towards it.  MacIntyre’s characterisation of a truth claim as not liable to 
inadequacy to or discrepancy from reality seems to Lutz (2004, p.72) ‘entirely 
unattainable’. 
Gadamer here provides an important point of caution for MacIntyrean enquiry which is 
explored further in the next two sections.  The researcher engaged in qualitative 
research involving the interpretation of speech or text is primarily engaged in a task of 
hermeneutic understanding.  As such, a claim to truth as characterised by MacIntyre, 
above, will be beyond the findings of that research, and concomitantly the findings will 
be provisional, not only in the sense of always being open to re-interpretation, but also 
in the sense that the goals of such research are always subject to revision (MacIntyre, 
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1977c).  However, it is important to emphasise that this does not mean that truth is not 
then the goal of enquiry, only that in acts of interpretation, analysis or understanding of 
others within social science, the researcher may only claim to make progress towards 
the truth, rather than to have ‘discovered’ it, and even then such a claim must be 
provisional. 
3.7 Gadamer on prejudgement (principle 5) 
‘Every tradition is embodied in some particular set of utterances and thereby in all the 
particularities of some specific language and culture’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p.371).  
Chapter XIX of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? sets out a discussion of the role 
that language plays in framing any understanding of a tradition, either from inside or 
outside of the tradition, and it problematises the activity of translation between one 
tradition and another.  This problem is founded on the difference between the 
assumptions which lie behind one linguistic tradition and the assumptions which lie 
behind another.  The chapter is nothing if not a discussion of the role played by 
prejudgement in hermeneutics, which MacIntyre (2002b, p.169) sees as ‘a 
subdiscipline of ethics’. 
Like MacIntyre, Gadamer is an Aristotelian engaged in articulating practical philosophy, 
and he conceives of hermeneutics as a form of practical rationality (Gadamer, 2001).  
When he gives his account of interpretation as tradition dependent, he is following a 
line of thought which is very close to MacIntyre’s idea of rationality being tradition 
dependent.   
MacIntyre makes clear both that he is indebted to Gadamer (MacIntyre, 1980) and also 
that he has several points of fundamental disagreement with him, most notably 
concerning metaphysics (MacIntyre, 2002b).  Gadamer follows Heidegger, rather than 
Aquinas, and this more than anything is what distances him from MacIntyre; MacIntyre 
(1998c), like Adorno (1973) and Levinas (1990), sees in Heidegger’s philosophy a 
system of thought compatible with the National Socialism of his time.  This should not 
prevent us from seeing MacIntyre’s project at least partly in the light of Gadamer’s work 
(Knight, 2013) because, seen from that perspective, a great deal becomes clear, 
including, for instance, that what MacIntyre has done is to develop his own particular 
version of philosophical hermeneutics,  even though he regards the term 
‘hermeneutics’ with some suspicion (MacIntyre, 1980) and prefers generally to speak 
of philosophical history and ultimately of tradition-constituted enquiry. 
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In Gadamer we find articulated some of the key themes which also are found in 
MacIntyre.  These include the ideas: 
 that there are no neutral standpoints; we cannot entirely escape our prejudices 
and assumptions, so that we are constituted more by our prejudices than by our 
judgements (Gadamer, 1975, p. 278);  that all understanding is historically grounded, always situated, and always 
incomplete (Gadamer, 1975, pp.299-301)  that tradition and authority play an unavoidable part in human understanding 
(Gadamer, 1975, pp. 278-285);  that understanding of others (and therefore of human sciences) is always an 
achievement of language (Gadamer, 1975, p.370);  that there are tools which can be used, but no generalisable techniques, the 
mastery of which will lead to the truth (Gadamer, 2001, pp.41-42);  that academic enquiry in social science is modelled on conversation - the notion 
of conversation in hermeneutics amounts to more than a metaphor (Gadamer, 
1975, 385-391). 
We also find some key concepts which Gadamer made very much his own and which 
MacIntyre places much less emphasis on.  These include not only his own articulation 
of the hermeneutic circle but also the idea of a horizon of understanding, and the fusion 
of horizons, which are particularly relevant for the design of method in this thesis. 
It is beyond the current scope of this thesis to devote the same level of analysis to 
Gadamer’s Truth and Method as it does to MacIntyre’s major works, and it is important 
to retain the emphasis that MacIntyre has developed and fully articulated his own 
explanation of rational enquiry which this thesis is following.  However, there are 
important ways in which a review of ideas arising from Gadamer act to further 
illuminate MacIntyre’s notions of moral enquiry, and the central notion of conversation 
as a paradigm for human understanding on which the present research project 
depends is entirely dependent on Gadamer .  Before proceeding further it will be useful 
to clarify the ideas of fusion of horizons and the hermeneutic circle as Gadamer 
articulates them.  These ideas are basic to Gadamer’s articulation of human 
understanding.  Like MacIntyre, he generally avoids talking about knowledge in 
developing his own theses, and regards beliefs as always liable to be overturned by 




The hermeneutic circle describes an iterative process of coming to an understanding 
through interpretation of a text.  In the tradition of German literary and scriptural 
scholarship before Heidegger, this refers to an iterative process between part and 
whole of a text (Grondin, 2002).  With Heidegger, the foreknowledge or prejudgements 
of the interpreter is introduced into the circle, and the understanding achieved by the 
interpreter is at each stage determined by this foreknowledge.  Gadamer articulates 
this explicitly in terms of the relationship between interpreter and tradition: 
‘The circle, then, is not formal in nature.  It is neither subjective nor 
objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of 
tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning 
which governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but 
proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the tradition. But this 
commonality is constantly being formed in our relationship to tradition.  
Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather we produce it 
ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of 
tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves.  Thus the circle of 
understanding is not a “methodological” circle, but describes an element of 
the ontological structure of understanding.’  (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 293-294) 
So for Gadamer, as for MacIntyre, understanding is achieved in the context of tradition, 
and tradition is a dynamic, forward moving, social phenomenon, always evolving 
through the collective acts of interpretation of those working within it.  And this is 
inevitable; Gadamer, like MacIntyre, is not describing some type of research process 
which can be chosen, but rather he is describing the way that all understanding is 
achieved.  This is what the word ‘ontological’ means here: the hermeneutic circle is an 
element of the structure of human understanding which is built into our nature as 
rational beings, something which cannot be changed by an act of volition. 
Fusion of horizons 
All our acts of understanding are circumscribed by a kind of boundary which is 
determined by our fore-understandings at any particular time and for any particular 
person or group.  This boundary is the horizon of our understanding, beyond which we 
cannot see, limited as we are by our own particular perspectives.  In natural 
conversations with others or in hermeneutic conversations with texts the boundary of 
one person’s thought encounters the boundary of another’s and a joining or ‘fusion’ 
takes place, through which our perspective may be altered, and new understandings 
become available to us.  Gadamer conceives of this process as occurring between 
persons, between scholar and text, and between different stages in the development of 
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a tradition over time.  New understandings are never achieved in isolation from old 
understandings, but always by the development of one understanding from another. 
‘Hence the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past.  
There is no more an isolated horizon of the present in itself than there are 
historical horizons which have to be acquired.  Rather, understanding is 
always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves’. 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 305, original italics.) 
That all understanding is historically grounded, always situated, and always incomplete 
(Gadamer, 1975, pp.299-301) implies various consequences for social science 
research which are not always widely acknowledged.  It implies, as already discussed, 
the importance of narrative enquiry.  Further, it implies that social science enquiry is 
party-dependent (Taylor, 2002) and therefore never truly replicable. 
‘Prejudice’, then, for Gadamer and for any researcher following Gadamer, is not a fault 
to be weeded out, but a necessary precondition for understanding, to be brought into 
the open and made integral to the research process.  Once this is established, it 
becomes a point of principle which colours all aspects of the research, from the reading 
of academic literature to the conducting of interviews and the interpretation of 
transcripts.  At each stage of the research process, as the project develops, the 
researcher following a hermeneutic process can regard another turn of the 
hermeneutic circle as complete, such that the prejudgements which informed his 
previous understanding of his topic have now evolved, and each subsequent iteration 
of the circle begins from a new set of assumptions, built on the foundations of the old 
ones.   
Such foreknowledge can be made partly explicit, but never wholly so, and 
consequently the basis of our understanding must be always to some extent opaque to 
us.  We cannot escape these prejudgements, but we can seek to make them explicit 
through a process of reflexivity.  Reflexivity then becomes of crucial importance to the 
quality of the research if distortion is to be avoided (Gadamer, 1975; Finlay, 2002).  
This is particularly important in the gathering and interpretation of primary data, and 




3.8 Conversation (principle 6) 
‘Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding.  Thus it belongs 
to every true conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly 
accepts his point of view as valid and transposes himself into the other to 
such an extent that he understands not the individual, but what he says.  
What is to be grasped is the substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we 
can be at one with each other on the subject.  Thus we do not relate the 
other’s opinion to him but to our own opinions and views.  Where a person 
is concerned with the other as individuality - e.g. in a therapeutic 
conversation or the interrogation of a man accused of a crime - this is not 
really a situation in which two people are trying to come to an 
understanding.’ (Gadamer, 1975, p.387) 
Gadamer makes clear the difference between knowledge of an object and 
understanding of an interlocutor (Taylor, 2002).  Knowledge of an object is appropriate 
to natural science and can be described as a unilateral process (with mind on one side 
and object on the other) with the ultimate goal of knowledge which is fully secure, and 
the intent of which is instrumental control.  Understanding of an interlocutor by contrast 
is always bilateral involving both speaker and listener (author and reader, researcher 
and research participant, etc.); it is party-dependent, insomuch as either party to this 
bilateral relationship are liable to change over time; and the goals of such 
understanding are always open to revision, insomuch as ‘coming to an understanding 
[of another person] may require that I give some ground in my objectives.  The end of 
the operation is not control, or else I am engaging in a sham, designed to manipulate 
my partner while pretending to negotiate.” (Taylor, 2002, p.128). 
Hermeneutic conversation 
Gadamer’s account of conversation as the basis of human understanding is therefore 
extremely helpful in reminding the researcher how such conversations need to be 
conducted if they are not to result in the sham described above by Taylor.  Gadamer is 
just as interested as MacIntyre in language and the problems of translation.  He 
spends some time comparing the process of understanding in ordinary conversation 
with the process of hermeneutic interpretation of a text, and concludes: 
“Thus it is perfectly legitimate to speak of a hermeneutical conversation.  
But from this it follows that hermeneutical conversation, like real 
conversation, finds a common language, and that finding a common 
language is not, any more than in a real conversation, preparing a tool for 
the purpose of reaching understanding but, rather, coincides with the very 
act of understanding and reaching agreement.  Even between partners of 
this “conversation” a communication like that between two people takes 
place that is more than mere accommodation.  The text brings a subject 
matter into language, but that it does so is ultimately the achievement of the 
interpreter.  Both have a share in it” (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 389-390). 
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Understanding is a joint enterprise, which brings into language a new subject, and 
Gadamer defines understanding as both linguistic and historically situated:  “The 
linguisticality of understanding is the concretion of historically effected consciousness” 
(Gadamer, 1975, pp. 389-390). 
Natural and genuine conversation 
This is important for a researcher hoping to follow philosophical hermeneutics in 
conducting interviews.  For understanding to be possible, the researcher must engage 
in genuine conversation.  The researcher cannot, in Gadamer’s view, stand back from 
the conversation and observe his interlocutor as an object of study in themselves.  As 
far as possible, the researcher will need to engage with the other as a rational agent 
and as a co-creator of an understanding or agreement on some topic which is of 
interest to both parties.  ‘As far as possible’, because in some cases it may not be 
possible for the researcher to engage in this way: there may be occasions on which the 
views expressed by the other are sufficiently repellent that no such rapport is available.  
More commonly, there may be simply points on which honest disagreement needs to 
be acknowledged, in order to preserve the relationship of mutual respect which a 
genuine conversation implies.  Again, this is not to say that a good conversation should 
be an argument (and the more so with a research interview), but only that the focus 
must remain on the views being expressed, the story being told, not on the interlocutor 
as an individual. 
There are two main consequences of this, which are in keeping with MacIntyre’s 
stance, and to some extent enable the researcher to accommodate his views on 
objectivity as openness to conflict.  First is the general attitude which the researcher 
will need to maintain: any interview based on Gadamer’s notion of a genuine 
conversation comprises two rational agents in a meeting of views, not a student and an 
object of study.  Second, it follows from that principle, that whilst there is an onus on 
the researcher to make the effort to understand the other’s viewpoint (the researcher 
has requested the interview, after all), there is also an obligation on the researcher to 
offer a view in return when appropriate.  In other words, the researcher cannot pretend 
not to have relevant views and cannot simply withhold views during the conversation.  
Judgement will therefore be required as to when such moments arise, but these 
judgements will not be on the basis of pre-planned tactics designed to elicit a particular 
kind of response.  Such tactics would, again, be a recipe for an inauthentic 
conversation in Gadamer’s terms. 
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3.9 MacIntyrean enquiry 
As summarised in Section 2.11 above there is a growing movement of academics who 
are using MacIntyre’s thinking as a basis for empirical enquiry.  Beadle and Moore 
(2011) explore the way in which MacIntyre has influenced research in organisation 
theory.  They make the case that “a set of philosophical commitments unite 
MacIntyrean and hermeneutic attitudes towards research methods.  The intimacy 
between social structures, social roles … and the tradition-constituted framework 
through which notions as fundamental as agency and context are understood provides 
distinctive boundaries around the conduct of research.”  They cite a number of 
MacIntyrean empirical studies which are characterised by an emphasis on thick 
descriptions created through narrative, and suggest that empirical work claiming to 
follow MacIntyre’s philosophy would exclude certain types of enquiry.  They refer to the 
following list of exclusions from Coe and Beadle (2008): 
 ‘enquiries which do not relate themselves (including the possibility of critically 
relating themselves) to a tradition-constituted community of enquiry;  enquiries seeking to create law-like generalizations through the testing of 
hypotheses about causation through measurement of a defined list of variables;  enquiries which do not report their findings in a narrative form;  enquiries which exclude agents’ self-understandings in attempting to account 
for their behaviour;  enquiries which exclude either  features of institutions (structure) or the agency 
of subjects in their explanations;  enquiries which do not recognize the ineliminable presence of the enquirers’ 
judgments in the accounts they present.’ (Coe and Beadle, 2008, p.10) 
The authors include the point of caution that the second bullet point does not exclude 
quantitative research, only research which makes positivist assumptions about the 
creation of law-like generalisations.  This is a useful list, but is cast in the negative in 
order to describe limits to what might be considered MacIntyrean research; it is not a 
formula for research design.  What it can do is to provide boundaries to potential 
research designs. 
We are now in a position to state in a positive mode, six principles of enquiry.  These 
match the six principles of epistemology already explored in the current chapter and 
are designed to be compatible with the boundaries set by Coe and Beadle (2008).  
They are stated here following the same sequence as that explored in the sections 3.3 
to 3.8 above: 
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Principle 1.  Moral enquiry is constituted in relation to particular traditions.  Traditions 
provide those bases in rationality from which the researcher enquires and from which 
participants or respondents answer. 
Principle 2. Narrative is both a medium of discovery and a medium for reporting; i.e. 
the self-understandings of research participants are encountered in the form of 
narrative, and research findings are presented likewise in the form of narrative. 
Principle 3. Plain persons are also always moral philosophers;  as moral agents in 
their day-to-day practice, plain persons are at least as well placed as professional 
philosophers to develop cogent moral theory. 
Principle 4. Claims to truth are provisional.  Truth is the aim of enquiry; rationality 
provides the resources by which enquiry is carried through.  Truth cannot be claimed 
as the outcome of any particular piece of research, only progress towards the truth;  
theories generated by empirical research are always to some degree provisional. 
Principle 5. All understanding is conditioned by culturally established prejudgements, 
a set of assumptions which make a particular agent’s horizon of understanding 
available to them.  Again this includes researcher and research participant. 
Principle 6. Human understanding is reached through conversations, both natural 
and hermeneutic, and all genuine conversations are places in which some fusion of 
horizons is ventured.  Conversation is a paradigm for the hermeneutic circle. 
Because this list is positively stated, it is more directive than Coe and Beadle’s list of 
exclusions quoted above, but it matches those limitations, allowing that the emphasis 
and language is in some respects different, mainly because of the introduction of 
concepts drawn from Gadamer.  In both cases the language is not yet fully the 
mainstream terminology of doctoral research; the terms interpretation / interpretive, 
data, data collection, analysis, coding etc., have not appeared in the set.  Most of these 
terms will reappear in further discussion, but it will have been helpful to have filled out 
this background first;  ‘data’, for instance, will reappear as some form of narrative 
and/or transcript of conversation.  For similar reasons, time has been taken up to this 
point to discuss at length the key notions arising from MacIntyre and Gadamer, in order 
that terms will be less open to misinterpretation.  So, for instance, the use of ‘narrative’ 




The above six list of six principles may be represented in diagrammatic form as follows: 
Figure 1:  Research Design Scheme 
 
 
The above diagram is intended as a visual representation of the six key principles of 
the research: conversation, narrative, prejudgement, tradition, plain persons, 
provisional truth status.  Conversation and narrative occupy a central place, and are 
particularly relevant to the gathering of primary data: primary data is generated through 
conversations, and those conversations concern narratives, especially participants’ 
narratives of their own professional lives.  On the left of the diagram are those 
principles which particularly inform the background to the gathering and analysis of 
primary data, and on the right of the diagram is the principle concerning the status of 
the research findings with regard to truth and rationality.  However, this diagram is not 
intended to convey an adequate sense of sequencing. 
Central to the scheme is the enactment of conversations, both natural and 
hermeneutic.  In particular, in this model primary data is generated through research 
conversations.  These conversations are in the form of ‘semi-structured interviews’, but 
because they are explicitly genuine conversations, they also have the following 
characteristics: 
 the conversation is led by neither party, but by both, so that the route that the 
conversation takes cannot be described in advance;  there is no attempt to exclude certain types of contribution from the research 









 the researcher likewise offers his own views (prejudgements) where 
appropriate, including on occasion his understanding of relevant academic 
theory, and there is no pretence of a neutral standpoint;  disagreement is possible in the conversation, including the possibility of a 
fundamental failure to understand one another;  conversational gambits may be used in an ordinary way by both parties, but 
there is no attempt by the researcher to manipulate the other into a given type 
of response in a pre-planned way; the research participant is at all times treated 
as a rational agent. 
As with any diagrammatic scheme, there is much that is not stated here.  Perhaps the 
most important omission to highlight here is the idea of reflexivity.  This is a strong 
theme in Gadamer, and he is keen to stress that his rehabilitation of the idea of 
prejudgement is not an excuse for a lack of rigour in the researcher, or a lack of 
engagement in conversation.  As Gadamer has it, ‘a person who is not ready to put his 
or her own prejudices in question is also someone to whom there is no point talking’ 
(Gadamer, 2001, pp.44).  This places an obligation on the researcher to continuously 
reflect on and question his own prejudices, and his own historical standpoint, including 
his position in any given tradition (Gadamer, 2001, p.46).  Reflexivity is therefore an 
essential theme which runs throughout this kind of research method and is implicit in all 
elements of the above scheme.  
3.10 Description of method: data collection 
Data was collected through ten conversations with leaders in Scottish banking in the 
period January to June 2013.  These interviews were set up as genuine conversations 
(Principle 6) in which the views of both parties were on offer and a fusion of horizons 
was intended.  This is not to say that they were unplanned; an interview plan in the 
style of semi-structured interviews was used, and this plan is shown at Appendix 1.  
The conversations gave the participants the opportunity to tell stories (Principle 2) from 
their own working lives and to tell stories, if they wished, about changes in their 
profession over the last thirty years.  The conversations therefore consisted of a 
mixture of personal reminiscences (e.g. about their first job) and wider accounts of the 
banking industry as they saw it. 
Conversations 
Because participants were regarded as moral philosophers in practice (Principle 3), 
there was open discussion of questions which go beyond a simple recollection of first-
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hand experience; so for instance there were discussions of the link between moral 
character and business failure.  The views of participants are taken seriously in this 
regard.  So, although the research question, ‘Is Scottish banking a corrupted practice?’ 
could not be put directly to participants, nevertheless it was still possible to explain and 
discuss MacIntyre’s idea of a practice, if this was appropriate to the course of the 
conversation at the time. 
Because these interviews were real conversations, ordinary conversational gambits 
were undertaken by both parties including the offering of views by the researcher 
where appropriate.  This led to some fruitful exchanges, particularly where the 
participant either strongly agreed or strongly disagreed with the view offered by the 
researcher, and this is shown in discussion of findings.  There was no attempt made, 
either before or during interviews to disguise the fact that the researcher had a 
particular perspective (Principle 5), but in the interests of permitting a genuine 
conversation, much of this perspective was held back in order to allow the research 
participant to follow their own line of thought.  This was a skill requiring judgement and 
balance from the researcher.  If no perspective is offered by the researcher, then no 
genuine conversation can take place, but if too much perspective is offered by the 
researcher, then the views of participants may be stifled.  In practice, participants were 
very forthcoming with their views and very ready to put their own perspective forward if 
they encountered views with which they disagreed, whether this was a view put by the 
researcher or a view circulating in public media. 
This process assumed an appreciative stance (Michael, 2005), so that if people were 
encountered who the researcher could not identify with positively as conversation 
partners, then there was always a risk that any particular interview would fail in this 
regard.  In fact this did not happen, but it does make for a potential limitation on this 
research method. 
The interview plan at Appendix 1 provides a framework which is flexible and which 
aims to cover two broad themes based based on questions designed to elicit 
autobiographical narrative:  “Tell me about your career”, “Tell me about a good leader 
(or a bad leader)”, and “Tell me about an ethical challenge in leadership”.  These 
questions are framed on Aristotelian lines derived from the literature review, rather than 
on organisation theory.  The first theme of career narrative invites the respondent to 
structure their own story in the way that they wish, including the narration of their 
progress towards their telos.  The second theme invites stories about particular 
leaders, which might be characterised along ethical lines or not.  The third theme 
introduces an ethical theme explicitly, inviting more stories or other responses including 
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counter-views to the theme.  The requirement of flexibility means that the conversation 
may go in a completely different direction from the plan; this does not imply that the 
interview will not have succeeded.  Quite the reverse might be the case, and such a 
‘derailed’ interview may be a particularly rich source of data. 
Planning and flexibility in questions 
Two types of question are particularly relevant to the research; the central research 
question itself, and the questions put to research participants. 
The research question for this thesis evolved over the life of the research, and in fact 
evolved into a central question and several sub-questions in response to the review of 
literature and the focus on leaders in Scottish banking.  The central research question 
moved from being a very general one concerning ethics and leadership, ‘How might we 
develop an Aristotelian ethics approach to leadership in banking?’ to one much more 
directly focused on the profession of banking cast in a specifically MacIntyrean frame: 
‘Is Scottish banking a corrupted practice?’ 
‘Practice’ is here a technical term (MacIntyre, 2007) which is explored in the literature 
review.  In an ordinary language phrasing, it is close to the question: ‘Is Scottish 
banking a corrupted profession?’  And this in turn is close to the questions that Scottish 
bankers and bankers more widely in the UK are in fact asking themselves at the 
present time both in private and in public (Chartered Banker Institute, 2011b).  It is 
therefore a question which reflects not only central concerns of MacIntyrean 
philosophy, but also central concerns of contemporary banking.  The question is 
supplemented by four sub-questions: 
 What do we learn about banking ethics by understanding banking as a practice? 
 Do the accounts of Scottish bankers provide evidence of the corruption of that 
practice from the 1980s onwards? 
 Do the accounts of Scottish bankers provide evidence for a distinctive tradition of 
Scottish banking? 
 If so, is that tradition capable of self-renewal? 
These questions can then be compared to the questions shown at Appendix 1, which 
are sample questions for the semi-structured interviews with leaders in Scottish 
banking.  These interview questions are fluid. They were scripted as a general guide; 
phrasing, sequencing and so on were not intended to be performed the same way 
twice. The questions were planned to follow a structure which falls into four parts: 
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career history, admired / unadmired leaders, ethical challenges and looking to the 
future. 
The development of the conversations in practice 
The questions used to shape the research interviews predated the final central 
research question(s), and this is significant in the development of the research method.  
The central research question and its sub-questions could not be fully formulated until 
at least some of the research conversations had been held.  This is because some 
assumptions – prejudgements - were brought to the first conversations by the 
researcher and others were not.  So, for instance, an interest in life stories is an 
assumption of an Aristotelian ethics enquiry, because the notion of a ‘telos’ or ultimate 
purpose in life is basic to such an enquiry.  However, there could be no similar 
assumption that banking is a practice in a MacIntyrean sense.  As the interviews then 
began to take place and through those conversations a picture of banking emerged in 
which participants spoke of their careers in terms of practices and traditions, then the 
researcher was able to formulate more precise central research questions related to 
the MacIntyrean literature. 
These more technical questions could then be adapted for inclusion in conversations 
as a development of the basic interview plan.  So, for instance, towards the end of an 
interview, when a participant had already spoken at length about their professional 
career and the current state of banking, it was sometimes appropriate to introduce 
some of MacIntyre’s ideas about practices and institutions, or traditions.  In one 
conversation this led to the researcher proposing the following interpretation of what 
his interlocutor had been saying:  ‘…investment banking and retail banking are really 
just two completely different, two different professions’ (C6: 126).  In the context of a 
large diversified financial organisation, this in effect formed a question which is a 
derivation of a MacIntyrean one:  ‘How does one institution successfully support two 
diametrically opposed practices?’ 
So from the point of view of the sequencing of this research, it has been important that 
the initial interview plans were open ended, with a simple structure and basic questions 
designed to encourage narratives of working life.  As the research progressed, the 
conversations which then took place enabled the researcher to refine his thinking about 
the issues which emerged as important to the group.  These issues could then be 
reflected back to the participants through genuine conversations, but always without 
limiting the initial open ended scope of the basic interview plan.  Participants were 
always invited to tell the story or stories of their own career as they saw it, before any 
more focused topics were introduced, and conversations lasted from one to two hours. 
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Sampling 
A purposive sampling approach was used (Cleary, Horsfall and Hayter, 2014).  
Leaders in Scottish banking were sought who had long-standing industry experience.  
With one exception, all participants had at least 15 years experience in Scottish 
banking, most had in excess of 25 years’ and one had 40 years’ experience.  Several 
of the participants were reached through personal contacts and word of mouth, and 
this group tended to be closely associated with The Chartered Banker Institute.  An 
effort was made to also reach banking leaders who were less closely associated with 
the Institute.  This was achieved through the professional networking site LinkedIn and 
by word of mouth.  The primary data set is therefore comprised of conversations with 
people who were leaders in Scottish banking, particularly those who had a long enough 
career behind them to have lived through changes in the industry. 
The process of focusing on leaders in Scottish banking was a gradual one.  Initially a 
focus was developed on a wider group: leaders in the financial sector in Scotland and 
the North East.  However, early in the interviews it emerged that leaders in Scottish 
banking formed a well-defined group with a clear sense of its own identity.  This sense 
of identity was expressed by participants in terms of the tradition of Scottish banking, 
which made it an ideal group for an explicitly MacIntyrean enquiry (Principle 1).  It was 
then decided to focus specifically on this group, and two early interviews outside of the 
group were excluded from the primary data set.   
The aim was to focus on an identifiable community, and this was achieved.  However, 
most communities are comprised of groups with fluid boundaries (Wenger, 2000), and 
in the context of this research the community in question is liable to consist of 
members of long standing or possessing a ‘typical’ profile together with those of less 
long standing or less typical profiles.  In the case of leaders in Scottish banking, a 
‘typical’ profile could be characterised as: 
 Scottish 
 a banker 
 with a track record in a leadership role 
 in a Scottish bank 
 or in banks in Scotland. 
As soon as such a list is proposed, however, exceptions arise.  So although most of 
those interviewed met all of these descriptions, not all did. 
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A map of this kind of approach to sampling might look something like this: 




 A = Bankers who have worked their whole careers or much of it in banking in 
Scotland and are active and fully qualified members of the Chartered Banker 
Institute. 
 B = People who are Scottish and have worked for many years in banking but 
may not now work in banking in Scotland, or people who may not be Scottish 
but have worked a number of years in banking in Scotland. 
 C = People who run the Chartered Banker Institute, based in Scotland, but with 
a UK wide remit. 
 D = People who run banks or quasi-banks other than in Scotland. 
So in the sampling strategy for this research, ten participants have been included in the 
primary data set, of whom seven fit the description for band A, two fit the description for 






A B C D 
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3.11 Description of method:  interpretation of data 
Analysis of data has followed a hermeneutic approach (Principles 5 and 6), with an 
emphasis on narrative (Principle 2), paying particular attention to themes arising from 
an Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition as transmitted by MacIntyre.  A conscious effort 
has been made to maintain a process of building successive hermeneutic circles 
through which the understanding of the researcher evolves.  Hermeneutic 
conversations have been conducted between researcher and text (the record of 
interviews) as well as between researcher and academic literature.  This leads to a 
complex set of interrelated natural and hermeneutic conversations being conducted to 
some degree simultaneously and to some degree in sequence, as illustrated below. 













This diagram visualises a sequence of interpretive events.  The researcher conducted 
the first natural conversation in January 2013; R1 designates the researcher at the time 
of this meeting, and P1, Participant 1, his interlocutor.  This interview was a genuine 
conversation in Gadamer’s sense of that phrase and constituted a distinct hermeneutic 
circle.  The conversation was recorded and later transcribed, resulting in the first 
transcript, T1.  The act of transcription was itself also an act of interpretation and 
likewise constituted a further hermeneutic circle.   
Immediately following completion of the transcript, and before moving onto another 



















approximately the same length as the transcript itself.  This act of interpretation, shown 
as a loop between R and T1, was in Gadamer’s terms a hermeneutic conversation, 
and constituted a further hermeneutic circle.  These two documents, transcript and 
commentary, then formed a linked pair, which were maintained as the basis for further 
acts of interpretation.  In the meantime, further conversations were conducted, 
transcribed, interpreted to a commentary, and so on.  These are shown on the diagram 
as R2 (the researcher at the time of the second interview in February 2013), holding a 
conversation with P2 (the second participant), the transcript T2 being made and a 
second commentary being written.  A further eight conversations were held and 
interpreted in the same way, not shown on this diagram.  At the same time, before 
during and after these cycles of interpretation related to primary data, the researcher  
was conducting hermeneutic conversations with the academic literature.  This is shown 
as a loop on the diagram between the researcher R and the literature L.  This loop 
should be envisaged as representing an indeterminate series of turns of the 
hermeneutic circle as the researcher read successive articles and books. 
The diagram is thus a simplified visual representation of a complex process in which a 
number of natural and hermeneutic conversations were conducted.  These 
conversations were in each instance turns of the hermeneutic circle, and were unified 
by the person of the researcher, who was engaged in an ongoing process of 
understanding.  Crucial to this process in terms of Gadamer’s thinking is the realisation 
that the researcher’s perspective is never stationary.  Each time that a turn of the 
hermeneutic circle commences, the researcher engages in an act of interpretation 
which is determined by his prejudgements at that time.  When that act of interpretation 
is complete (albeit provisionally) the researcher’s prejudgements have been adjusted, 
so that when the next turn of the circle commences this new act of interpretation is 
determined by a new set of prejudgements.  Another way to express this is to say that 
as each circle is complete, some fusion of horizons will have occurred, such that the 
researcher’s horizon has shifted before the next conversation is encountered. 
Narration and analysis 
The overall mode of analysis here is hermeneutic and interpretive.  In fact ‘analysis’ is 
itself arguably a misleading term in this context; what is not being undertaken in this 
research is analysis in the root sense of breaking down into component parts.  It would 
be better to characterise the process as successive acts of interpretation from one kind 
of language into another, or from one set of narratives to another.  The transcripts of 
conversations which form the primary data set do not consist only of narratives (they 
also contain questions, speculative theories, affirmations, rebuttals and so on), but 
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narratives are of primary interest, and a fusion of those narratives will result in an 
overarching narrative to be produced by the researcher. 
To what extent is it helpful to describe this undertaking as ‘narrative research’?  It 
clearly is narrative research insomuch as it elicits stories through interviews and then 
interprets those stories through a narrative built up by the researcher, and there are 
various texts (Andrews, Squire and Tamboukou,2008; Elliott, 2005) which offer helpful 
advice about the rationale for and techniques of narrative research in social science.  
However, such authors also make clear that narrative enquiry is very heterogeneous 
and not particularly rule bound.  Even then, their assumptions are not necessarily the 
assumptions of this research.  So for instance Elliott (2005) distinguishes between first-
order narratives, which describe the first hand lived experience of research 
participants, and second-order narratives produced by the researcher which make 
sense of other people’s accounts and the social world.  The current research project, 
however, recognises participants as second-order narrators in this sense, because it 
recognises them as moral philosophers.  So the participants in this research might 
embark on first-order narratives with a phrase such as ‘My first job was in a branch of X 
Bank in Dunfermline…’; or equally they might embark on second-order narratives with 
a phrase such as ‘The problem with banking these days…’  Both are equally valuable 
sources of data. 
Perhaps the most helpful way to characterise this research, then, is as narrative 
enquiry in a MacIntyrean mode, and to rely on the six principles of enquiry already 
articulated, together with MacIntyre’s writings more widely to guide the way that the 
research approaches the stories being told.  For example, the emphasis on genuine 
conversation which is central to this research method implies that the researcher takes 
seriously the intended meaning of each participant, as far as this can be ascertained.  
Ostensible meanings conveyed through stories are therefore of primary interest.  This 
is not to say that hidden or unintended meanings are not of interest or factors such as 
narrative structure, genre or context, but they are of interest principally in 
understanding this or that particular person’s point of view.  The first question is, ‘What 
is this person trying to say in this story?’ rather than, ‘What is this person 
unintentionally revealing about themselves?’  The same principle guides another 
aspect of this narrative approach, which is that the research aims to articulate 
narratives as presented by this group, rather than to critique their narratives against 




Coding or indexing 
The point of caution above about the word ‘analysis’ applies also to the idea of 
thematic analysis and coding.  Analysis here cannot mean the breaking down of text 
into component parts, since it is vital that the texts retain their narrative and 
conversational unity and context; either a broken-up story is no longer a story, or it is a 
different story.  For similar reasons, the term ‘coding’ needs to be treated with caution, 
since some methods of coding text imply that sections of text are categorised, and 
potentially reordered (Bryman, 2008).  So ‘coding’ has been used in this research in 
the process of interpreting primary data, but only in the sense of indexing, without 
categorising, breaking up or re-ordering sections of text.  This process of indexing 
supports the hermeneutic sequencing of successive interpretations, allowing the 
researcher to track themes or topics through successive stages of the development of 
his own ‘second-order’ narratives and to demonstrate that those themes remain rooted 
in the original stories told by the research participants. 
Examples of the coding process are shown at Appendix 2.  The appendix shows how 
transcripts were coded using a simple tabular format in a word processing programme.  
This process was flexible, allowing for a number of adaptations of coding patterns.  
Indexing in this way was used as a means of recording interpretation and retrieving 
data for the presentation of findings in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.  The appendix 
also shows a coding diagram which illustrates how coding was being grouped during 
analysis.  However, this process was treated flexibly at all times, and there was no 
attempt to have interpretation follow coding.  Rather, coding followed interpretation, 
and then acted as a flexible aide-memoire during further iterations of interpretation. 
3.12 Completion and output 
Completeness and sufficiency 
How does the researcher know when sufficient data has been collected?  No formula 
for completeness of a qualitative data set is available within what has here been 
described as MacIntyrean enquiry, as there is, for instance, in grounded theory with the 
notion of saturation (Bowen, 2008).  In MacIntyrean enquiry there is no expectation that 
at a given point new data will begin to produce no new themes.  Further, if we are to 
take Gadamer seriously, then the implication of his thinking is that we should not 
expect any such point of closure to be reached, for several reasons.  First, each new 
conversation reveals a new participant, and any new participant may always introduce 
new ideas if the possibilities of the conversation are kept open.  Insomuch as every 
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individual has lived a life to date which is unique, then their particular perspective and 
the stories that they tell of their own history will likewise be unique.  Second, if the 
researcher is genuinely open to a fusion of horizons with each encounter and the 
epistemic risk which that brings, then he not only approaches each conversation with a 
slightly different set of assumptions from the last one, but, more than this, he should be 
open to the idea that no matter how clear any particular theme appears from his 
research to date, any such certainty may always be overturned by the next interview.  
Lastly, there is the general point that the claims to truth of this research are provisional 
(Principle 4); they carry with them no claim to completeness or finality. 
In practice, after ten conversations were held, a review of the data and ongoing 
interpretation was conducted to determine sufficiency.  The interpretive commentaries 
were critical in this regard, because they illustrated for the researcher and for the 
research supervision team the richness of the data being gathered.  The primary 
criterion for sufficiency was that enough rich data had been generated to support 
overall narratives relevant to the central research questions.  The interpretive 
commentary itself, which ran to 128 pages by the end of conversation no. 10, 
demonstrated this, and the decision was made to begin writing up findings.  The 
narratives which emerged in the commentaries were clearly MacIntyrean in nature – 
there was for instance a central narrative forming from the outset regarding tradition – 
but this was not a requirement for sufficiency; it would have been equally possible that 
an entirely different set of narratives could emerge and these would still have been 
sufficient for the writing of the thesis. 
Narrative as output 
The output from this research is in the form of narrative, which implies some form of 
meta-narrative or second-order narrative, though not one which necessarily purports to 
represent a group account.  What criteria then should such a narrative meet in order to 
be able to claim to have moved towards the truth rather than away from it?  In addition 
to the requirement of conforming in general terms to the six points of principle already 
discussed, there are perhaps some additional things to be said specifically of this type 
of narrative in the context of moral enquiry. 
 Since this is an empirical enquiry, and there is a clear primary data set 
available, this type of narrative output should be evidence based and should at 
each stage show clearly how the story being told is grounded in the transcripts.  Since MacIntyre and Gadamer both insist on the importance of the situation of 
the enquirer, the story should make this clear:  there can be no question of the 
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narrator (the researcher) either attempting to efface himself and his 
assumptions from the story, or adopting a mask for this occasion which might 
be then set aside for another.  Since both MacIntyre and Gadamer both insist on the importance of tradition 
and historical understanding, the story should connect the past with the 
present, seeking an understanding of how things have come to be the way that 
they are which is rooted in the way that they were.  This is of course not only a 
process which looks to the past, but also one which looks to the future.  Insomuch as this is a moral enquiry, then those reasons for actions which form 
significant links in the sequence of events should be to a sufficient degree moral 
reasons19.  Insomuch as it is an Aristotelian and particularly a MacIntyrean 
enquiry, then such reasons should speak of the practical life of moral agents, 
capable of their own moral reasoning. 
These points influenced the writing of Chapters 4 and 5 on findings.  An effort has been 
made to refer as far as possible to the primary data directly in the text, particularly as 
an initial chronological narrative is developed.  The position of the researcher is 
referenced where appropriate including in the discussion in Chapter 6.  The moral 
reasoning of the participants is treated with respect albeit critically on occasion, and 
their various modes of reasoning are allowed to speak directly in the narratives given. 
3.13 Research ethics and confidentiality of primary data 
The procedure of the research has followed the ethics policy of Northumbria University 
Faculty of Business and Law.  Ethical approval to the research was gained on the 18th 
of June 2012 (correspondence shown at Appendix 6).  Compliance included participant 
consent forms which made explicit the commitments of the researcher to ensure 
confidentiality (example shown at Appendix 6).  The usual procedures were followed in 
order to protect the participants in the study, including removal of names of people and 
organisations from the transcripts and secure storage of data. At one point in the text of 
the thesis (Section 6.3), a short fictionalised case history is used to protect identities. 
Participants in the conversations have offered frank and detailed autobiographical 
information, and an added consideration for this research has been the high profile of 
                                               
19
 Usage of the phrase   moral reasons is intended here flexibly.  Primarily it is intended to 
distinguish reasoning that concerns either ends or moral rules from reasoning which is purely 
instrumental.  Note that this is here a principle of narrative formulation, not a principle of analytic 
structure.  Justification for what are interpreted as moral reasons rather than instrumental ones 
depends on the exploration of moral themes given in chapters 5 and 6. 
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several of these participants who are senior leaders and well known in their 
professional sphere.  The researcher has been sensitive to the need to protect 
identities and consequently has not recorded details which would make the voices 
shown in the thesis recognisable, including information on age and ethnicity.  Only a 
general profile of professional standing of the group is given above at Section 3.10.  
The transcripts of the conversations held run to 205 pages, 102,049 words.  For similar 
reasons of confidentiality, extended sections of the transcript documents are not made 
public with the thesis.  Selected and limited quotations are used in the text of the 
thesis, and additional references without quotation are given to show relevant 
anchoring of the findings in the primary data.  References are then made to the 
transcripts by number of conversation and page number of the primary data set in the 
form ‘C10: 200’, where C10 refers to Conversation no. 10, and 200 refers to page 200 
of the overall data set.  
3.14 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter has described a method of research which is consistent with MacIntyre’s 
ideas of tradition-constituted enquiry.  It has sought to combine his epistemology with 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics in the conduct of empirical enquiry which is able to articulate 
a movement towards agreement in gathering and interpreting data, and is also able to 
explore a movement towards conflict in moral narratives. 
Six principles of enquiry have been developed: 
 Moral enquiry is constituted in relation to particular traditions;  Narrative is both a medium of discovery and a medium for reporting;  Plain persons are also moral philosophers;  Claims to truth are provisional;  All understanding is conditioned by culturally established prejudgements;  Conversation is a paradigm for understanding. 
The implications of these principles for research method have been discussed 
including data collection through genuine conversations, and the role of hermeneutics 
and narrative in interpreting and presenting findings. 
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Chapter 4:  Chronological narrative 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide two different kinds of narrative as articulations of the content 
of the ten research conversations which were held in Edinburgh and Lothian from 
January to June 2013.  Chapter 4 is a chronological narrative which aims to give an 
overview of the recollections of the group with a minimum of dependence on explicit 
theory.  Chapter 5 then narrates the same material, but from a theoretical perspective, 
deploying key themes in MacIntyrean and Aristotelian enquiry. 
The chronology of the current chapter begins with the recollections of the group 
concerning their careers in banking before the impact of the deregulation of the UK 
banking system in the 1980s and charts the transition from traditional banking in 
Scotland – ‘old banking’ as it is termed here – to a new style of banking which 
developed in the 1990s.  The narrative falls into three broad phases.  The first phase is 
a period of relative stability: old banking, which is recounted by the participants from 
the 1960s in some cases, through to the 1980s.  The second phase is a period of 
radical change from the late 1980s through to the early 2000s: the introduction of ‘new 
banking’.  The third phase is another period of radical change extending from 2007 to 
the present and future: the crisis in new banking. 
The manner of relating this narrative here is to use the participants’ own words as far 
as possible.  There is little reference during this narrative to any other sources, and no 
attempt is made to critique the participants’ stories from the point of view of any 
external history. 
4.2 Old Banking 
‘They started talking about the old bank and the new bank’ (C1: 4) 20. 
Old banking, as the phrase implies, has largely been replaced, even if many who 
consider themselves traditional bankers remain active and dedicated to its values.  
Two of the participants in this research began their careers in the late 1960s, and 
                                               
20
 References to primary data are given throughout this chapter in the form ‘C4: 89’, where C4 
refers to Conversation no. 4, and 89 refers to page 89.  Pages are numbered continuously from 
1 to 205 in the primary data master document, which contains the ten conversations in temporal 
sequence.  A similar convention is applied to participants, as in ‘P1’ for the participant in 
Conversation no. 1. 
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several others in the 1970s.  Their memories of old banking are nevertheless clear, 
and some of the most vivid and detailed stories are told of early career events including 
the processes of entering banking in the first place.   
All of these participants have had long and successful careers in banking, but none 
had any idea of such careers when they first went to work for a bank, often straight 
from school.  Why did they go into banking? 
‘I had had an uncle who worked in the X Bank who I had visited when he 
was manager of the branch in Port Ellen on the Isle of Islay on the West 
Coast of Scotland, which was a very nice place to be a bank manager, 
because his life consisted of living upstairs and around the branch and sort 
of wandering down about quarter past nine in the morning to open the mail, 
maybe see a customer or two and then wander out to meet the ferry 
coming in on a daily [basis] to see who was on the ferry and then 
somewhere for lunch then back to the office for maybe a meeting or two, 
sign some letters and that was his day. So that was very appealing 
[laughs].  The other influencing factor I suppose was that I was brought up 
in St. Andrews where there was kind of a race when the school closed 
between the school kids and the people who worked in the bank as to who 
got to the golf course first, because the hours were slightly different then.  
So there was another appealing factor.  And there was also I suppose the 
headmaster in the school in St. Andrews was at the time when I was 
growing up at secondary school regularly at morning assembly he’d be 
reading out vacancies in the local banks.  And his words they were like a 
tape recorder.  Every time he announced a vacancy in whatever bank it 
was, because there were five, he would say that he could commend 
banking as a career to any young man [emphasised with a laugh] who was 
interested in that sort of thing.  I suppose all these things came together.’  
(C2: 22-23) 
This young man was not alone in choosing old banking for reasons other than pay and 
promotion prospects.  Another was more interested in football.  ‘And I was 17, I’d 
finished my Highers in fifth year, didn’t fancy doing a sixth year.  Loved playing football 
and thought: I’ll just get a job that pays £35 a week.  Much to the disappointment of my 
parents’ (C6: 107).  Chance plays a large part in many of the stories at this stage.  ‘I fell 
into it, and at 17 I felt: Och, I’ll do it for a year, then I’ll go back and do the university.  
And here I am 26 years later without a break’ (C10: 187). 
The beginnings of such careers in old banking offered stability, the prospect of a 
respected status in the local community and a long apprenticeship in order to get there, 
including taking the required banking exams.  Several of the bankers were surprised by 
the necessity of sitting exams as soon as soon as they made the move from school to 
work:  ‘literally it would be about a couple of months into the job, and the branch 
manager said to me, “You’ll be doing your exams.”  “What exams?”  thinking I’ve 
finished with exams for the rest of my life.  And he said, “No, you’ll be doing your 
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Institute exams”’ (C6: 108).  This was a requirement for anyone to make progress to 
management levels, including branch manager.   
These formal qualifications, run by the Chartered Banker Institute, formed a bedrock 
for professional knowledge in Scottish banking, but they were not the only element.  A 
practical and often prolonged apprenticeship was also required ‘in old traditional 
branch banking where you were the junior who learned the ropes as a 16 year old from 
then up’ (C5: 93).  One banker who rose to the most senior executive levels first of all 
spent 25 years in junior teller and middle management roles before being promoted to 
senior management roles.  ‘I used to be ambitious like everybody else, used to want to 
get on, and people used to say, “You know it’ll not be until you’re 40 before you get 
your first Bank Manager’s job”’ (C3: 65).  This structure ensured a firm grounding in 
professional practice and experience of a range of economic circumstances, before 
being offered senior levels of responsibility.  ‘It wasn’t because you weren’t clever 
enough, it was because you needed experience to take on that role’ (C3: 65).  Those 
who entered banking in these circumstances recognise the impact that such thorough 
apprenticeships had on ethical awareness:  ‘the way it used to be, when your first 
promotion came ... you were 30 if you were lucky, so you’d had a long time to learn 
what the ethics were in the business’ (C1: 6). 
In old banking, the status of branch manager (which was synonymous with bank 
manager or just manager) was worth waiting for, not so much for the salary it carried, 
but for the position of respect accorded to the role by the local community:  ‘it was your 
old branch managers who tended to hold that respect of all their customers and within 
the town as well.  They were seen as being honest and trustworthy and a key member 
of the community, I suppose’ (C7: 136).  The passing of that role and that status is felt 
as loss: ‘that role of an individual within a community is completely disappeared.  I think 
only the local doctor still commands that type of respect now, whereas 30 odd years 
ago, 20 years ago, the doctor would, the policeman would, and the banker would’ (C7: 
141).  Others have a similar sense of loss that the role of ‘trusted advisor’ (C5: 96) to 
the local community is closed to them.   
Several bankers recall that in old banking branch managers tended to be of a similar 
stamp:  ‘there was a degree of diversity there, but generally a pretty common approach 
to the way it was’ (C2: 24).  One, as a junior in the bank, found these old style 
managers formal and ‘very far away’ (C9: 170), but others recall key characters with 
affection.  One banker early in his career together with another junior colleague had 
presented a report to his Chief Executive which was less than satisfactory: 
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‘And we sat round his desk and just discussed it for ten minutes or so, and 
then he simply handed it across the desk to us, and he said, ‘I think, 
gentlemen, that paper requires further work.’  And you knew without being 
shouted at that you needed to go and do further work.  And so there was a 
manner about him; the respect that man commanded was just enormous, 
just enormous.  Never made a fuss about things.  Believed passionately in 
what he was doing, and saw very clearly what had to be done and got on 
with it.  Just a very impressive man.’  (C1: 8) 
The emphasis in these early career stories is on encounters with senior managers who 
had characters and occasional eccentricities of their own, but who displayed a strong 
degree of conformity in their attitudes to banking and to working life, and who were 
conservative both in their manners of communication and in their attitudes to risk.  As 
another says of branch managers in the late 1960s:  ‘the managers when I was young 
gave me a good grounding.  I wouldn’t single any of them out.  It was basically, that 
was a standard you had to aspire to. Banking wasn’t deemed to be a big risk taking 
business.  It was deemed to be, as I say, a custodian of deposits’ (C3: 53).  The same 
speaker observed a close connection between the trustworthiness of these early 
branch managers and their lives as members of the community and particularly of the 
church.  ‘When I started in the bank, the main people were all church elders.  The 
manager was, the assistant manager was.  That was part of the community, the 
Captain Mainwaring [type]21, as I tend to… they were part of the community, they were 
upstanding people and good, as we’d say in Scotland at the time, they were good 
members of the kirk‘ (C3: 63). 
These participants started their careers in ‘old banking’ and enjoyed it enough to stay 
in banking for 25 years in some cases to 40 years in others.  So what did they enjoy 
about old banking? 
Even in the 1980s, all trainees were expected to spend several years on routine 
administrative tasks and on frontline services to customers.  There is no sign of 
resentment about this.  These bankers are proud of their solid grounding in the nuts 
and bolts of retail banking, and have affectionate memories of their colleagues and 
their relationships with customers.  There is a strong sense of theatre in this early 
career recollection which is still relevant to the speaker’s current work: 
                                               
21
 Captain Mainwaring is a well known character in the British TV comedy series Dad’s Army:  
‘Captain, Bank Manager, Rotarian, pillar of the community.  George Mainwaring was all of 
these.  Born in Eastbourne in 1885, his father, Edmund, was a member of the Master Tailors 
Guild.  He was educated at the local grammar school, and upon leaving found work at the local 
branch of Swallow Bank, and slowly working (sic) his way up to become Manager in 1935.’ 
(Dad’s Army Appreciation Society, 2014) 
90 
‘So the banking hall in our branch was a very long narrow hall with bandit 
screens up the middle, where the customers were on one side and all the 
staff were on the other.  And me being a junior, I was a runner; I was 
running up and down doing what the front agents needed.  And [the 
resource manager] sat on this plinth behind us and he used to just shout, 
‘Sarah, get on the cash!’  ‘Sarah, do this!’  ‘Sarah, do that!’  [. . . . . .  .]  So 
when the branch door shut - and we were just talking about this morning 
with my team actually - the branch door shut at 3:30 under the old banking 
day. I’d go to shut the doors and then it was, ‘Right everybody!’  You could 
hear the clap going round, you know it was 50 people all turn round and 
looked.  ‘Strive for five everybody, strive for five!  Let’s get ourselves out the 
door!’  So we’d served the customers for the day; now it was about getting 
the job done and getting the hell out.  So there was that clear kind of thing 
about, ‘Ok make sure… people have worked hard all day, but come on 
guys, we want to get out of here at five o’clock.  Let’s go.’  (C10: 193-194) 
Two members of the group use the word ‘fun’ to describe their work and each time it is 
associated directly with customer relationships:  ‘community banking - there’s a lot of 
enjoyment out of that, there’s a lot of fun to see businesses started off, growing, 
employing people and as part of the community.  That’s a different model and that’s 
where I think the fun is’  (C6: 124).  For all of them, the relationship with the customer 
locates what they regard as the core of banking:  ‘But that was the best part of it, was 
the interaction with the customer, because you actually felt part of their business, and 
you felt in many ways that you were part of their success and part of their failings as 
well’  (C7: 130).  Such relationships could be very personal: 
‘It was a really exciting time to see [the customer’s] company go.  Not the 
bit about the deal, but the fact that it happens.  I remember going round to 
his house  [. . . . ]. Went outside and met his wife and kid - his kid was 
maybe only about 18 months at the time.  And he’d a little family.  And [his] 
idea  -  he was a real entrepreneur and inventor.  He’d invented this thing 
and it was going to go from his little room to out there.  And that to me was 
what it was all about.  Not just that.  Places like this, shops.’  (C6: 125) 
In old banking, stability and a promising vision of a steady and respectable career 
seem also to have been strong sources of motivation, particularly in the context of 
extended apprenticeships:  ‘people could afford to be patient, because they knew what 
was ahead of them. It was a job for life; which was one of the other things that got 
thrown out in the nineties’ (C1: 10).  Professional development was paternalistic in 
form.  Promotions were not advertised, they were granted, based on past performance 
and the perceptions of management, and often they involved relocating to another 
town at short notice: 
‘And when I started in branch banking, it was normal that the bank told you 
where they wanted you to work, so when you were ready for a transfer, 
there was two letters came into the branch, one was a blue one if it was a 
male member of staff, one was a pink one if it was a female member of 
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staff.  And you could see by the envelope, by the paper, sorry, within the 
envelope window, whether it was, and of course it spreads like wildfire: 
[gasps] ‘There’s a transfer coming in, somebody’s getting transferred out!’ 
(C10: 188)   
This was not a predictable world in terms of immediate working life, but it was one 
which offered long term prospects for those who were able and hard working.  Those 
who prospered in this system did so through an often protracted process of formal 
professional qualifications and apprenticeships of 5 years or more including transfers in 
and out of branches and central departments, so that when they were eventually 
awarded management status they retained a sense of having earned it through a 
thorough grounding in retail banking.  In their recollections, those who value their 
origins in old banking now possess a strong sense of solidarity with each other which 
identifies them as real bankers, defines their behaviour and delineates them from ‘non-
bankers’.  This is continuous in their language:  ‘it’s inbred into you’ (C3: 61), ‘being 
imbued all with the same ethos and culture all the way through, and that culture was 
very much, “We’re just here to serve the customer, and not take any risks”’, (C2: 36)  
The distinction is cast in terms of a shared history of apprenticeship, and people are 
described accordingly:  ‘he’d been through the whole route of the traditional banker’ 
(C1: 7),  ‘traditional bankers who came up through the stream’ (C3: 53), ‘traditionalists, 
you know, coming in and gaining grounding right from the basics from seeing 
customers right up to actually doing bigger deals and learning and understanding how 
it all operates’ (C3: 54). 
A shared grounding in old banking gave its junior practitioners access to a set of quite 
consistent models of behavior in the form of their branch managers, who may have 
been stuffy at times, but who embodied a clear role in the community characterized not 
only by respectful customer relationships but also by painstaking record keeping.  
Balancing the books depended on manual systems and 100% accuracy:  ‘We balanced 
it every day.  We balanced the whole bloody book-keeping system every day.  And it 
was somewhat laborious.  And it was somewhat silly at times.  You know, because if 
ten pounds was missing from the cash at night, you stayed there until it was found.  
And you might be paid overtime for that, so the overtime bill might be twenty quid’ (C2: 
15). 
This uncompromising attitude towards accuracy went hand-in-hand with a similarly 
uncompromising view of risk: ‘banking traditionally has been risk averse, you know 
very risk averse’. (C10: 200)  And this aversion to risk was founded on the relationship 
with the customer, because, in old banking, bankers were first and foremost guardians 
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of other people’s money:  ‘the first thing we were taught in banking was that you were a 
custodian of deposits.  You’re looking after other people’s money.  Lending is a means 
to expand your profitability, but you’ve got to be sure that your lending is secure’ (C3: 
51-52). ‘We never lent on the basis of bad debt, we lent on the basis that we wouldn’t 
have any bad debt, that we’d actually get everybody to repay.  And we charged a fair 
price for the product on offer’  (C3: 62). 
In sum, traditional banking – old banking – was structured physically around its branch 
network, with a presence in specific towns and cities.  It operated in the material 
context of accepting deposits and making loans, but was defined not so much by these 
mechanisms as by the way that they were approached, with an uncompromising 
dedication to accuracy, a bond of mutual loyalty between customer and banker, a 
severely conservative attitude towards risk and  a respected role in the community. 
‘Your traditional banker was horrified by some of the things that happened next’ (C1: 
2).   
4.3 The defeat of old banking by new banking 
The stories that are told by the group of their experiences of the 1990s and early 2000s 
are in general stories of conflict between new banking and old banking, followed by the 
ultimate defeat of old banking and the fragmentation of the profession.  Not all 
members of the group regard this as a bad thing, and one seems quite glad to have left 
old banking behind, but all are in their different ways aware of the sea change in 
banking, and several have a strong sense of personal defeat and loss.  Those in the 
group whose careers began earliest feel this most acutely, and there is a pervasive 
sense of their being the last of a kind, ‘a dying breed’ (C6: 128). 
How did the conflict arise?  There is frequent mention of hostile forces which invaded 
the culture of old banking:  ‘that was the time when all sorts of external consultants 
start to appear on the scene’ (C2: 29).  Some participants give detailed diagnoses in 
terms of the role of such outsiders: 
‘If you look at what happened in the X Bank in the 1990s,  M & N 
[consultant company], the consultancy agenda, all these great ideas, M & N 
came in in the 1990s with this fantastic …, saying ‘This is how you should 
do it all.’  I mean look at unauthorised bank charging and all that stuff.  M & 
N’s great idea about how you make money was for everybody you have to 
bounce a cheque for, charge them £3, and they called that ‘referral charge’ 
in those days.  And we were all sitting going, ‘We’re going to say to a 
customer, that we’re going to charge them £3, when all we’ve had to do is 
go look at a sheet and go ‘well we know they’re OK’.’  And everybody was 
up in arms.  I remember the conversations, I remember meetings, whether 
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it be branch managers or relationship managers, saying ‘It’s crazy, we’re 
pissing off customers we’ve got good relationships with for £3!’ (C6: 114-
115) 
Consultants advising from the outside were a problem, but much worse from the point 
of view of traditional bankers, was the trend for non-bankers (often MBAs) to come into 
banking at a senior level sometimes directly into the role of chief executive : 
‘And if you look at all the banks who’ve had difficulties, it wasn’t bankers at 
the top.  It’s just a fact.  A one, B another example, C another example.  
The bankers were at lower levels, and it was non-bankers telling bankers 
what to do.  Now how you get back to the old stalwart idea of qualifications, 
for example; banking qualifications mean nothing.  When I started… up 
until about 19... late 80s, it meant something, and then all of a sudden it just 
moved away from that.  If a person came in with an MBA, he could run a 
bank, you know, that was the attitude.  Some of the ridiculous suggestions 
of what we should do in the market place were just down to the fact they’d 
no experience.  They’d no experience of customers.  They’d no experience 
of how customers… what they want, how they tick; they’d no experience of 
problems that customers encounter, because you get that through face to 
face discussions with people.’  (C3: 64) 
These diagnoses tend to come back to a lack of formal qualifications and practical 
apprenticeship in banking, particularly with regard to experience of customers.  
Outsiders did not have the required knowledge and experience to understand the 
nature of the businesses they were trying to control.  One senior banker speaks of this 
as a period ‘when they brought some of these non-bankers in, who thought it was 
basically, you have a tee shirt and you mark it up by a third and you get it back and 
you’re covered by debt’ (C3: 62).   
In some cases a similar problem is perceived in the movement of ‘investment bankers 
into retail banking’ (C5: 99), and there is considerable resentment of ‘the red brace 
boys’ (C8: 164) from the City of London.  Investment bankers are regarded as an alien 
culture with poor moral judgement (C8: 154).  ‘Investment banking’s not the same as 
retail banking at all.  Totally different mindset, totally different.  It’s like… If I was to sit 
with somebody in this room who was an investment banker I would probably think they 
were from a totally different industry and organisation’ (C10: 199). 
There is acknowledgement that changes had to happen because old banking was too 
insular and too inefficient.  In the early 90’s, one participant recalls that ‘all banks - but 
the X Bank in particular was struggling to disclose a profit’ (C2: 29).  However, as time 
went on, change began to be driven increasingly by a sales culture which was at odds 
with the service culture of old banking.  ‘The full impact of the sales culture which 
emerged probably didn’t become apparent immediately’ (C2: 30).  Not only is there 
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frequent talk of the gradual replacement of service orientated branch staff with a sales 
force, but there is directly doubt about the morality of the sales effort:  ‘Oh ignore that 
stuff that’s on the intranet today about ethics.  We all know it’s about sales points. Just 
ignore…’ (C4: 79)  Financial incentives linked to sales targets drove out the need for 
good judgement in banking services, and brought in impoverished ethics and wide 
ranging deterioration of standards.  ‘What would restore trust in banking? … Well, 
number one, get rid of all the incentive schemes.  Do not allow product led incentive 
schemes,  …  you know, that is a root of evil’  (C6: 113). 
The mechanisms of conflict, then, are clear and reasonably unanimous among the 
group;  external forces created a clash within banking in which a sales culture replaced 
a service culture.  Responses to this conflict vary within the group, but predominantly 
they tell stories of resistance, and for some those stories of resistance are the central 
focus of their overall personal narrative. 
One banker in particular tells a story of resistance to the new sales culture which 
significantly affected his career.  He achieved a good level of seniority relatively early in 
his career as a manager of a portfolio of 600 business clients.  He enjoyed the role, 
which allowed him to form stable relationships with his business customers, and the 
role should have been a stepping stone to further promotion.  However, whilst in the 
role he became uncomfortable with the new sales culture which was being introduced 
at the time.  He saw it as transforming long standing relationships of service provision 
and mutual benefit into ones characterised by sales targets and exploitation of the 
customer: 
‘Yes. I [pause]  I left my role after…  before the four years was up, and I 
guess in some ways my customer might - of my portfolio - might have said, 
‘Well you know you committed to us you would be in the role for four years,’ 
but for me I was always open with my customers at that time, said, ‘Listen, 
I’m not comfortable doing what’s expected of me in this role, and I think it 
would be more suitable for me to, rather than be uncomfortable and do 
anything that I didn’t feel right doing, and perhaps you feeling bad of me, I 
would rather step away from the role.’  So I think I’ve always been quite - I 
suppose it’s like these things are instilled in you from the way you’re 
brought up and who you engage with throughout your life - I think I’ve 
always been moralistic I suppose.  Perhaps overly so.  I may have 
advanced in my career quicker had I not been so.  But I wouldn’t have been 
comfortable doing that.’ (C7: 137) 
Although he was able to move within the organisation, the cost to his career was 
considerable: 
‘Maybe had I been in a smaller organisation it might have been different, 
but I like to think I would still have followed my own course.  I mean I have - 
I did resign from a particular role because I wasn’t comfortable with what 
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was being asked of me by my line manager in terms of fulfilling sales 
targets, and I took a pay cut and I - what’s the opposite of promotion? The 
word escapes me at the moment - I took a drop down in levels as a result 
of that, to get out of the role.’ (C7: 139) 
Although this speaker throughout the interview plays down the long term impact of his 
resistance, it is clear that the moment of his decision changed the course of his 
professional life. 
The evidence of resistance provided by others in the group is not always so dramatic 
or so central to their overall narrative, but is still strongly present.  In some cases 
people have been forced to a choice even at very senior levels because they can no 
longer tolerate the organisational culture in which they find themselves.  They express 
this discomfort in a range of ways.  One senior executive moved from his position as 
head of a national high street bank because he could not support the aggressively 
commercial direction in which the bank was being taken by the Group Chief Executive, 
and explains his motivation in moving simply as: ‘And I was being very disillusioned 
about 2002 with the place, because it was culturally just in a bit of a mess’ (C6: 110). 
Another senior executive is more specific in his account of the kind of failings which he 
encountered: 
‘And that’s what started in America with the rot as well, with the sub-prime 
mortgages.  They were lending extra to customers.  And that was starting 
to creep in here in my day, which I resisted, but it didn’t last long.  Which 
I’m glad, because I didn’t want to be associated with this problem.  […] 
‘Well, for example, the consolidation of credit card debt.  That was another 
example I never did.  People consolidating credit cards across to one card 
to get a better rate.  A recipe for disaster, because usually they’re 
struggling with their existing credit cards, that’s why they want to 
consolidate.  So there was a lot of that going on.  These are only just one or 
two examples of bigger problems that could actually hit.’  (C3: 59-60) 
He expresses the basis for his resistance in terms of his background in old banking: 
‘For example at one point it was suggested that we don’t do valuations on 
property when we’re lending for mortgages, and I insisted that we continue 
that practice, because people say, ‘You’re transferring mortgages across; if 
they repaid their last two payments they must be good.’  And I said, ‘No, we 
want to look at the asset, we need to do the drive-past, make sure the 
asset’s there,’ etc.  So I insisted on all this traditional practice be applied.  
And it wasn’t cutting corners.  Yes, it increased some of your costs, you 
could have made more money in the short term.  In the longer term it’s 
been proved that that’s not the case.’ (C3: 63) 
Several participants have similar stories, often ending in some form of dislocation to 
their career progress.  One participant is conspicuous in having achieved a successful 
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outcome against the odds, but only by moving from a senior position in a large 
diversified international bank, to run a small local savings bank.  By doing so he 
sacrificed some of the status and pay associated with the larger organisation, but 
regained his professional self-respect.  On the question of sales culture and target 
driven incentive schemes, he speaks on behalf of the savings bank: 
‘…we do not have a sales culture here at all.  There’s not one individual whose 
performance is judged on the basis of what they’ve sold during the year, never mind 
the past week.’ 
He appears to have achieved a rare peace of mind with regard to his own professional 
standards, but has only been able to do so by effectively rejecting new banking entirely 
and finding a bank which maintains the standards of old banking, but which can only do 
so by remaining marginal to the mainstream banking sector. 
In all these narratives, old banking loses the battle with new banking.  Those in the 
group who are most committed to the values of old banking report a pervasive sense of 
decline and defeat.  This includes the decline of professional and moral standards and 
the erosion of a way of life rooted in community and Kirk: 
‘A lot of that has gone by the board, unfortunately.  You know that as well 
as I do. These moralistic - what I would term as upstanding Presbyterian 
ethics.  There’s less of that now.  And sometimes you have to resist - you 
have to fight for honesty and integrity: some of the battles I had, maybe that 
was at the heart of it, I don’t know.’  (C3: 63) 
There are several consequences for banking as a profession in Scotland, including a 
dramatic fall in the numbers of young bankers taking professional qualifications, falling 
standards of service, a lack of expectation of and capacity for independent judgement 
and fragmentation of the profession. 
Banking in Scotland moved from a situation in the 1970s and 1980s in which all those 
who aspired to management positions took their banking exams through the Chartered 
Institute to one in the 1990s and 2000s where few did, and this latter situation has 
persisted: 
‘I think about the work at the Institute as helping the next generation of 
people get the skills they need.  […]  And I think there’s a lost generation, 
you know.  There was a lost generation definitely in the 90s who didn’t get 
that and in my view that’s one of the things that is questionable whether 
banking will ever return to the profession it was, you know in the 60s and 
70s and much before that.’  (C5: 95) 
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This has created an imbalance between older members of the profession who have 
attained the status of Fellow of the Institute and younger bankers who are not being 
encouraged down the same route: 
‘I got my Fellowship in October, and I think there was about 17 of us got 
Fellowship and maybe only about 25 completed their Members.  When I did 
my Members, there was about 380 graduated, and that was because every 
junior every year started that journey through their professional 
qualifications.’ (C8: 146) 
This process of reducing the professional rigour of banking is consistent with a 
reorientation towards sales targets and a reduction of the need for professional 
judgement in highly standardised systems.  In old banking, ‘the basic core grounding 
apprenticeship schemes that we went through, they give you that knowledge and 
understanding.  It wasn’t just keying entries into a computer, not understanding what 
was happening’ (C3: 52). 
The development of technology plays a central role in the removal of the need for 
professional judgement in retail banking:  ‘the business model’s changed now, so as 
long as they can design a product, deliver that product through a distribution 
underpinned by some technology and keep it simple, then perhaps, you know, there 
isn’t… what is the role of the banker’? (C5: 98)  The same speaker, when challenged 
by the researcher, acknowledges that such technological  advances are not simply an 
external force imposed on banking, but a trend actively developed by senior members 
of the profession themselves:  ‘And I guess I’m part of that, because I’ve developed 
credit score cards and credit models, statistical models that allow you to say 10,000 
times a day ‘yes’ or ‘no’, with pretty good odds that you’re getting the right decision as 
opposed to, if you were a bank manager, you could probably do 10 a day max’ (C5: 
101). 
Cashpoints in particular were actively developed by banks who then discovered that 
the machines had effectively removed their customers from branches.  ‘ATMs are a 
fantastic 24/7 convenience, but actually they did exactly what banks didn’t want, which 
was they stopped people going into branches’  (C5: 102). 
Such developments disrupted the relationship between banker and customer, which 
was at the heart of old banking in a quite direct way.  The word disaggregation is used 
by two of the speakers to refer to two kinds of disruption.  One refers to ‘disaggregation 
of channels’ (C8: 149) by which he means ‘the customer morphing from the branch to 
web, to ATM etc.  So you lost them to deal with, to interact’ (C8: 163).  Another refers 
to the disaggregation of services and sees this as irreversible: 
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‘So is banking going to come back?  No, I think you’ll get just some product 
companies that do things, that maybe are relatively straightforward and 
transparent.  But the product set’s been disaggregated.  The notion that a 
banker’s someone to give you advice is disaggregated.’ (C5: 103) 
Banking is no longer a cohesive career, but a series of specialisms (C5: 94), linked not 
by a professional cadre, but by large diversified institutions.  It is a key feature of the 
decline of old banking, that non-banking generalists recruit non-banking specialists 
(C5: 97-98), rather than encouraging people to qualify as bankers first and then 
specialise in some other sphere, such as HR or IT (C2: 31).  Banking professionals in 
any general sense therefore became increasingly squeezed out in the turn towards 
new banking, by the mechanisation of the generalist banker’s functions, by a tendency 
towards specialism and by the recruitment of non-banker general managers to the 
most senior roles.  ‘The bankers were at lower levels, and it was non-bankers telling 
bankers what to do.’ (C3: 64).  This is not to say that bankers themselves were not 
involved in these changes, and one of the recurring ironies of these narratives is that 
several of the bankers who are speaking have been at the forefront of innovations in 
banking which have done so much to break up the profession. 
4.4 The crisis in new banking 
All of the participants in this research have a view on the banking crisis of 2007/8.  
There is a large measure of agreement on the immediate causes of the crisis, but 
differences in emphasis depending on how closely they see themselves affiliated to old 
banking compared to new banking, and there are many unanswered questions raised 
by the group as to the deeper causes of the crisis and how things might be resolved.   
The immediate causes of the crisis always come back to the question of risk.  Banks 
became reckless in their attitude to risk:  ‘the risk taking went beyond the bounds, I 
think - just my opinion - went beyond the bounds of good sense, (C1: 19).  This is 
characterised as ‘arrogance’ (C9: 180) or ‘complacency’ (C10: 200).  An attitude of 
recklessness towards risk among the banks was compounded by the fact that the 
complexity of the risks that they were involved with outstripped their capacity to 
understand them:  ‘some of the complex instruments, the fact that even the people that 
were doing them didn’t understand them fully.  It’s that, “Why the hell would you do it?”’ 
(C10: 200) 
The risks of derivatives were often not properly understood, and this was an inevitable 
consequence of the risk market, because those who created and traded risk based 
derivatives succeeded in part by disguising the risks involved in such instruments: 
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‘There’s sub-prime, near prime.  Well, it’s either prime or it’s not prime!  It’s 
like the old cocaine; dice and cut, dice and cut, mix it with something else.  
Then go back and do the same again.  It’s near prime, it’s almost good 
quality, but there’s a bit of stuff in it that’s not quite right’ (C6: 120). 
Recklessness was driven by senior managers, who in turn were driven by a range of 
structural as well as personal forces.  There were structural forces driving banks to 
greater volume of business and to greater leverage:  ‘margins were being driven down 
on lending, and the only way to make any money was to lend more, and to derive 
some scale economies from that.  And that’s why they started borrowing all that money 
in the wholesale markets’  (C1: 18).  The same speaker, however, is clear that 
personal ambition was also a key factor and one chief executive was well known for his 
ambitious growth strategy and aggressive risk taking. 
‘But there’s a story told about G too, when he went into Glasgow to talk to 
his commercial lending team there, and he said to them, you know, ‘You’re 
the no. 2 bank in this region for commercial lending. What are you going to 
do about it?’  In other words, you’ve got to become the no. 1 bank, in other 
words you’ve got to lend more.  And that means more risk.’ (C1: 18) 
Such attitudes towards risk driven by personal ambition might be readily associated 
with investment banking (the ‘red brace’ boys), but are also reported as working their 
way through the ranks in retail banking:  ‘And I think our risk function was probably a lot 
lighter resource-wise when these events happened.  I’m not sure whether it was a lack 
of thought to risk, more of an over-consideration of profit.  Not necessarily profit for the 
business, but profit for oneself’  (C7: 135). 
The drive towards risk was commensurate with the sales culture which did so much to 
erode the ethos of old banking, and both sprang from similar pressures.  On the one 
hand there was the pressure for profitability, which was always recognised as 
legitimate, but which then came to predominate:  ‘what I think was wrong with the 
banks – it started in the 90s – is that the profit motive started to take over, is you know 
what I mean, the drive to increase profitability’ (C3: 53).  On the other hand there was a 
new and aggressive pressure for growth:  ‘Get bigger, get bigger, get bigger, get 
bigger’ (C10: 190).   ‘And it was because it was, “Grow, grow, grow! Grow, grow, grow!”  
Nobody was actually taking a higher view, saying, “We’ve got to make sure the 
quality’s right,”’ (C3: 59). 
Whether these pressures surface as bonus culture, or sales culture, at root, the group 
sees this whole picture as a problem of greed, :  ‘these good times would never end, 
and everybody was just pushing forward and pushing forward’ (C2: 31)… ‘as time went 
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on […] what happened in banking was everybody got greedy’ (C3: 449).  One 
participant tells the story of her bank’s acquisition strategy in the most graphic terms: 
‘We became a buying bank […] it’s a bit like watching a chihuahua chewing 
a, you know, eating a rottweiler, is really what it amounts to.  […] You can 
see everybody going, “Oh my God, we’ve just eaten up this big whoomph,” 
you know.  “We’ve eaten up this big organisation.”’  (C10: 190 - 192). 
The broad diagnosis of the crisis in new banking seems clear, at least in general terms.  
New banking has generated its own crisis through an excessive drive towards ever 
greater growth and profits, ever more complexity, sales and growth.  Good sense was 
driven out by this all-consuming passion, and the industry as a whole was without 
protection when the inevitable reversal occurred. 
So what of the present and future?  Is banking in a position to recover? 
Although the basic mechanisms of the crisis are not in doubt, and indeed are very 
much in public view, there is much less certainty about the prospects for recovery of 
banking as a profession.  There is little doubt that banks will continue to be needed and 
that banking as a structure will somehow be reinforced or re-engineered, but there is 
profound doubt about bankers as a professional group being in charge of that process.  
Some express a sense of despair that banking can be restored as a respected 
profession. 
‘I do worry that actually the professional banker is, you know, certainly, is 
becoming very elderly, and… potentially becomes extinct, because quite 
simply, the people who now run banks are often not traditionally qualified 
bankers, the people who they hire around them are often now technical 
specialists - you know technical in technology or in marketing or in 
something else.  And so the chief executive, not being a banker them self, 
surrounds them self with a team, just like a sports team, where they’ve got 
some attackers and some defenders.  They have some marketers and 
some IT people and some whatever.’  (C5: 97-98) 
Not everyone in the group sees some kind of return to the values of old banking as a 
better future than what has been achieved by new banking, and even those who are 
most attached to those traditional values are aware that old banking was far from 
perfect.  Those who are relatively optimistic that banking can recover as a profession 
still see it as a very long process:  ‘I think it’s going to take a generation maybe for our 
perception to change, assuming things start to go a bit more smoothly, and we clean 
up our act in terms of some of the things that are going wrong, in terms of the mis-
selling and all that kind of stuff’ (C9:183). 
Structurally, there seems to be no immediate chance of going back to old banking, 
because the institutions of new banking do not provide a suitable home for it.  The kind 
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of environment which they provide is too diversified, too fragmented and too fast 
moving to support the stable, service intensive, low margin, low growth activities of old 
banking. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented a chronological narrative.  It has been concerned with the 
lived experiences of bankers who lived through periods of radical change, and has 
fallen into three broad phases.   
The first phase has been characterised as the last decades of ‘old banking’ – traditional 
banking – which was physically structured around branch networks based in 
communities, and where the career of the banker was stable, respectable and 
relatively slow moving.  Old banking was still very much a part of the working lives of 
the research participants during the 1980s.  A turning point, ‘the sea change’ (C2: 28) 
was reached in the late 1980s or the 1990s with the rise of a new form of banking.   
Even the most senior leaders are not clear about pinning this change down to a given 
year or event, but they are still aware of its dramatic significance; ‘somewhere along 
the line, and I think again it was the 80s to 90s, things changed.  Stories became 
different.’ (C5: 98)  The final phase was the rapid growth and then failure of ‘new 
banking’, culminating in the financial crisis of 2007/8 and the subsequent distrust of 




Chapter 5:  Thematic narrative 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 provided an overall narrative of key changes in banking in Scotland from the 
perspective of long-standing leaders in the industry, based on their accounts given in 
ten research conversations.  Chapter 5 aims to explore the same empirical data 
explicitly through a framework of Aristotelian ethics as developed by MacIntyre.  It 
provides a number of interpretive narratives of the material, this time based on key 
themes of MacIntyre’s moral philosophy:  tradition, practice and virtue.  These themes 
are in effect meta-themes; they are over-arching concepts which provide a context for 
the exploration of other themes such as conflict, resistance, constancy and so on.  
However, no firm ranking of levels is intended in this framework, so all of these 
concepts are referred to as themes, and where necessary, the three themes of 
tradition, practice and virtue are distinguished only as ‘key’ themes. 
Some justification is needed at this stage concerning why these three themes have 
been chosen to provide a narrative structure.  Many themes which are available in 
MacIntyrean and Aristotelian literature also appear in the primary data of the current 
research.  To have these running to a list of ten, twenty, or a hundred themes provides 
no meaningful narrative structure.  A three part scheme has therefore been developed 
which is intended to be manageable in terms of narrative structure.  Accordingly, three 
key themes have been selected which are central to the MacIntyrean literature and 
which are well evidenced in the primary data.  The themes are: tradition (Sections 5.2 
to 5.4); practice (Sections 5.5 to 5.8); and virtue (Sections 5.9 to 5.12). 
The key themes of tradition, practice and virtue have been chosen for two reasons.  
First, these three themes seem to be particularly characteristic of MacIntyrean ethics;  
the themes of tradition and practice are strongly representative of MacIntyre’s major 
works (MacIntyre, 1988; MacIntyre, 1990; MacIntyre, 2007), and the theme of virtue is 
the most obviously defining characteristic of Aristotelian virtue ethics (Crisp, 1996).  
Second, these three themes also appear to be of central importance in the speech of 
the participants, and part of the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the way in 
which they are so.   
It is important to acknowledge that what is offered here is one interpretation, not the 
only possible interpretation of the data.  Other themes could have been chosen.  For 
instance, the theme of the narrative unity of a human life is equally important alongside 
tradition and practice in After Virtue (Dunne, 2013; Knight, 2013), the ideas of social 
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structures and moral agency are central to MacIntyre’s thinking elsewhere (MacIntyre, 
1999a; MacIntyre, 1999b), and the notions of telos or life purpose and eudaimonia or 
well-being are central to Aristotelian ethics generally (Annas, 1993).  The three part 
scheme of tradition, practice and virtue is thus offered here as a useful basis for 
interpretation in a narrative format, but not the only possible such basis. 
The narrative is given principally from the perspective of ‘old banking’, because this is 
the prevailing voice in the ten conversations.  However, the perspective of ‘new 
banking’ is also given throughout where it is significant in the primary data.  This is 
often in the context of conflict between old banking and new banking, which is a key 
dynamic of the narrative throughout. 
5.2 Tradition 
Talk of tradition and culture 
The theme of tradition is introduced by the first participant in the group within the first 
two minutes of the conversation.  It is introduced in the language of ‘culture’.  1988 was 
‘a time when, if we can think of banking cultures old and new, that was a time still when 
the old culture prevailed, when every youngster entering a bank was expected to take 
the Institute examination’ (C1: 1). ‘So there was this old culture about professionalism, 
and you know, it imbued young men, in particular young men, with an ethos about what 
banking really was’ (C1: 2).  Such talk of culture soon becomes talk of tradition: ‘your 
traditional banker’ (C1: 2), ‘traditional Scottish bankers’ (C1: 3).  With this speaker, 
there is a close association between culture or tradition on the one hand and ethos, 
standards or ‘philosophy’ on the other:  ‘the basic philosophy of banking was lost’ (C1: 
13).  Certain social structures, including the Chartered Bankers’ Institute and the 
professional exams which it offered, provided mechanisms by which this tradition was 
handed on, and the drop in the number of young bankers taking the qualifications 
represents for him and others not only a de-skilling of the profession, but a disruption to 
the handing on of the tradition (C1: 4, C5: 95, C5: 97).  It is important to note that in this 
first conversation, it is not the researcher, but the participant who introduces the topic 
of tradition, whilst recounting the outline of his career.  Of the group as a whole, this 
first speaker is perhaps the one who has the keenest sense of history, but he is not 
alone in having a strong awareness of Scottish banking as a tradition.  Talk of 
traditional banking and traditional bankers is ubiquitous, as is the narration of the fall of 
one culture and either its replacement by a new one or its conflicts with alien ones.  
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The words tradition and culture are used alongside each other by several of the 
speakers, and they are consistent in their usage. 
Culture is the preferred term to denote particular ways of thinking and doing which are 
prevalent among the group, and is similarly used of rival ways of thinking and doing.  
The term is used 82 times in total in the primary data (including the forms culture and 
cultural and excluding usage by the researcher in the conversations) 
For all of the speakers, culture is a vehicle for ethos or ethics.  Particular cultures may 
clash and frequently do, for instance ‘old culture’ and ‘new culture’ (C1: 1), or 
investment banking and retail banking.  ‘It’s two different cultures.  You see an 
investment banker taking on a retail bank, they just don’t get it: the culture and ethics’ 
(C6: 126).  Cultures can be bad as well as good. 
‘There was a leader in an American credit card company whose mantra 
was ‘Say yes more.’  And given they used to run up and down the 
underwriting floor saying  ‘Say yes more,’ without giving the underwriters 
any guidance as to  what was a good and a bad credit decision, you can 
imagine that that was a culture, a principle and something that was driven, 
but it was wrong.  It was just blatantly wrong.’  (C5: 106) 
The most frequently cited bad cultures are sales culture and bonus culture, and these 
cultures are not just hostile to banking: they are seen by some as positively lethal.  ‘To 
be honest, what’s killed banking is the bonus culture.  Just killed it, stone dead, I think.  
Because everybody was looking for quick ways to make money’ (C3: 50). 
Tradition is the preferred term in the group to denote long established culture, or a 
culture viewed retrospectively.  The term is used 39 times in total in the primary data 
(including the forms tradition and traditional and excluding usage by the researcher in 
the conversations).  Like culture, tradition is closely associated with ethos, ethics and 
values, and in this respect they are interchangeable.  However, unlike culture, tradition 
is generally used to describe something valuable.  There is talk of bad cultures, but no 
talk of bad traditions.  Traditions and traditional ways of working are throughout spoken 
of as things worth defending. 
What it means to belong to a tradition 
Two questions arise concerning this interpretation.  Is it true to MacIntyre’s 
understanding of tradition?  Is it reasonable as an interpretation of the primary data, or 
is there a risk that the intentions of the speakers are being distorted? 
A discussion of tradition is given above in Sections 2.6 and 3.3  There is no need to 
reiterate that discussion here, but it might be helpful to summarise the idea of tradition.  
We might say that on MacIntyre’s account, a tradition is a social structure which 
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provides a basis for practical reasoning and which persists and develops by being 
handed on from one set of inhabitants to another.  Any given tradition may suffer a 
crisis of belief in its goods and purposes, either through internal conflict between 
adherents of the tradition or through external conflict with a rival tradition, and through 
this process new understandings may emerge.  MacIntyre is particularly interested in 
traditions as fields of epistemological conflict and in the way in which progress towards 
the truth might be made through such conflicts. 
If this is a fair representation of MacIntyre’s idea of tradition, to what extent is it also fair 
to understand this group’s talk of tradition and culture from that perspective?  First, to 
be clear, with the exception of the researcher, the participants in these conversations 
have not encountered MacIntyre’s writing. So, when they use the words tradition or 
traditional, they are using them in a common language sense and not in the exact 
sense used by MacIntyre.  Second, it is important to emphasise that MacIntyre’s 
interest lies not just with traditions generally, but also more specifically with traditions of 
moral enquiry.  No suggestion is being made here that Scottish banking should count 
as a tradition of moral enquiry in its own right.  It is very clearly a tradition which is 
oriented around a practical occupation, rather than a moral philosophy.22 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that traditional Scottish banking amounted to a distinct 
way of life which carried with it certain moral standards.  It is similarly clear that several 
speakers in the group are using tradition in a very similar way to that intended by 
MacIntyre, and the first three speakers in the series are particularly sensitive to the 
idea of tradition.  They express it frequently in one form or another, particularly when 
identifying their own affiliation to people of a similar ilk:  traditional bankers (C1: 2, C2: 
26, C3: 5, 57), bankers born and bred (C1: 11), long standing bankers (C2: 27), 
stalwart bankers (C3: 54) or just stalwarts (C3: 53, 55).  These three speakers are the 
oldest members of the group, and started their careers in the late 1960s to early 1970s.  
Consequently they have the strongest memories of what they understand as traditional 
Scottish banking. 
Structures 
Several features of their account are strikingly similar to MacIntyre’s idea of tradition.  
For these three traditional Scottish bankers, ‘old banking’ was socially embodied and 
structured in the sense that it was rooted in physical communities.  More than that, the 
                                               
22
 Nicholas (2012) might be understood as offering an opposing view of tradition, and he himself 
acknowledges a difference of view from MacIntyre.  Since an accurate placing of the idea of 
tradition is important to this interpretation, this is discussed in a short note at Appendix 5. 
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structures and rhythms of those communities were integral to the structures and 
rhythms of banking, and these structures gave the tradition stability.  They also lent it 
the basic values and assumptions of rationality on which a form of practical reasoning 
specific to the tradition could be built.  For instance, the thinking and behaviours of 
traditional branch managers are understood in terms of their membership of both bank 
and kirk, their status both in the bank and in the community. 
These social structures and the relationships between them were not just a backdrop 
to the tradition of Scottish banking as these speakers understand it.  They were central 
and critical components of it.  These structures included the banks themselves and the 
Chartered Banker Institute, originally a Scottish institution (Chartered Banker Institute 
(2014) but now with a UK wide remit (C4: 75).  When the structures of the banks 
themselves changed in the 1990s in response to changes in the regulatory 
environment and developments in the global economy, then the tradition inevitably 
changed also, not just because of a causal effect between bank and tradition, but 
because the banks were part of the tradition.  The structures of the banks were of 
course particularly central to the tradition, but other community structures were also 
important, including the Presbyterian churches, and the reduction of these other 
structures also played a part in the decline of the tradition (C3: 63).  Similarly, in the 
view of traditional Scottish bankers, the rise of the business schools and generic 
management theories played its own part, replacing traditional structures of education 
and morality in Scottish banking with international models of competitive business 
management (C1: 7, 10, C2: 30, C3: 53, 63, 74, C8: 164). 
The structures of old banking gave that tradition coherence and stability.  The 
Chartered Institute played a key role in the handing on of the tradition (C2: 39, C5: 95).  
Its qualification framework, supported by all the banks as a requirement for aspiring 
managers, was a formal recognition of this, and gaining full membership of the Institute 
by examination was an outward sign of membership of the tradition (C1: 2, C3: 74) .  
The existence of the Institute even offered a means of distinguishing proper bankers 
from people who were not really ‘bankers in what you would think of as the Institute 
sense’ (C8: 145). 
The Institute, then, was an essential part of the transmission of the tradition, but only a 
part; it worked alongside a fabric of other elements such as apprenticeship, forms of 
hierarchy and promotion, common procedures and conventions.  These structures 
gave Scottish banking its characteristic rationality, including that broad impression of it 
which is still prevalent among those who appreciate it as outsiders.  The word canny 
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does not appear in any of the conversations, but one later speaker, who is not a banker 
by training, diagnoses the problem with risk: 
‘But when the economy stops rising, it’s very difficult, and you find out very 
quickly if you haven’t done the right things.  And that’s traditionally - there’s 
a great tradition of the Scottish banker being this really dour, prudent 
pessimistic individual - that was there for a reason, because they knew the 
economy was going to turn, and they wanted to make sure the organisation 
was protected.’ (C4: 87) 
5.3 Tradition and external conflict 
Perhaps the most striking area of coincidence between MacIntyre’s understanding of 
tradition and the self-reports of this group is over the question of conflict.  MacIntyre 
regards two types of conflict as key features of the way in which traditions make 
progress (Nicholas, 2012), one being internal conflict amongst members of the tradition 
and the other being conflict with outsiders (‘critics and enemies’ (MacIntyre, 1988, 
p.12)), and these conflicts are seen as being a means of articulating, confirming, 
developing or refuting fundamental agreements concerning the purposes and goods of 
the tradition.  When we apply this thought to the conversations with Scottish bankers, 
both modes of conflict, external and internal, are apparent. 
Consultants, MBAs and City analysts 
The most obvious form of conflict with outsiders is between traditional bankers and an 
influx of alien influences in the 1990s.  This has already been portrayed in the 
chronological narrative of Chapter 4 as a key element of the conflict between old 
banking and new banking, where outsiders appear in different guises, as consultants, 
MBAs, non-bankers, investment bankers, or City analysts.  They are always people 
who don’t understand ‘proper banking’ (C2: 38).  Some of the issues presented by the 
speakers in this regard are problems of understanding and articulation, in MacIntyre’s 
lexicon, problems of translation or translatability (MacIntyre, 1988).  Others are 
straightforwardly issues of power (Knights and McCabe, 1999). 
There is no need to retell that story of external conflict here, only to emphasise that the 
participants themselves view it as a clash of cultures (Schein, 1990), and this is 
explicit, whether the language used is of sales culture (or bonus culture) versus service 
culture, investment banking versus retail banking, or old bank versus new bank.  The 




Conversation partners, bankers and the public 
At this point it perhaps useful to add a short exploration of a second form of conflict, 
also between insider and outsider (Tinker and Armstrong, 2008), but which is less 
obvious in the surface narrative.  This is the conflict between the participants and the 
researcher.  This conflict is suppressed in the conversations for reasons of good 
manners and because the researcher is making a conscious effort to understand each 
participant in that sense of understanding articulated by Gadamer (1975).  Gadamer’s 
approach to conversation emphasises coming to an agreement, rather than engaging 
in a contest.  Nevertheless it remains a fact of the conversations that they are in each 
case a conversation between insider and outsider, albeit a sympathetic and interested 
outsider.  Sometimes explicit arguments arise, very politely, between the two parties to 
the conversation, but most of the time the conflict is suppressed and runs as a 
background tension under the surface of the conversation. 
This tension is detectable in a tendency towards defensiveness and repetition.  
Defensiveness surfaces in a number of ways.  One participant opens the conversation 
with,  ‘Ok.  Well I suppose on the basic front I tend to tell people I’m an estate agent 
now.  It’s slightly more respectable than saying “a banker”’ (C8: 144).  Most of the time, 
it is simply a question of participants adopting a defensive stance in response to a 
challenge by the researcher.  In particular, senior executives naturally defend their own 
institutions, and in these conversations at least, frequently defend their place in the 
tradition (C2: 36, C4: 81-82).  If MacIntyre is correct in his view of tradition, then what 
we would expect to find is that such defensiveness tends to argue for the goods of the 
tradition, and this is in fact what we do find.  So for instance, one participant is asked 
by the researcher what he would say to a young person who was considering banking 
as a career, but was more interested in a ‘really rewarding job’ rather than ‘getting rich’: 
‘I didn’t get rich being a banker’! (C6: 123) 
This speaker then goes on to express the goods of his own tradition in terms of the 
relationship between banker and customer and the position of the banker in the 
community, over against the alternative tradition of investment banking (C6: 124).  
Similarly, P2, in defending his own organisation’s ethos against any suggestion of a 
sales culture, expresses the goods of his tradition as a relationship of trust with the 
customer (C2: 36), together with the wider goods of the community, held together by a 
governance structure directly in touch with that community.  P4 is defensive of his own 
organisation’s role in the tradition largely because it is his job to defend it, and his role 
is partly a political one (e.g. C4: 81-82).   Another participant misinterprets a question 
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by the researcher as a question about dubious banking ethics, and defends the 
tradition, although no criticism has in fact been voiced (C1: 2). 
At times conflict between the partners in these conversations is explicit.  At one point, 
researcher and participant argue with each other over the behaviour of one high profile 
chief executive who suffered great reputational damage as well as losing his job 
because of his role in the 2007/8 crisis.  P1 finds himself defending the chief executive 
in question, in part over the question of his grounding in the tradition (C1: 12).  Mainly, 
however, there is a background defensive attitude which is inherited from hostile press 
coverage, so that, as soon as the topic of ethics arises, a defensive position is more-or-
less automatic:  ‘I must admit I do get frustrated with [a journalist] and the like going on 
about bankers, because I tend to view the City of London…  I don’t believe they’re 
bankers in what you would think of as the Institute sense’ (C8: 145). 
In a sense, then, much of the tension between researcher and participants in these 
conversations is really an extension of the hostility which the bankers feel is directed 
towards them by the general public and the press.  Where there is real engagement in 
a constructive argument between researcher and participant, then there is accordingly 
a chance of real progress in understanding.  Very often this progress is made by the 
researcher understanding the participant’s point of view better.  But sometimes the 
participant can be caused to re-evaluate a position (C9: 178, C5: 101). 
The overall picture of external conflict, between insiders and outsiders, emerges as 
one of defence.  Most obviously, as narrated in the previous chapter, this is a story of a 
losing battle.  Traditional banking in Scotland, which for this group means retail 
banking, has been unable to resist effectively the arguments of consultants, MBA 
generalist managers and investment bankers.  This story of defeat is dramatically true 
of the period from the 1990s to early 2000s, and sadly for this group is also true of the 
current position, because the public at large no longer distinguishes between retail 
bankers, as this group see themselves, and a range of other investment banking-type 
activities such as hedge fund management, foreign exchange or bond trading. 
5.4 Conflict over goods and purposes 
Conflict among the research participants themselves is harder to detect than external 
conflict, partly because the participants are not here in direct dialogue with each other 
and partly because they are able easily to identify external groups to argue against 
(C6: 123, C8: 145), but not so readily to pick out factions within their own tradition to 
argue against.  There is on occasion specific disagreement among the group on a 
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particular point, such as their assessment of one high profile acquisition which went 
wrong (P10: 201).  However, such specific points of contradiction are rare and, in any 
case, do not necessarily directly express any fundamental conflicts over goods and 
purposes of the tradition.  In order to detect more fundamental disagreements of this 
sort, we need to be able to understand the overall position of each individual with 
regard to their own telos, their rank ordering of goods or their underlying assumptions 
regarding banking as they have experienced it.  We might then be able to compare 
those positions, and perhaps even to group them into opposing factions. 
Such varying positions are evident when the interviews are read as a whole set.  It is 
clear, for instance, that the last two participants in the group have a very different view 
of banking from the first three participants.  To give a fully detailed picture of this here 
would risk breaching confidentiality.  However, a broader description of trends is still 
possible; and this description can be organised around the notion of old banking and 
new banking as already explored in the chronological narrative.  Arranging the factions 
this way raises an interesting question of affiliation which is explored below in Section 
6.4. 
The goods and purposes of old banking can be described partly in terms of virtues and 
structures.  The virtues of old banking include courage in the Aristotelian sense of that 
word, justice, truthfulness, patience, self-control and practical wisdom; they are 
contrasted with vices such as carelessness, greed and ignorance.  These virtues are 
goods in themselves.  They are described and evidenced in detail in the section below 
on the virtues of old banking (Sections 5.7 ff). 
Certain social structures are also goods and are recognised as such in old banking.  
These include a branch network grounded in local communities, the community status 
of the bank manager, the relationship between banker and customer and membership 
of the Chartered Institute as a professional body.  In old banking, a ‘banker’ is clearly 
defined by membership of the Institute, and banks should be run by bankers.  These 
structures are described above in the chronological narrative (Section 4.2). 
Goods and purposes of new banking 
The goods and purposes of new banking can then be differentiated from those of old 
banking in terms of somewhat conflicting virtues and structures.  The following 
paragraphs describe and evidence some of these new virtues and structures, because 
these are not dealt with elsewhere as are the goods of old banking.  The description is 
less full, because the voice of new banking is less strong within this group, and the 
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evidence here excludes hostile views of new banking as portrayed by those most 
thirled to old banking.   
The virtues of new banking do include some of the virtues of old banking such as 
justice and practical wisdom, but the ways that such virtues are conceived is different.  
For instance, tales of justice or injustice in new banking (C9: 171, C10: 196) are more 
focused on processes internal to the organisation, rather than the relationship between 
banker and customer.  Meanwhile, new qualities appear as important, which are 
arguably not virtues at all in an Aristotelian sense, but are spoken of as virtue-like.  
Authenticity is an important attribute in new banking and includes the quality of 
transparency. ‘I think they both had very clear values, so you knew what they stood for, 
and they were quite transparent in that’ (C9: 171). ‘[She] was for me a phenomenal 
leader, very authentic and very true.  Her values were very visible’ (C10: 192) […] 
‘being as authentic and as real as I can be, so not being something I’m not, not trying 
to over-position things’ (C10: 195).   
Other new “virtues” include adaptability and inventiveness.  ‘[She] had been in HR for 
27 years and was sent to run a contact centre, because it was, ‘You have transferable 
skills, go and do it.’  We loved that kind of variety.’  (C8: 154)  R:  ‘And just from the 
way that you’re talking there, you obviously really enjoy the process of innovation; and 
well, that’s your principal reputation; you have a reputation as an innovator.’  P:  ‘Yes, 
well you can’t go into new markets and set up new banks unless you offer something 
different.’  (C3: 49).  In new banking, stuffiness and formality are vices, and people 
must be forward looking, embracing change.  The following speaker contrasts a 
younger, forward-looking accountant with older managers stuck in their ways: 
‘The Accountant was the person who was fully engaged, was the kind of 
forward thinking - he was a younger guy than them.  He’d probably then be 
about late thirties, early forties; they were kind of fifties, had been brought 
up in a slightly different banking world.  They were kind of more stiff, you 
know, sit with the kind of…  call them “Mr.” and everything else, but this 
chap was a really, kind of, “You’ve got to develop, you’ve got to improve.”’ 
(C9: 111) 
Structures which are emphasised as goods in new banking include working for a large 
employer with opportunities for varied career opportunities accompanied by continuous 
business change and technological sophistication.   
‘I’ve always been in good areas with fantastic people riding the buzz.  
Because it is constant change.  I suppose if I was being positive about it, I 
would say if you just look at that change… When I started it was microfiche, 
every morning.  And when we did get a computer, it was 24 hours out of 
date.  And look at us now.  […] From that point of view, it’s still a fascinating 
industry.’  (P8: 165)   
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‘I’ve been given a lot of opportunities which has been super.  […] I think in 
an organisation the size of this. There’s so many different things that you 
can do.’  (C9: 173) 
‘And I see some things we do in this technology centre, the focus that we 
have on our customers, and the opportunity that I have to play in that 
space, even though I’m not face to face with the customer every day, I 
really value.’  (C10: 183) 
In new banking, a banker is defined less by their professional training and more by 
their employed role:  ‘if you work in a bank, you’re a banker.  But, within that, yes there 
are lots of different professions’ (C9: 174).  Banks should be run by the best available 
leader, whether a banker or not. 
R: ‘do you have any view as to whether bankers should be in charge of 
banks - I mean bankers as in professional bankers?’  P:  ‘Yes, career 
bankers…  I don’t necessarily think they should be.  I think so long as 
they’ve got the right people in their team that can advise them and direct 
them when they really need to be directed, and actually then when you get 
to that level, it’s all about leadership and running a business.’ (C9: 184-185) 
The idea that banks can be run as generic businesses (C10: 204-205)  is a key point of 
conflict between old banking and new banking. 
5.5 Banking as a practice 
Before moving to interpret the narratives of this group as stories of a practice or 
practices, it is necessary to explore briefly the question of whether banking is a practice 
at all in a MacIntyrean sense.  Van de Ven (2011) believes it is, largely on the basis of 
the status of banking as a profession (see also section 2.13).  However, part of what 
helps us to identify banking in Scotland as a tradition in the previous sections are the 
institutional structures which also identify it as a profession, and these structures need 
to be kept distinct from the idea of banking as a practice, something which MacIntyre is 
very clear about.  If we are to interpret banking in Scotland as a practice, it is the 
activity on which we must be focused, not the structures amongst which the activity 
takes place. 
One way to proceed at this point would be to split down the idea of a practice into its 
component elements to establish criteria, somewhat as Nicholas (2012) does with the 
idea of a tradition.  Those component elements extracted from MacIntyre (2007, p.187) 
might then read as follows.  A practice is a social activity which is: 
1) coherent and complex 2) cooperative, and through which 3) goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
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4) those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that 5) human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended. 
An exercise in evidencing these elements could then be undertaken to show how these 
elements operated in banking in Scotland.  There is, for instance no shortage of 
evidence, as is shown below, that this group of bankers take their activities to be 
coherent, complex and cooperative, there is plenty of talk of internal goods, and 
animated discussion of standards proper to that activity. 
However, there are two reasons for not undertaking this procedure.  For one thing, the 
process would be likely to reach a halt with the fifth element, because the result 
proposed by MacIntyre, that human powers to achieve excellence are systematically 
extended, is likely to be undetectable.  Effectively, this last element is the one which 
locates practices as schools for the virtues (Knight, 1998) and, even if the narratives of 
the participants as a group could show that they are indeed virtuous characters, what it 
could not possibly show would be the systematic extension of such excellence, which 
would require a much wider evidence base.  Secondly, at a more fundamental level, 
such an analysis would be somewhat beside the point, because the idea of a practice 
can best be understood in narrative form, at least in MacIntyrean enquiry (Lutz, 2004).  
This is true for reasons of methodological consistency (Coe and Beadle, 2008), but 
also for practical reasons.  The only way in which we can hope to understand, with any 
meaningful degree of teleological insight, the way in which people might move towards 
excellence through an activity is by listening to their own stories of their progress 
(MacIntyre, 2007).  So we are not so much concerned with elements of practice as 
criteria, but with the way in which all these elements work together to make a whole 
picture, and we are not so much concerned with the activity itself at a moment in time, 
but with the life narratives of participants in that activity. 
Consequently, the procedure of the following sections is in keeping with the procedure 
of the rest of this chapter.  The idea of a practice is explored through narrative.  Along 
the way, there will be plenty of opportunity to point out how the various elements of a 
MacIntyrean practice are evident in this narrative, but this will not for the moment 
amount to a demonstration that banking ought to be viewed as a practice.  That 
question will be resumed later at Section 6.5.  At this point all that is shown is that by 
viewing it as a practice we can learn a great deal about the stories of these bankers, 
and new insights into their moral arguments become available. 
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One last question needs to be broached before proceeding.  If Scottish banking is or 
was a practice, is there more than one practice in view in these conversations?  A 
similar question has arisen already with regard to tradition, and the question of old 
banking as a tradition in its own right as distinct from new banking has been deferred to 
the discussion chapter.  The question related to practice seems more straightforward.  
New banking appears as such a distinct activity or set of activities that it is hard to 
reconcile old and new banking as one practice.  At the very least, in view of the conflict 
between the two which has already been shown above, it would be hard to group old 
banking and new banking together into an overall activity which would still count as 
coherent.  The following narrative therefore focuses on old banking as a practice, with 
mention of new banking mainly as a contrast. 
5.6 The recollection of practice 
Those of the group who started their careers in banking earliest have the strongest 
memories of old banking as a practice.  They are able to articulate with confidence and 
with passion key features of that practice as it appears to them. 
Apprenticeship 
Apprenticeship is of the greatest importance to their shared view of the practice, and 
their membership of the practice is largely defined by it:  ‘the great thing about the 
banks in those days, I guess because perhaps there was more mundane activities, 
everybody did start as a kind of apprentice almost’ (C8: 145).  All members of the 
group recall this process (most explicitly at C1: 2, C2: 31, C3: 52, C5:97, C7: 128, C8: 
145, C10: 186).  In the 1960s and 1970s these apprenticeships extended over long 
periods: ‘your first promotion came when you were 30 if you were lucky’ (C1: 6). This 
gave time for a thorough grounding in practical skills and an understanding of banking 
systems (C3:52).  It also gave a grounding in ethics.  People who experienced this 
process of traditional apprenticeship in old banking ‘had a hugely long period of time in 
which to absorb the culture, the ethos and the ethics’ (C1: 2).  The idea of 
apprenticeship was bound up with formal qualifications and membership of the 
Institute, and up until the late 1980s there was an assumption that young bankers ‘had 
to do exams as part of the bank apprenticeship’ (C3: 54). 
Such apprenticeships achieved many things, including a sense of belonging, shared 
standards and leadership of the practice.  Shared standards, the ‘ethical / cultural 
things of banking […] never had been explicitly stated […] it was just the way it was’ 
(C2: 34).  Because these standards resulted from a living practice, they were absorbed 
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by being socialised into the practice more than through formal instruction, and operated 
at the time as tacit assumptions rather than codes of conduct:  ‘it would have been 
challenging - to articulate [them] thirty years ago, because it’s only now that you kind of 
realise that that was the way it was, because it changed so much in the meantime’ (C2: 
34).  These standards might be unwritten but verbalised: ‘mantras went around like: 
“We don’t take equity in business.  That’s for merchant banks”’  (C2: 36).  And in this 
case the standard serves to draw a clear boundary to the practice.  ‘There was a time 
we actually said, “We don’t do mortgages.  That’s for building societies.  We don’t do 
life assurance.  That’s for life companies”’ (C2: 36). 
Leaders in the practice 
The gaining of standards in old banking through apprenticeship defined the practice 
and developed leaders capable of providing authority within the practice, to a large 
extent by themselves providing exemplars of what it meant to be a good banker.  ‘The 
people who used to run banks were people who’d worked their way up from the ranks 
and knew everything there was to know about how that bank operated.  They’d 
inculcated the traditions throughout their career and they were great authority figures’ 
(C4: 88).  The emphasis was not on the individual manager, or personality or 
authenticity, but on a general type, showing a certain uniformity, because all were 
apprenticed in the same practice.  ‘Well I had a lot of good managers in my younger 
day […] and the managers when I was young gave me a good grounding.  I wouldn’t 
single any of them out.  It was basically, that was a standard you had to aspire to’ (C3: 
52:53) 
For those who are most attached to old banking, the provenance of their leaders is of 
great importance: 
‘It’s said that he was offered the governorship of the Bank of England and 
turned it down because he preferred to stay in M Bank.  So he’s the kind of 
guy that people felt safe with.  But he’d been through the whole route of the 
traditional banker, because he was probably the first graduate entrant to M 
Bank, and he’d done military service as well, but they made him start in a 
branch making the tea.  So he’s seen it all.’  (C1: 7) 
This is not only because a shared history gives a sense of social comfort.  It is also 
because banking is a complex practice which can seem deceptively easy in periods of 
extended economic growth.  One banker sees this as being a key component of what 
makes for a self-defining practice, and a key symptom of its dissolution as a 
profession.  Speaking of being consulted by a politician over high profile building 
society failure, one banker says: 
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‘You’ve got to ask the question: Are they qualified bankers, qualified 
building society guys?  And they’re not. […]  We’re the only profession in 
the country that’s allowed other people to run it.  Doctors haven’t done that.  
Lawyers haven’t done that.  Dentists haven’t done that.  Everybody thought 
banking was easy.  It was just a retail commodity.  Yes, we commoditised 
some of the products, but all we did is we took some of the knowledge that 
we had and actually translated it into analytical tools and analytical tool 
sets.’ (C3: 60) 
5.7 The goods and purposes of the practice 
To a large extent, the goods and purposes of banking as a practice, as expressed by 
this group, are not very different from the goods and purposes of banking as a tradition 
except that the goods of the practice exclude certain institutional structures.  The 
internal goods of the practice, like the goods of the tradition, can be described broadly 
as a range of typical virtues, a set of capabilities, a set of relationships and some 
distinctive purposes.  The virtues of old banking are dealt with in more detail in further 
sections below.  Here are discussed capabilities, relationships and purposes. 
Capabilities 
To describe capabilities as goods is uncontroversial23 in Aristotelian ethics and it is not 
intended at this point to enter into a debate about the relationship between virtue and 
techne.  Here it is perhaps sufficient to state that capabilities are being discussed in 
association with the idea of ‘techne’ (Aristotle, NE, II.4) to include skills and expert 
knowledge, and that the primary distinction between virtue and techne is a twofold 
Aristotelian one.  A techne is an instrumental capability which may be used to a range 
of ends, either good or bad, whereas a virtue cannot move towards a bad end, since 
virtue also encompasses the idea of a good telos (MacIntyre, 2007).  Second and 
related to this, a given specific techne or a subset of technea can operate to a degree 
independently of some notional complete set, whereas virtues always operate as a 
complete set as understood in the doctrine of the unity of the virtues (Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae, I-II, Q.65, A.1, co.; Porter 1993).  Even so, there remain some difficulties 
with this notional separation of techne and virtue, and this topic will be discussed 
further in Chapter 6. 
                                               
23
 This is simply to say that Aristotle’s argument about the characteristic functioning of human 
beings is central to his argument about goods. ‘For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an 
artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is 
thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function’ (Aristotle, 
NE, I, vii).  It is does not imply anything concerning Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
(Nussbaum, 2000). 
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What sorts of capabilities contribute to the goods of old banking?  One key and in 
some ways defining capability is the understanding of banking and the bank as a 
whole.  This is expressed in concrete rather than theoretical terms, being not so much 
a grasp of the economics of banking systems, but a practical feel for what banks do:  ‘a 
real idea of what the bank is about, what were the bits that made the bank tick and 
what was important.  […] just the nuts and bolts of what makes the bank’ (C2: 26).  
This included elementary understandings of technical processes: ‘you understood the 
credit entries, you understood the debit entries, you understood what happened when 
a cheque was unpaid.  You understood all these basics’ (C3: 52).  It also included 
highly complex understandings.  Many of the bankers talk with enthusiasm of their 
technical achievements in developing systems or of managing complexity (C8: 152, 
C3: 48 and 59, C5: 129) and, for most, technical proficiency or a thorough 
understanding of banking has been a key element of their route to success (C2: 24, 
C6: 109, C10: 191). 
Relationships 
Three main types of relationship appear to be important goods in old banking.  Most 
obviously the relationship with the customer is central and defining.  This is true when 
bankers are simply speaking about their own past, (C2: 27, P6, 114, P7: 130 and 143) 
and when they are trying to locate what banking is all about.  ‘The raison d’être is to 
serve the customer […] if I can’t articulate what it is I do in terms of what [it] gives a 
customer […] then I shouldn’t be in a job’ (C10: 199).  The central importance of the 
customer relationship is perhaps expressed most pointedly when they wish to criticise 
someone as not understanding banking or not being a proper banker, a criticism 
particularly levelled at leaders.  One Chief Executive whose background was general 
management and venture capital ‘wasn’t particularly interested in talking to customers, 
because he’d come from that background, because a customer to him was a deal’ (C2: 
32-33).  Fully apprenticed bankers gain a unique understanding of customers from their 
time spent in branches, and good leadership is ‘leadership that’s closer to the 
customer’ (C5: 106). 
Equally valued in the context of old banking is the banker’s place in the community 
(C2: 22-23, J3: 63).  This is of course directly linked to the customer relationship 
because customers form a key element of the community, but it also concerns other 
structures.  Branch managers ‘were involved in the community, they were elders in the 
church, they had…  there was an involvement and a professional status and there was 
something about those people’ (C5: 99). 
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Finally, as with any practice, friendships with colleagues are valued (C5: 99-100), and 
they are valued not only as people, but also as fellow practitioners.  ‘They all 
understood and all worked well as a team, because they all understood what a core 
bank was’ (C3: 56). 
Purposes 
One aspect of coherence evident in old banking as a practice is that between goods 
and purposes.  The purposes of old banking are frequently stated in direct connection 
with the customer relationship. Banking was there ‘to provide a safe home for people’s 
money and to lend people money on a sensible basis’ (C2: 36).  ‘The first thing we 
were taught in banking was that you were a custodian of deposits.  You’re looking after 
other people’s money’ (C3: 51).  These formulations of the basic purposes of old 
banking in terms of customer service (C2: 36, C10: 199) are in marked contrast to 
formulations which are more in tune with new banking and economic theory, such as 
‘redistributing the available capital’ (C8: 156).  These kinds of purpose become more 
apparent below in the context of virtues, because virtues such as constancy and justice 
as understood in old banking are very much dependent on an understanding of the 
purposes of banking. 
A second aspect of coherence in purpose is the match between internal goods, the 
purposes of the practice and the purposes of each individual in the way that they steer 
their own life, i.e, their own telos.  When asked the question, ‘How would you 
recommend banking to a young person considering their career choices?’, none of the 
participants indicate external goods of money, power or status as attractive rewards in 
themselves.  Those who are most attached to old banking speak about the rewards of 
having a place in the community and the status and relationships which go with it. 
‘So someone coming into banking, I’d say, ‘If you want to - it depends 
which part of banking you want to come into - I’m a retail banker - if you 
want to work with people and you want to be involved with looking after and 
serving people on the street, with businesses and helping that - community 
banking - there’s a lot of enjoyment out of that, there’s a lot of fun to see 
businesses started off, growing, employing people and as part of the 
community.  That’s a different model [from investment banking] and that’s 
where I think the fun is.’  (C6: 124) 
5.8 The corruption of the practice 
A clear line of development in MacIntyrean enquiry has been taken by Beadle, Moore 
and others (Moore and Beadle, 2006; Beadle and Moore, 2011) which explores the 
tension between practices and institutions, and which regards institutions as 
mechanisms for both supporting and corrupting practices.  There is further discussion 
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of this idea in Chapter 6.  For the present, the interpretation offered in this section 
explores this tension as one aspect of the decline of the practice, but does not seek to 
theorise it as an overall diagnosis.  Rather, an interpretation is offered which is as close 
as possible to the accounts offered by the participants themselves.  Corruption here is 
understood as loss and breakage, a breaking down or loss of the goods and purposes 
of the practice.  This story of breaking down is very clear in the narratives of the group 
and it throws into relief those original goods and purposes; as they are lost or opposed, 
they become more obvious and articulated.  Goods which might otherwise have been 
hidden come to light as they are lost. 
Loss and breakage 
One such good is the structural good that a practice should lead itself.  That the 
leaders of banking in Scotland would be Scottish bankers was, in the 1960s and 
1970s, so taken for granted that it could hardly have been articulated as a good.  This 
changed when it was removed.  One banker speaks of the collapse of a building 
society: ‘We’re the only profession in the country that’s allowed other people to run it’ 
(C3: 60). (The full quotation is given above at Section 5.6.) 
This became a general problem. ‘There are very few bankers at the top of banks who 
are professionally qualified bankers’ (C5: 102).  This loss of authority went hand in 
hand with a whole raft of other losses and breakages. 
‘Yes, the other thing was the banking exam side all went by the board.  We 
had to do exams as part of the bank apprenticeship.  We had to pass part 
one first, then you’d to pass your part two, and then you had to do all that… 
That gave you a good solid [grounding] in ethics, lending, knowledge of 
history and all that, what went on, together with the practical training, 
because they moved you into different areas, you know branch, 
department, marketing department, things like that.  And that was all part of 
the culture of understanding how banks operated at the time, whereas what 
happened was it seemed to me after about 1995 or so, anybody could run 
banks.  And it’s as a profession, we lost it.’  (C3: 54) 
De-skilling 
The requirement of a coherent set of qualifications for all those aspiring to be 
managers was abandoned, and along with this change the traditional skills of old 
banking were eroded or replaced by new ones, ‘re-skilling or de-skilling depending on 
how you want to look at it’ (C5: 93), a process which resulted in a new workforce with 
many specialists, but few generalists who had the comprehensive skills and knowledge 
of old banking and who could therefore perform ‘proper banking, when you were 
actually there to give advice to the customer, be that point in the community’ (C8: 156).  
The same speaker sees those who now occupy managerial positions in the branch 
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network as having sales techniques rather than the skills and knowledge necessary to 
provide a professional service:  ‘if you went into any bank round about here in the 
space of a mile, would the manager be able to tell you how to set up a small business?  
I suspect he wouldn’t, because they’ll be retail only, and they’re probably 21, to be 
honest.  And they’re the branch manager because they had the best sales record’  (C8: 
156-157). 
Other goods were lost along the way as part of the same process; the goods of 
professional status, skills and standards were replaced by sales targets: 
‘You know, you were the banker, so there was a position in society that 
went with that, and behavioural expectations, most of which you imposed 
upon yourself, but society also had those expectations of you and with the 
onset of a much more aggressive commercial approach to banking - not 
just to banking but to the whole business world, that’s pretty much gone.’  
(C1: 10) 
Fragmentation 
Breakage is apparent in various ways in this process of the corruption of goods and 
purposes, and is expressed in various ways as the fragmentation or dissolution of the 
profession.  For instance, two of the participants use the word ‘disaggregation’ in 
different ways.  One uses it to describe the way in which the services, functions and 
skills which used to form a coherent set in old banking  have been broken up and 
redistributed around large, complex, diversified organisations so that banking as a 
coherent profession is no longer at the centre of the bank.  For one banker, ‘the 
product set’s been disaggregated’ (C5: 103).  Another speaks in the context of the 
customer relationship about the ‘disaggregation of channels’, and speaks of the 
‘customer morphing from the branch to web, to ATM etc.  So you lost them to deal with, 
to interact’ (C8: 143).  Organisational complexity intervened to break up professional 
mastery, and technology intervened to break up the relationship with the customer 
which was the central good of old banking. 
It appears in these stories of the decline of old banking that the corruption of that 
practice was comprehensive and multifaceted.  It involved a raft of losses and 
breakages:  the loss of qualifications and skills, the erosion of standards and status, 
the loss of customer relationships, the loss of leadership, the fragmentation of functions 
and roles, and the weakening of professional structures. 
Does this amount also to moral corruption?  Certainly the participants in this research 
were keen to acknowledge that banking had lost its way ethically as well as financially.  
One way to view this decline in ethical standards is to 
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transgressions, in the way, for instance, that the Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards (2013) has done.  Another way to view it is from a virtue ethics 
perspective, looking at the virtues of old banking, and seeing how they have been 
marginalised or displaced in new banking.  The following sections make this attempt, 
considering a core set of virtues which appear to characterise the practice of old 
banking. 
5.9 Cardinal Aristotelian virtues in old banking 
This section considers the position of old banking in relation to the cardinal Aristotelian 
virtues of justice, courage, self-control and practical wisdom.  As MacIntyre (1988) 
demonstrates, conceptions of these and other virtues vary from tradition to tradition, 
and therein lies a potential difficulty of translation:  there can be no presumption that 
Scottish bankers are articulating the same virtues as Aristotle does.  The following 
paragraphs therefore make no claim that the participants in these conversations are 
speaking of virtues which are exactly equivalent to Aristotle’s, only that there is a broad 
correspondence.  As the argument proceeds in later sections and in Chapter 6, it will 
become clear that these virtues work together in a coherent tradition in a way which 
strengthens that correspondence. 
Justice 
Many of the participants are strongly interested in justice and, in the context of old 
banking, the notion of justice was centred on the financial contract between customer 
and bank, and more specifically on the notion of stewardship of another’s funds.  
Banking ‘was there to provide a safe home for people’s money and to lend people 
money on a sensible basis’ (C2: 36).  Unlike in new banking, where complex mass 
communication technologies act as a veil between bank manager and retail customer, 
in old banking the relationship was direct and personal.  Correspondingly, justice along 
with other virtues emerges as something which was not only designed into the systems 
of old banking, but was also something instilled into young bankers as a virtue (C2: 
36): 
A Presbyterian upbringing was always straight, truthful, honest, above 
board, you know all these.  It’s inbred into you.  You know, it comes back to 
even the managers that hadn’t a role as elders of the Kirk and all that in 
these days it was always back to: your primary role here is, you’re a 
custodian of deposits - it was bred into me when I was just seventeen - 
when you lend, you’re lending other people’s money. […]  That’s what 
we’re here for, and we’re going to make sure we’re going to get this back.  
(C3: 61) 
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There was an implicit contract here which was directly between the banker and the 
customer, a relationship based at root on a simple act of trust in which depositors trust 
the banker with their savings and trust that they will get their money back (C2: 36).  
This relationship of trust in effect defined responsible lending, because in old banking it 
was not the bank’s money which was being lent, but the depositor’s money which was 
being lent on.  The proper discharging of the duty to repay the depositor’s funds when 
required – the fulfilment of the responsibility of custodianship - was the primary arena 
for the operation of justice by the banker.  This then extended to other aspects of 
justice, similarly oriented towards the trust placed by the customer in the banker, for 
instance the duty to act well as a trusted financial advisor (C5: 96), or to act as a 
trusted lender (C3: 62). 
Tales of injustice are oriented in the same way, being described mainly as abuse of the 
relationship of trust between banker and customer.  This is most obviously the case 
with mis-selling of products (C2: 30, C8: 150), and is explicitly linked to the gap 
between cultures:  ‘we’re dealing with different, completely different cultures and 
environments […]  so there was mis-selling, because that’s what the engine’s saying ‘I 
want more of this’. (C6: 127) 
In traditional Scottish banking, then, there was a clear line of thought on justice.  
Justice in the specific sense of distributive justice centred on the obligations of the 
banker towards the customer, and this relationship was definitive of the virtue in its 
particular application to banking.  Broader notions of justice as straight dealing or 
honesty were not simply founded on this relationship - they were inherited from broader 
social structures including the Kirk - but justice in old banking was focused and 
developed specifically in terms of the obligation to the customer.  It was a strong if 
somewhat Old Testament version of justice.  There was no room for mercy or the 
forgiveness of debts. The other Aristotelian cardinal virtues in old banking were to 
some extent dependent on this basic notion of justice, and this is discussed further in 
Section 6.3. 
Courage 
‘So the courageous person is the one who endures and fears – and likewise is 
confident about – the right things for the right reason, in the right way and at the right 
time’ (Aristotle, NE, III.7).  In describing the virtue of courage, Aristotle was not only 
concerned with physical danger of injury or death, but with a range of possible 
dangers, including loss of money or status.  Courage, in this Aristotelian sense of a 
right attitude towards fear, danger or risk, was a very large part of what the 2007/8 
crisis was about.  This is most obvious in the condemnation by the bankers of the 
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corresponding vice of recklessness, where ‘the risk taking went […] beyond the bounds 
of good sense’ (C1: 19).  A concern with recklessness or ignorance of risk is ubiquitous 
in the conversations (C1: 17, C3: 53, C7: 135, P8: 150), and is termed on some 
occasions ‘complacency’ (C10: 200) on others ‘arrogance’ (C9: 180).  In terms of an 
Aristotelian mean (Aristotle, NE, II,6) – hitting the right balance between cowardice or 
recklessness – there was a very clear position adopted by old banking, that risking 
depositors’ funds was a bad thing.  The principal vice, therefore, was recklessness or 
carelessness with other people’s money.  There is no mention of any opposing vice 
such as timidity or cowardice, because the virtuous banker had a virtually zero 
tolerance of risk (C2: 36).  It is tempting then to characterise courage in this context as 
the bankerly virtue of prudence.  However, the word prudent is used just once (C4: 87), 
and then by the only non-banker in the group.  Words preferred by the group in the 
context of virtuous lending are good sense (C1: 19), wise (C1: 19), sensible (C2: 34), 
responsible (C2: 36).  There is in fact no single term used by the group as a whole to 
refer to a right attitude to risk, but all would nevertheless recognise terms such as 
responsible lending or good sense to refer to the same thing with regard to risk.   
In old banking, knowing in practical terms how to go on with lending or any other 
banking activity, in order to achieve such responsible use of funds, was very much 
dependent on a sense of justice, because these attitudes were always based on the 
role of the banker as custodian of deposits, rather than as corporate entrepreneur.  It 
was also directly linked to practical wisdom and technical expertise.  
Practical wisdom 
One of the notable things about this group is that there is frequent talk of practical 
wisdom.  Several are readily able to articulate the difference between virtue and techne 
(see Section 2.10), and most have some idea of how virtues operate together in their 
sphere of work.  These understandings tend to rotate around phronesis or practical 
wisdom, which in turn depends also on other aspects of a good character.  Aristotle 
(NE, VI.5) describes practical wisdom as the ability to ‘calculate well to promote some 
good end that lies outside the ambit of a skill’ …and … ‘a true state involving reason, 
concerned with action in relation to human goods’.  Foot (2002, p.5) sees practical 
wisdom as having two parts:  ‘In the first place the wise man knows the means to 
certain good ends; and secondly he knows how much particular ends are worth’.  It 
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thus has an evaluative element (knowing a good end) and a calculative one (how to 
achieve the good). 24 
The question of practical wisdom arises in these conversations particularly in the 
context of leadership, and it is wisdom rather than cleverness or technical knowledge 
that is prized by many of those speakers who voice the values of old banking.  Since 
such things are perhaps significant findings, and are discussed further in Chapter 6, it 
is worth looking at some of these articulations in some detail. 
 ‘I mean, a lot of the people who sit at the top of these banks are technically 
competent, but when it came to making a decision, about what was the 
right or the wrong thing to do, they went with the wrong thing.  And to me 
that was more about human nature and how they were brought up, what is 
right or wrong in their world, as opposed to anything else.  I mean if you 
take M [name of Chief Executive removed] as an example, do I think M is a 
very bright individual?  Absolutely.  No doubt about it.  He was sharp in lots 
of ways.  But once you get to the level he got to, there’s almost this human 
bit where ‘I can’t show my weaknesses’.  And certain individuals are like 
that.  […]  And of course in areas where he should have sought more 
assurance and understanding… and then there’s the kind of ego thing 
becomes big.’ (C6: 119) 
M lacked practical wisdom rather than techne, and that deficiency brought down his 
bank.  It is seen here as a character failing associated with a kind of pride or a fear of 
showing weakness.  Others reiterate this diagnosis of the same high-profile leader (C1: 
12, C5: 100).  One of the reasons why technical competence does not come to support 
an overall practical wisdom is a failure of upbringing.  Those who have not been 
through the required apprenticeship over an extended period of time do not have the 
experience required to achieve practical wisdom, because they don’t fully understand 
the consequences of certain sorts of action:   
‘You’ve to be through two or three bad cycles to actually understand what 
goes wrong, which I have been in my career.  If you go back to the 
recession periods of the 70s, were always a bad cycle, and then you come 
out and as [name removed] used to say to me, “Understand, we’re building 
a book that could withstand the bad times, not withstand the good times.”  
You don’t get it all right, but generally you get it right’.  (C3: 56) 
This is not to say, of course, that techne was not a good.  Under old banking, techne 
and practical wisdom were seen as aligned, and the above speaker recalls how his 
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 MacIntyre (2007, p.161) enumerates ‘four essential elements’ to practical reasoning in terms 
of Aristotle’s practical syllogism: the presupposed goals of the agent; the assertion of the major 
premise (this type of thing is good for a such-and-such); the assertion of the minor premise (this 
is an instance of this type of thing); the action that concludes the syllogism (Section 2.9).  I have 
used Foot’s two part expression for simplicity in the main text. 
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traditional expertise saved one bank from humiliation, because only someone with his 
depth of understanding could diagnose the large but hidden problem building up in the 
divisional accounts (C3: 57).  The same speaker emphasises that good leadership 
entails understanding what to aim for, and that non-bankers do not have such 
understanding: ‘leadership does come from the top, but you’ve got to understand what 
your goal and your objectives are, what you’re trying to achieve.  It was the same in F 
and K [names of banks removed], not bad banks, to be honest, but not run by bankers’ 
(C3: 60). 
These explanations of practical wisdom are offered frequently in the context of 
leadership, and particularly in the context of leadership failures in new banking.  One of 
the features of old banking which was lost in its defeat by new banking was the 
operation of practical wisdom at branch level and at the level of customer transactions.  
In old banking, the decision to lend money was based partly on assessment of 
character – ‘a judgement call’ (C3: 62) – something which was increasingly removed by 
technology (C3: 52), as ‘technology became more important […] and took away 
decision making processes’ (C7: 128).  In old banking, advice, for instance on small 
business financing, was offered to customers based on professional judgement, rather 
than on a product line:  ‘I felt before I was selling my ability to make a difference, rather 
than selling a product on which I had no real knowledge or expertise’ (C7: 130-131). 
The overall picture here is that practical wisdom was actively developed in old banking 
because it was required at branch level, but the rise of new banking accompanied by 
automated decision processes and greater central managerial control increasingly 
removed the exercise of such judgements.  In other words, banking in Scotland was 
not only de-skilled, it was at the same time ‘de-virtued’, because the development of 
the two were linked in practice. 
Self-control 
The virtue of self-control in old banking is taken for granted and little discussed by the 
bankers, although it reappears in a somewhat different form as patience in the next 
section.  Aristotle (NE, III.10) describes self-control (sōphrosune) in terms of a 
balanced attitude towards bodily appetites such as sex, drink, food etc.  With respect to 
what appetite would self-control be needed in old banking?  A common sense answer 
to this must be the desire for money (Weitzner and Darroch, 2009).  Aristotle’s scheme 
locates the vice of pleonexia (‘acquisitiveness’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p.137), possessing 
and possessing more) as a form of injustice, and, strictly speaking, discussion of it 
belongs under the head of justice rather than self-control.  It is discussed here under 
the head of self-control in order to emphasise that a lack of self-control was a problem 
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not only in respect of money, but also in respect of a range of other goods such as 
status, power, prestige.25 
Interestingly, the love of money appears nowhere in narratives of old banking.  There is 
acknowledgement that traditionally banking in Scotland was a respectable, stable and 
financially comfortable career (C1: 11), but slow-moving hierarchies in slow-moving 
organisations created little opportunity to make a great deal of money quickly for most 
traditional bankers.  (This seems true for this group at least, speaking principally as 
employees and managers; it may have been different for stock holders.) 
What does appear frequently is condemnation of greed and especially of the bonus 
culture of new banking, and the onset of the bonus culture is directly associated with 
failures of judgement or practical wisdom (C1: 6, C2: 7, C3: 50, C7: 135, P8: 156, C10: 
203).  There is no condemnation of moderate profit (C3: 53), of wealth as such or of a 
reasonable ambition for seniority and a good salary (C7: 139).  The bankers here are 
simply interested in a healthy balance of goods and they are sensitive to how quickly 
that balance can be tipped towards greed (C5: 98, C6: 124) and consequently towards 
a lack of practical wisdom:  ‘everything was just getting more and more hectic and 
more and more exciting, you know, and these good times would never end, and 
everybody was just pushing forward and pushing forward’ (C2:  31).  The efforts that 
some of the adherents of old banking make to distance themselves from the greed of 
new banking can lead to almost comic language.  As one banker has it: ‘Yes, I wouldn’t 
go into banking to get rich; you ain’t going to get rich now anyway …  I was fortunate, 
but I never earned a fortune in comparison to bankers’! (C6: 124)  Greed is also 
associated with injustice (C2: 38) and with bad character (C1: 14, C5: 99, C8: 164). 
5:10 The traditional bankerly virtue of truthfulness 
Once we step outside of a given canon of the virtues – in this case Aristotelian cardinal 
virtues – a whole range of potential descriptors of virtue opens up.  How then is a 
decision to be made on what to include or to exclude in a short list of those additional 
virtues which seem to be most characteristic of old banking in Scotland?  Two criteria 
have been used here.  First, any candidates for further virtues to be included in this 
chapter must be clearly related to the four canonical virtues already mentioned.  
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 I have preferred the term greed to acquisitiveness for this reason.  The stories of excess in 
new banking are not so much of personal wealth gained and held, and more wealth added, but 
rather of an increasingly feverish pursuit of goods which were questionable as to degree or 
appropriateness: wanting things and wanting them now.  Aristotle does not have a discrete 
virtue of self-control with regard to ‘non-bodily’ appetites. 
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Second, they must be clear in the primary data, i.e. they must either be frequently 
occurring, or they must be pivotal to one or more of the participants’ narratives.  The 
further virtues which appear to meet these criteria are the virtues of truthfulness, 
constancy and patience.  Others could be added to the list – courtesy, for instance – 
but these three seem particularly strongly present in the conversations. 26 
Truthfulness is described here as a characteristically bankerly virtue because it is, of 
these three, most directly related to both the tradition and the practice of old banking in 
Scotland.  The word truthfulness is being used in this thesis in a way which follows the 
sense given by Williams (2002).  Williams describes truthfulness as having two 
component virtues, accuracy and sincerity.  ‘You do the best to acquire true beliefs, 
and what you say reveals what you believe’ (Williams, 2002, p.11).  It is significant that 
both of these components are observable in recollections of old banking, that both 
appear to be of equal importance and that they work together. 
Sincerity 
Truthfulness as sincerity is claimed with pride by those who most value old banking 
(C1: 14-15, C3: 61) and traditional bankers are praised for being ‘honest and 
trustworthy’ (C7: 136).  Such praise is frequent, with a range of similar terms being 
used:  ‘honesty and integrity’ (C3: 62, 63 and 74) were at the heart of old banking, 
good bankers were ‘straight’ or ‘straightfoward’ (C2: 27, C3: 61).  There is a close link 
here between justice and truthfulness, and both are encompassed in the notion of 
integrity in the relationship with customers.  Deceitfulness was a vice which directly 
countered the virtue of justice: a traditional banker ‘was deemed to be, as I say, a 
custodian of deposits, and if you lie to people...’ (C3: 53).  Dishonesty is still regarded 
as a personal vice in new banking (notwithstanding institutional and system wide 
deceitfulness in, for instance, mis-selling of products), but is more an issue when 
dealing with colleagues than customers and is differently expressed in the language of 
authenticity (being true to oneself, Section 5.4). 
Accuracy 
Particularly striking in the stories of old banking is the central position of Williams’ other 
virtue of truthfulness, accuracy, not least because banks are saved by it or fail in its 
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 These criteria may not appear to exclude many qualities which might be termed virtues in 
common language, but they do oblige the author to make the case in this specific occupational 
context.  So for instance, it would be stretching a point to argue for cleanliness as an obvious 
virtue in banking because it somehow relates to justice in the customer relationship (?), 
whereas it would be essential to argue for cleanliness as a virtue in nursing, because it is 
exactly related to justice in the relationship between nurse and patient. 
128 
absence.  Accuracy, as Williams (2002, pp.87-88) has it, is ‘the virtue which 
encourages people to spend more effort than they might have done in trying to find the 
truth, and not just to accept any belief-shaped thing that comes into their head’. 
The habit of painstaking accuracy, which we might term diligence, was something 
deeply ingrained in old banking, particularly through its system of apprenticeship: 
‘But the basic core grounding apprenticeship schemes that we went 
through, they give you that knowledge and understanding.  It wasn’t just 
keying entries into a computer, not understanding what was happening.  If 
you’re writing hand-posted ledgers, which we weren’t allowed to make 
mistakes in [laughs], right, you actually understood what was actually 
happening.  You know, what was a debit, what was a credit, where this was 
coming, what was cash, what was this, what was that.’  (C3: 52) 
With this speaker, this quality of diligence is a point of great personal pride, and the 
story (C3: 57) which he tells of saving a division of his bank from a disastrous 
systematic accounting failure is one in which he personally pursued the truth through 
the details of the bank’s accounting system until he finally uncovered the systematic 
error which instinct told him was there.  In doing this, he was working against the odds, 
because nobody else believed there was a problem, and he was working against 
technology because the error was hidden by the complexity of computerised accounts.  
He was able to eventually detect and diagnose the problem, which by that time had 
already accrued £58m of losses which had not been detected by the accounting 
system.  The revelation of this problem saved the division from accruing further losses 
to a potentially fatal level. 
His pleasure in recounting this story is clear, not least because it is a vindication of the 
importance of practical wisdom and painstaking accuracy – the expert knowledge of 
the traditional banker: 
‘And we were getting told in the [name removed] bank - here’s an example 
– “Look how these guys are growing their book.  Look how wonderful it is.  
Look how marvellous it is.”  And I was sent over there to look at this and 
learn how they’re doing it, because I was an old fuddy duddy, right?  So I 
was put in there in [name removed] financial services and within a week, 
one of the non-exec directors who was a traditional banker on D’s [name 
removed] Board, says, “This cannot be right.  I don’t know what they’re 
doing, but it can’t be right.” So I went in…’  (C3: 57). 
This speaker’s example is particularly colourful, and it is important to him because it 
demarcates a key distinction between old banking and new banking.  As custodian of 
deposits, the traditional banker had a personal obligation of accuracy in his relationship 
with the customer.  Old banking did not take risks with other people’s money, and an 
essential capability in avoiding risk was diligence in accounting for that money, a 
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diligence which could not operate in the absence of a full (and time-served) 
understanding of the ‘nuts and bolts of what makes a bank’ (C2: 26).   
Old banking understood well that sincerity was necessary but insufficient for 
truthfulness; the habit of painstaking accuracy was also required.  The stories of the 
collapse of new banking on a grand scale in the crisis of 2007/8 are preeminently 
stories of a lack of diligence.  This is true of due diligence in taking on major 
acquisitions (Perry and Herd, 2004) (C1: 19, C10: 201), it is also true of the trading of 
derivatives either too complex to understand or deliberately designed to disguise the 
truth (C6: 120, C8: 156, C10: 200).  This in turn brings out another feature of accuracy 
in the sense of truthfulness which is critical to its functioning as a virtue rather than 
simply a technical skill; accuracy or diligence in old banking required not only attention 
to detail, but also understanding.  It was not a machine-like faithful reproduction of 
data; it was a capacity to grasp also the implications, the relevant meaning of data, a 
question of knowing what to look for and how to apply information; something which 
turns on a capacity for judgement and consequently answers also to the virtue of 
practical wisdom. 
In sum, the virtue of truthfulness, in both of its aspects of sincerity and accuracy, was 
central to old banking: it was required of the banker as custodian of deposits, and was 
consequently directly aligned with the virtue of justice in a way in which it is not in new 
banking.  
5.11 The virtue of patience 
Painstaking accuracy implies patience in the execution of the task, and the quality of 
patience turns out to be a recurring theme in these conversations.  Patience ‘is the 
virtue of waiting attentively without complaint’ (MacIntyre, 2007. p.202) for some good 
purpose.  In old banking, patience was learned as part of one’s apprenticeship, and it 
was a vital attribute in permitting the development of practical wisdom: 
‘I was forty before I got my first managerial type appointment.  And even at 
that I was probably inexperienced, looking back.  What I mean is 
experience grows through experience if you know what I mean; you gain 
that through practical day-to-day operations and learning from people who 
are more senior than yourself’ (C3: 66). 
There is an explicit acknowledgement here that practical wisdom is built on experience 
(C3: 55) and, in the case of banking, prolonged experience.  There was a stability built 
into old banking, which permitted its practitioners to develop the patience required:  
‘people could afford to be patient, because they knew what was ahead of them. It was 
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a job for life; which was one of the other things that got thrown out in the nineties’ (C1: 
10). Patience was valued in the leaders of old banking (C1: 8, C2: 27), and criticisms of 
bad leadership from the perspective of old banking are very often criticisms of a lack of 
apprenticeship because leaders lacking an adequate duration of apprenticeship in 
banking lacked the experience required to develop practical wisdom (C1: 6, C2: 33, 
C3: 56 and 64, C4: 87-88).   
Patience was important as a character trait of leaders in a number of ways.   The 
development of the necessary understanding of banking was not something which 
could be rushed; it was something you had to ‘grow up’ with (C6: 117, C4: 78-79), 
patience was therefore a prerequisite of leadership development.  Once in a leadership 
position, patience in dealing with people, particularly subordinates, was valued as a 
virtue in its own right (C2: 27).  Patience was vital in the exercise of due diligence 
(Section 5.11).  Finally, it was important as an aspect of self-control in the development 
of the organisation.  New banking is described by traditional bankers as obsessed not 
just with growth but with the pace of growth (C3: 50, C8: 156); the problem is both 
greed and impatience.  For traditional bankers, the corresponding vice of impatience is 
a character defect and appears as such in an immediate and personal way:  ‘He was 
actually quite, on the face of it, quite a charming guy, but quite vindictive, quite nasty 
with people.  He was, you couldn’t describe him as anything other than, brilliant at what 
he was doing, but he would have no time for - no time in an impatient sort of way - for 
anybody’s failings, shall we say’ (C2: 32). 
Patience is not a virtue in new banking.  Certainly, adherents of old banking criticise 
leaders in new banking for their lack of patience as illustrated above, but more 
importantly, there are no tales in new banking of the value of patience.  There are, by 
contrast, criticism of bankers or banks as slow-moving or sleepy (C6: 111, C10: 190-
191), and frequent positive stories of the extent or speed of change (C8: 165, C9: 168, 
173-4, C10: 186, 188-189, 203). 
Patience was linked to all of the cardinal Aristotelian virtues in the context of old 
banking.  It was linked to justice, because the obligation of the banker towards the 
customer was not particularly to do anything with money, it was to preserve it, to keep 
it safe, and this was a long-term project.  In this respect, patience was also linked to 
courage and self-control, because an appropriate view of risk, given this idea of justice 
in banking, required a long time horizon.  The pursuit of growth, particularly short term 
growth, was a corollary of recklessness and greed.  Lastly, patience was directly linked 
to practical wisdom in two respects; it was a feature of the exercise of practical wisdom 
in old banking, and it was a prerequisite for its development. 
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5:12 The virtue of constancy 
The meaning of constancy as used here is linked to the Aristotelian idea of integrity in 
the sense of wholeness of character (rather than in the common language sense of 
integrity as honesty). Integrity is that virtue which sets limits to one’s adaptability to 
social roles, and constancy is that which sets limits to flexibility of character (Maletta, 
2011).  Constancy as a virtue is particularly linked to resistance as an activity (Beadle, 
2013).  Without constancy, a person is unable either to detect where resistance might 
be necessary or to find the strength necessary to offer that resistance. 
Resistance 
In all but one of these research conversations, there are many tales of constancy 
because there are tales of resistance against a background of conflict.  Constancy has 
a particular flavour in the conversations, and is associated with an identifiable kind of 
feeling, which we might term moral discomfort (C6: 110, C7: passim, C8: 155).  One 
speaker (P7) gives a full portrait of this in his account of his own career.  He had 
attained a level of seniority which was unusual for someone as young as he was at that 
time.  He enjoyed the role, which allowed him to form stable relationships with his 
business customers, and the role should have been a stepping stone to further 
promotion.  However, whilst in the role he became uncomfortable with the new sales 
culture which was being introduced and which he saw as transforming long standing 
relationships of service provision and mutual benefit into ones characterised by sales 
targets and exploitation of the customer.  The theme of discomfort recurs regularly and 
explicitly in his narrative (C7: 129, 130, 136, 137 and 139), and at one point he 
describes in personal terms his decision to quit his role as a result of increasing 
pressure to pursue sales targets rather than customer service.  He voices this as a 
dialogue with his customers in which he tells them of his discomfort and his obligations 
to them in giving reasons for resigning.  (The story is given more fully above at Section 
4.3.) 
Sources of constancy 
The basis on which he came to this judgement is clear, and it was not only a question 
of how he was trained to do banking, but how his whole life, including his family life, 
fitted together:  ‘these things are instilled in you from the way you’re brought up and 
who you engage with throughout your life’ (C7: 137).  The cost to his career of 
resigning from his managerial role at the time in terms of seniority and pay was 
significant:  ‘I took a pay cut and I - what’s the opposite of promotion? The word 
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escapes me at the moment - I took a drop down in levels as a result of that, to get out 
of the role’ (C7: 139). 
Even if they are not always as dramatic as in this case, several other participants have 
their own stories of constancy and resistance, which involve moving jobs or losing 
seniority or pay (C2: 26, C3: 49 C6: 110) or refusing certain actions despite institutional 
pressure (C3: 59).  Such stories of the resistance of old banking to new banking are 
told in terms of resistance to sales culture or to the pursuit of foolish objectives in the 
interests of short term gain.  A clear set of standards was in operation in old banking 
which provided limits to behaviour, and an awareness of those limits depended on 
one’s training in banking and on one’s upbringing in family and community (C7: 139). 
There are stories of constancy in new banking and they can also result in acts of 
resistance involving moving roles within an organisation. One speaker in new banking 
clearly understands the idea of setting limits to flexibility of character and puts it very 
precisely with regard to standards of behaviour among colleagues:  ‘I’m not going to 
change to be the way that you want me to be’  (C9: 173). 
However, new banking also champions an entirely different quality of flexibility or 
adaptability which pulls in the opposite direction from constancy.  It involves a 
readiness to embrace change (Section 5.4), which can include flexibility with regard to 
basic values, and this can cause confusion.  One participant complains that whilst she 
is happy to be adaptable to new philosophies being brought in by new chief executives, 
it can be wearing after a while: 
‘If you go into the bathrooms there’s stickers on the wall.  There’s 
something on my desktop this morning which again is new  […]  And it’s 
actually been done really well.  No, it’s good.  And I don’t actually feel 
negative about it at all.  I just kind of, over the years,  it’s that kind of… you 
want it to stick at a leadership level, not just because of the top person 
that’s in’ (C9:177) 
Constancy, then, is perhaps not something which was peculiar to old banking, but is 
something which comes to the fore in these conversations because of the backdrop of 
conflict between cultures. 
The link to cardinal virtues 
In what ways does constancy relate to the cardinal Aristotelian virtues in the context of 
old banking?  There is an obvious link to courage.  In all these stories of constancy, 
acts of resistance required personal courage because they involved the individual in an 
unequal power struggle against the organisation, against an ascendant culture or 
against powerful others.  Quite often the person resisting lost out materially, at least in 
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the short term.  This then gives a quite different perspective on courage from the 
prudential view given above at Section 5.9.  The difference is that the risk being taken 
here in the context of constancy is to one’s own financial and material goods rather 
than one’s customer’s savings.  What remains consistent between these two different 
manifestations of courage is that both are driven by a concern for the welfare of the 
customer, and both still concern the judging of risk. 
Links to the other cardinal virtues also seem clear, as least in old banking.  Constancy 
is only possible if one also possesses the virtue of justice; when P7 explains why he 
took the actions he did, he explains it straightforwardly in terms of justice – what was 
owed to his family and what was owed to his customers.  This sense of justice is 
founded on a relationship of trust, often expressed as trustworthiness, and so it 
becomes clear that the relationship between justice and constancy also works the 
other way round.  Justice is only possible if one also possesses the virtue of constancy, 
because on those occasions when the limits of justice are reached, constancy is 
required to remain true to one’s obligations. Self-control is a pre-requisite of constancy, 
because in order to resist pressure applied, for instance through the threat of dismissal 
or demotion, one cannot be too attached to the rewards of pay, status or comfortable 
working conditions.  Lastly, as with all the virtues, practical wisdom is required to know 
when and how constancy should be pursued.  This is clear in all of these conversations 
– all of them weigh carefully their situation before taking action – and, in the case of 
P7, the affective nature of the operation of practical wisdom is clear; he acted as he did 
because he felt an acute sense of discomfort, not only because he worked out that he 
had an obligation to resist. 
The rewards of constancy 
In these stories, resistance comes at a price, sometimes a very significant one.  But 
constancy also has rewards.  P1, for instance, eventually achieved a return to old 
banking by moving from a senior position in a large diversified international bank, to 
run a small local savings bank.  In doing so he sacrificed some of the status and pay 
associated with the larger organisation, but was able to return to the standards of his 
practice.  On the question of sales culture and target driven incentive schemes, he 
responds:  ‘…we do not have a sales culture here at all.  There’s not one individual 
whose performance is judged on the basis of what they’ve sold during the year, never 
mind the past week’ (C2: 36).  This speaker appears to have achieved a rare peace of 
mind with regard to the internal standards of his own practice, but has only been able 
to do so by rejecting life in the mainstream banking sector.   
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Acts of resistance were often prompted by dissatisfaction with a target driven sales 
culture or other efforts to grow sales or reduce costs, but resistance was also prompted 
by other perceived moral issues, such as fair recruitment procedures (C7: 140).  In the 
case of at least four members of the group, there was evidence of a long term pattern 
of resistance.  This is not conveyed as a pattern of obstruction to change, and one of 
the bankers in question has a national reputation as an innovator of banking services;  
it is rather a pattern of observation of the limits of justice and adherence to those limits.  
There is a suggestion in these cases that some people go on to be serial resistors (C3: 
63).  Having once discovered that they can successfully resist the pressures of the 
organisation, they develop a habit of tenacity (C7: 140) which allows them to continue 
to challenge others when they see the limits to their own moral flexibility being 
approached. 
5:13 Summary: tradition, practice and virtue 
Ten conversations were held with leaders in Scottish banking; each conversation 
contains many stories, and amounts to one overall story in its own right.  One 
challenge for the researcher has been to make sense not only of the overall narrative 
of each conversation and its various sub-narratives, but to fashion a meta-narrative of 
the group as a whole.  This has been attempted now in two ways, chronologically and 
thematically in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. 
The broad themes which have been used to interpret these narratives in the current 
chapter have been those of tradition, practice and virtue.  To what extent has it helped 
to consider these themes and in this order? 
To regard Scottish banking as a tradition serves to highlight some significant aspects of 
the narratives of these Scottish banking leaders, particularly from the perspective of 
moral enquiry.  It allows us to ground their accounts of their own rationality in a distinct 
social structure, and it helps to show how that social structure embodied a 
correspondingly distinct mode of practical reasoning, which has been characterised 
here primarily in terms of ‘old banking’.  It also gives a framework within which we can 
begin to understand the conflicts in banking in Scotland as moral and social conflicts, 
rather than only in terms of market forces or economics. 
What we find in the case of old banking as recalled in memory is a picture which is 
strongly in agreement with MacIntyre’s characterisation of the idea of a tradition.  Old 
banking, that is banking as it was experienced in the 1960s and 1970s and as it 
persisted to some degree through the 1980s, is shown in these narratives as a 
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coherent social structure which carried with it a basis for practical rationality.  It was not 
a social structure complete in itself, but was dependent in turn on the structures of local 
communities in which banking occupies a physical place.  Old banking was embodied 
in a way in which new banking is not; it depended on physical meetings of people, 
known for their roles in physical communities, rather than on mobile phones, ATMs and 
the internet.  It was intimately connected with other social structures, particularly the 
Presbyterian Kirk and, when it comes to questions of moral standards, there is more 
talk in these conversations of the Kirk than of any financial regulator.  The fabric of 
practical rationality on which Scottish banking depended for its own coherence was 
given physical form in the Chartered Banker Institute, and this was in old banking a 
specifically Scottish institution supporting a specifically Scottish tradition (C1: 2). 
Once the historical narrative of banking in Scotland is given, the practice or practices 
which are in view can be understood in context.  It becomes clear, for instance, that 
new banking, if it is a practice, is a very different kind of activity from old banking, and it 
becomes clear that old banking, which has many of the hallmarks of a practice, is now, 
if not extinct, at least marginalised in the contemporary finance sector.  Viewing old 
banking as a practice, we are in a better position to understand the complex 
relationships between the profession of banking and the institutions amongst which it 
has moved.  We are able to trace the history of the decline of that practice in the 
context of its tradition, complete with the structural changes which accompanied and to 
a large extent caused its decline. 
Once old banking is viewed as a practice in the context of a tradition, then in turn the 
way that the virtues operate becomes clearer.  It is possible to detect the characteristic 
pattern of virtues in old banking, and to trace changes in that pattern in response to 
circumstances and particularly in response to conflict; we can also better delineate and 
describe those virtues by contrasting old banking with new banking, which appears not 
to require some of them and which appears to value other qualities which are less 
recognisable as virtues in an Aristotelian sense. 
On the basis of these narratives, we should then be in a position to explore the 
significance of the findings for moral enquiry.  They give us a means not only of 
illuminating the moral lives of bankers on the basis of virtue ethics, but also of critiquing 




Chapter 6:  Discussion 
6.1 Introduction and voice 
This chapter takes the themes of tradition, practice and virtue, which have been 
evidenced in Chapters 4 and 5, and discusses their significance from the perspective 
of Aristotelian and particularly MacIntyrean enquiry.  It explores the applicability of 
these themes to the empirical data, asking how the empirical data affects our 
understanding of key ideas in MacIntyre’s writing, and how those ideas can enhance 
our understanding of the moral narratives of this group of leaders in banking.  It also 
considers a number of questions related to virtue ethics which are more generally 
Aristotelian, including the unity of the virtues and the relationship between virtues and 
skills.  Finally this chapter considers the state of banking in Scotland as a practice, its 
apparent decline and its possible futures. 
Sections 6.2 to 6.3 deal with the theme of tradition, exploring the boundaries of that 
concept in this context and bringing out the idea that two incompatible ideas of justice 
may be in view.  Sections 6.5 to 6.7 discuss banking as a practice, including the 
question which was introduced in the previous chapter of whether banking is or was a 
practice in MacIntyre’s sense of the word.  Sections 6.8 and 6.9 discuss two 
challenging concepts in Aristotelian virtue ethics, the unity of the virtues, and the 
distinction between virtues and skills.  Section 6.10 addresses the core research 
question: ‘Is Scottish banking a corrupted practice?’, and 6.11 looks forward to the 
future direction of banking based on these discussions. 
The chapter adopts a different voice on occasion from previous chapters, and 
reintroduces a first person perspective into the text where appropriate.  This voice is 
adopted in order to make explicit the hermeneutic nature of the enquiry and to facilitate 
its expression.  In part this is for clarity.  Direct use of the first person avoids 
circumlocution and ambiguity.  For instance:  ‘The researcher developed further 
questions x and y during the conversation.  In the author’s view this was because…’ 
Becomes simply, ‘I developed further questions x and y during the conversation, 
because…’  It accommodates MacIntyre’s understanding of a kind of tradition-
constituted enquiry which makes clear the position of the enquirer.  This first person 
voice is adopted where required from this point forward, in the singular where the 
author’s perspective is made explicit, and in the plural where the perspective of author 
and reader together is intended in the procedure of the argument, as in the usage:  ‘If 
we follow this line of thought…’ 
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6.2 How many traditions? 
MacIntyre is interested in conflict within and between traditions, and this implies that 
such traditions are identifiable and plural (Kuna, 2005; Nicholas, 2012).  Tradition in the 
sense that MacIntyre uses the word does not only denote the concept of one’s 
background set of assumptions.  It also denotes a social structure extended in time 
which has members and boundaries, which can be described and named, and which 
can stand over against other similar social structures (MacIntyre, 1988; MacIntyre, 
1990).  Traditions are explored by MacIntyre as fields of conflict, and the initial question 
of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is framed in terms of conflict:  ‘How ought we to 
decide among the claims of rival and incompatible accounts of justice competing for 
our moral, social, and political allegiance’? (MacIntyre, 1988, p.2)  Here MacIntyre 
explicitly chooses to discuss four large traditions of enquiry, represented as Aristotle, 
Aquinas, the Scottish Enlightenment and Liberalism.  In doing so, he acknowledges 
that others could have been chosen, and while he attempts to clarify, through 
examples, what he means by traditions, he makes no attempt to define a set.  The 
implication is that over the course of human history, there have been an indefinite 
(though not an infinite) number of such traditions.  
Some questions then arise for the current thesis: In Scottish banking, are we looking at 
one tradition or more than one?  If conflict has been detected between old banking and 
new banking is this a conflict within a tradition or between two traditions?  Or is the 
conflict perhaps between some other traditions, between, for instance, a tradition of 
Scottish Presbyterianism ethics and free-market capitalism? 
It is perhaps easier to deal with the last question first.  There is clear evidence of 
conflicts between traditions or at least ‘tradition-like’ cultures in these narratives which 
are not confined to conflict between old and new banking.  This is true in the case of 
conflict between the Kirk on the one hand and free-market forces on the other (C1: 14, 
C3: 63, C5: 99), and true of conflict between Scottish bankers compared to London-
based ‘red brace boys’ (C3: 56, C8: 145 and 164, C5: 98-99).  There is a useful way to 
position these further conflicts within this study.  First, we can acknowledge that these 
conflicts are interesting and relevant, but not the focus of the study, and should 
therefore not be pursued as a substantive topic in their own right.  Second, we can 
acknowledge that they are relevant to the question of the boundaries of the tradition or 
traditions of Scottish banking, and this is something discussed further below with 
regard, for instance, to the close connection between old banking and the Kirk, and the 
doubtful status of new banking as a tradition in its own right. 
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The specific question of whether new banking is a separate tradition from old banking 
then deserves a fuller exploration.  There are reasons for thinking that old banking and 
new banking are voices within the same tradition.  Scottish banking has been, and 
apparently still is, in a state of epistemological crisis, so we can expect to find that 
there are conflicts between its members and that these conflicts might either directly or 
indirectly concern the goods and purposes of the tradition.  This is in fact what we do 
find.  There are, for instance, competing notions of what makes for a good leader of a 
bank which in old banking includes being a banker (C1: 6-7, C2: 33, C3: 56 and 64, 
C4: 88) and which in new banking does not (C10: 205), and there are competing ideas 
of what makes for a rewarding career which old banking sees as specifically linked to 
one’s place in a community (C2: 22-23, C3: 63, C5: 99 and C6: 124), and which new 
banking sees in terms of opportunities for personal development (C8: 165, C9: 173 and 
C10: 183). 
However, there must come a point when conflict becomes so fundamental that it 
signifies conflict between traditions rather than conflict within a tradition.  If one group 
rejects ‘all or at least key parts of [the] fundamental agreements’ (MacIntyre, 1988, 
p.12) of another group, one might surmise that two traditions are contending.  Again, 
there are reasons for thinking that this point has been reached.  It has been observed 
above that the virtues operate differently in old banking and new banking.  Virtues such 
as patience, which were valued in old banking, are not valued in new banking, and new 
virtues, such as flexibility and authenticity come to the fore in new banking, which were 
not recognised as virtues in old banking, and which are arguably not recognisable as 
virtues in Aristotelian ethics.   
It might then be argued that to have a different rank ordering of goods (for instance to 
value patience over flexibility or vice versa) might be in itself an insufficiently 
fundamental rejection of agreements, and that a more reliable touchstone is needed.  A 
core thesis of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is the idea that different traditions 
have different conceptions of justice.  There is no suggestion here that in order to 
identify one tradition as different from another it is a defining requirement that one 
should identify competing versions of justice.  However, if we can identify that such 
opposing versions of justice are assumed by different two groups, then it would seem a 
fair conclusion that more than one tradition is in fact in view. 
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6.3 Two versions of justice 
Aristotle describes distributive justice as ‘that found in distributions of honour or money 
or the other things that have to be shared among members of the political community’ 
(NE, V.6), and he further describes that aspect of it which is voluntary, i.e. freely 
entered into, as being concerned with things like ‘selling, buying, lending at interest, 
pledging, lending without interest, depositing, and letting’ (NE, V.2).  Does new banking 
approach such transactions in a radically different way from old banking? 
Justice OB 
It has been shown above (S5.9) 27 that old banking in Scotland had a particular 
understanding of justice as it operated in banking, and that this was based on other 
traditional ways of thinking learned in families, communities and Kirk.  If the question is 
framed28, ‘What do I owe to whom?’  then old banking answers this with reference to 
the role of the banker in relation to the community and in relation most of all to the 
customer.  Let us call this ‘Justice OB’.  Justice OB falls into two main parts, related to 
the two roles of custodian of deposits and trusted advisor.  In answer to the question, 
‘What do I owe and to whom?  Justice OB answers: ‘To the customer I owe the deposit 
entrusted to me together with the agreed interest on it, and to the community I owe 
trustworthy advice.’  This formulation separates out the duty to the customer as a 
custodian of deposits, which operates on a strict financial calculation – the banker 
owes at all times an exact amount to the depositor, neither more nor less – from the 
duty to the community as an advisor.  Advice may be offered quite widely before 
someone becomes a customer in the sense of having some formal contract as for 
instance a borrower or depositor. This distinction is not intended to separate out the 
customer from the community; the link between banker and customer as members of 
the same community is crucial in old banking.   
If Justice OB is a fair characterisation of the way the old banking understood things, 
and new banking flatly denies that characterisation, it would seem reasonable to 
conclude that two incompatible versions are in play.  In Chapter 5, evidence has been 
given of this version of justice operating in old banking.  New banking displays a very 
different version of justice, but this is perhaps less evident in the findings chapter, and 
                                               
27
 For brevity, internal references are given in this chapter as ‘S5.5’ if the topic has already been 
explored in Section 5.5 of the current thesis, or ‘C1: 14’ if further direct references to the primary 
data are intended. 
28
 I have adapted an active form of this question from MacIntyre’s (1988, p.33) passive ‘what is 
due to’…, as in ‘formulas used to define justice: each person and each performance has to be 
accorded what is due to him or her and to it…’. 
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in order to show it clearly, it will be necessary to offer a short fictionalised narrative.  
This is in the interests of confidentiality29.  The following narrative is based on the 
transcripts, but amalgamates a number of different actual stories told of different banks 
and different senior executives in order to protect anonymity: 
Carrier Bank grew from being a national to a multinational concern over the 
space of twenty years. A large part of that growth was through the 
acquisition of other financial institutions, the modernisation of processes 
and technologies and the development of a competitive approach to 
developing and selling new products.  Carrier Bank was spectacularly 
successful over this period of expansion, and its successive chief 
executives were treated by the UK government as heroes, until the financial 
crisis of 2007/8 caused the failure of this bank as it did or nearly did to 
several other major banks.  When Carrier Bank did fail and was saved only 
by the government through the injection of public funds it carried on 
operating, but several failures of judgement at the most senior level 
became apparent.  The bank’s programme of corporate acquisition had 
become far too ambitious, its portfolio of loans was toxic, and it had mis-
sold products systematically. 
Taking this case, the first step is to observe that injustice became endemic to Carrier 
Bank if we use Justice OB as the basis for our judgement.  Certainly mis-selling is an 
injustice with regard to the second requirement of Justice OB to offer trustworthy 
advice, but the first requirement of Justice OB, that the depositors’ funds should be 
protected, has been breached on the grandest possible scale.  Carrier Bank has used 
depositors’ funds to engage in risky lending and even riskier acquisitions resulting in 
financial collapse.  However, the question here is not just whether this is a case of 
unjust behaviour by an institution.  A stronger argument is needed to show that an 
entirely different standard of justice is in operation.  One needs to be able to show that 
some person or persons, for instance the leaders of the bank, were ‘OB Unjust’ 
habitually, and that they were acting in accordance with some alternative and 
conflicting version of justice which was culturally grounded.  This cannot be just a case 
of rogue leadership unsupported by a tradition, and it cannot just be a question of 
technical failure.  It needs to be shown that the leadership of Carrier Bank was acting in 
the characteristic mode of justice of new banking – let us call this ‘Justice NB’ – and 
that the enterprise they were engaged in was just from the perspective of Justice NB, 
and unjust from the perspective of Justice OB. 
                                               
29
 Research participants frequently refer to cases of business failure or ethical failure which 
have been prominent in the news and many which have not.  Often the speakers had personal 
links to key figures in those cases.  It is impossible to relate here an actual case without breach 
of confidentiality, so instead a (very short) fictionalised case is used, drawing from the 
conversations themselves and combining features of some of the different stories told. 
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Justice NB 
What then might the principles of Justice NB look like for a leader of Carrier Bank as it 
was before the crisis?  In response to the basic question, ‘What do I owe and to 
whom?’ we could propose the answer:  ‘To the shareholders of Carrier Bank I owe 
profitability and growth.’  This may be a crude formulation, but it is true to the portrait 
given in the conversations of the leadership of new banking, particularly in its later 
stages, which is characterised by an urgent drive for profits and an equally urgent drive 
for growth (S4.4).  There is little of security or risk avoidance in this portrait and little of 
the language and assumptions of Justice OB.  Further, there is every reason for 
thinking that these kinds of drive towards profits and growth were strongly approved by 
the culture in which this leadership found itself.  Speakers on behalf of both old banking 
and new banking in the conversations are not slow to offer criticisms of specific 
leadership failures in the style of Carrier Bank (C1: 18, C9: 180).  But they are also in 
agreement that the basic direction of travel of this kind of leadership was consistent 
with the culture of new banking which was orientated to rapid growth in sales and 
profits: 
‘Any kind of good business is a business that puts its customers first, 
because it’s relying on these customers for its long term future and what 
we’ve seen in the banking world and other businesses too is, you know, 
that being put aside in the interests of shareholders primarily, but also in 
the interests of senior staff, given the bonus systems that operate.  And so 
the long term interests of the business are really put aside in favour of the 
short term interests of the shareholders’.  (C1: 17) 
This orientation towards rapid growth and the risks that went with it was in turn 
consistent with the model of capitalism which had been encouraged on a society-wide 
basis and at a governmental level (C6: 121, C10: 204). 
It seems, then, that the leadership of Carrier Bank was operating according to a 
different version of justice compared to Justice OB.  Even if Justice NB as I have 
formulated it is not the best possible representation, whatever could plausibly be 
formulated in its place must also be radically different from Justice OB.  Some further 
questions remain.  Is Justice NB or some more accurate equivalent really a sign of a 
tradition identifiable as new banking – for instance, is it widely and reliably assumed as 
a fundamental agreement?  Am I simply exaggerating: have I elevated to the status of 
a principle of justice something which is really just a difference in job role? 
Distributive justice from an Aristotelian perspective ‘consists of the application of a 
principle of desert to a variety of types of situation’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p.106), and this 
includes the idea that different occupations may need to act in different ways in 
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applying the same principle of justice.  So a music teacher may award praise to a 
school orchestra very differently from the way in which a critic awards praise to a 
professional orchestra, but the same underlying sense of justice may still operate.  In 
order to show that Justice OB and Justice NB are genuinely two competing versions of 
justice, I need to show that they are operating on a different principle, not simply that 
they are different applications of something which could be a unified idea of justice at a 
more fundamental level. 
It might be responded that neither of these systems (old banking or new banking) have 
any strong claims to justice.  For instance old banking fails in respect of several 
modern liberal notions of justice with respect to equality of opportunity and openness of 
competition.  However, two things need to be kept in mind.  First, my purpose here is 
not to critique the standards of justice in old banking by the standards of liberal 
conceptions of justice (Rawls, 1999), but to show that more than one standard is in 
play in the primary data. Second, if old banking had continued to thrive and to develop 
as a tradition, it is a fair assumption that it would in any case have moved on as most 
other traditions have in the last fifty years, for instance with respect to gender equality.  
Traditional Scottish banking as it was in the 1960s would have been open to critique 
from the perspective of traditional Scottish banking as it might have been in 2013, had 
it not been displaced by new banking in the meantime. 
Beyond the question of justice 
One possible way to proceed from this point would be to show how these two 
supposedly different versions of distributive justice answer to two different 
philosophical traditions.  This would be reasonably straightforward in this case, and the 
two versions would fit quite readily with say a libertarian notion of justice on the one 
hand and a Kantian one on the other (Friedman, 1970; Pommerleau, 2014; Sandel 
2010).  Justice NB rests on the right of the firm to compete in a free market 
environment, while Justice OB rests on a categorical commitment to honour the 
promise made by the banker as custodian of deposits.   
However, any attempt to formulate a distinctive idea of justice at a fundamental level in 
the context of MacIntyrean enquiry needs to take account of the close connection 
between justice and practical reasoning.  A key contribution of Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? is to show how fundamental conceptions of justice vary from tradition to 
tradition, and that these variations are inseparable from variations in practical 
rationality between those same traditions.  Further, MacIntyre teaches us that traditions 
of rationality and justice are embodied in social structures (MacIntyre, 1987; MacIntyre, 
1999b).  So if we are to identify old banking and new banking as two traditions, it will 
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be a surer path to describe the whole picture, observing how these different 
components of each tradition fit together.  In doing so, we can also stay closer to the 
primary data, without fear that the picture developed of each is being redesigned to fit 
one ‘ism’ or another, when the reality might be that Justice OB or Justice NB might be 
somewhat unique, not fitting wholly into a ready made category taken from elsewhere.  
Consequently, at this point, it will be helpful to drop the phraseology ‘Justice OB, 
Justice NB’ and speak simply of Tradition A and Tradition B. 
Returning to the primary data, we can begin to characterise two different traditions in 
terms of justice, rationality and structures.  As portrayed in Chapters 4 and 5, Tradition 
A is centred on justice in the relationship between banker and customer (S5.9).  This is 
expressed directly in the obligations of the banker to return the depositor’s funds and to 
give trustworthy advice (S5.9). These obligations are dependent on a particular and 
stable ranking of goods in physical political communities (S4.2, S6.2).  These include 
the goods of professional knowledge and skills, earned respect and particular kinds of 
relationships in towns and cities (S5.7).  
Tradition B is centred on justice as fair competition in a free market economy (S4.3).  
This is expressed in stories of freedom, adaptation, development and growth (S4.4, 
S5.11).  These things are dependent on a ranking of goods in organisational structures 
(C8: 183).  These include the goods of salary and status, competition and winning (C7: 
134, C8: 156, C10: 200), together with team based relationships (C9 and C10 
passim30).  The key actors are the CEO and general manager against a background of 
complex and sometimes conflicting links between bank, global economy, stock market 
and regulator. 
Schemes of tradition 
The above characterisations of two different traditions A and B clearly go far beyond 
the question of two different job roles, but they do explain how the different job roles of 
banker and general manager come to be so distinct, even when they may formally 
occupy the same organisational position (e.g. when a champion of new banking takes 
over from a champion of old banking as the most senior employee of a specific bank).  
This can be seen, for instance, in the question of entrepreneurial activity.  In new 
banking,  where there is recognition of the necessity of rapid adaptation and 
                                               
30
 The two speakers who voice new banking most clearly use the word team 47 times between 
them, in comparison with the other eight speakers who only use the word 19 times altogether.  
By contrast, these two speakers only use the word community 4 times whereas the rest of the 
group use it 26 times. 
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competition in a free market, the entrepreneurial chief executive is welcomed and it is 
not the taking of risk in itself which attracts criticism, but failure.  In old banking with its 
emphasis on stable cooperative structures, there was a place for entrepreneurial 
activity, but it belonged properly to the customer, and the idea of an entrepreneurial 
bank manager would have been simply an oxymoron. 
We can even go so far as to schematise the typical elements of the two traditions, as 
shown below. 
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In the above schematics the word ‘justice’ does not appear, and this is a result of the 
limitations of such representations.  Justice in the sense of particular distributive justice 
lies behind each scheme in its different formulations relative to old banking and new 
banking and surfaces, for instance, in the different primary expressions of each 
scheme, and the different description of the key actor(s).  Justice in its wider sense of 
‘complete virtue in relation to another person’ (Aristotle, NE, V.1) is best seen here as 
appearing in the whole scheme; each scheme gives its own snapshot of how this wider 
sense of justice is founded in one tradition compared to the other.  One might then 
wish to return to the question of whether justice in new banking appears as a libertarian 
one, but this would be a further enquiry beyond the remit of the current thesis.  For 
current purposes it is enough simply to note that these are quite different models not 
only in respect of justice, but also in respect of practical reasoning and social 
structures. 
6.4 Tradition, boundaries and content 
The above argument is almost sufficient to show that old banking was a tradition as 
MacIntyre uses the term, though not a tradition of enquiry in its own right – almost but 
not quite. A key criterion for deciding that old banking was a tradition is not only that it 
is spoken of as such, and that it was structured as such, but also that it was handed 
on.  The word tradition is rooted in the Latin word tradere, meaning to hand over; a 
tradition is something handed on (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010).  It is distinct in 
this respect from a culture (Schein, 1990) which may be handed on or not.31  That old 
banking was a tradition handed on from one generation to the next is clear from 
McKinlay (2002), who traces banking in Scotland as a cultural phenomenon at least as 
far back as the establishment of the Scottish banking cartel in 1863 (the old 
‘Agreement of Understandings’ (C1: 13)), which was itself a response to a previous 
banking crisis in 1857.  The culture of Scottish banking at the end of the 19th century is 
vividly portrayed in a collection of cartoons in the archives of the Bank of Scotland.  
Robert Shirlaw, a clerk who joined the bank in 1899, produced hundreds of cartoons 
and hid them in ‘Ledger 99’.  They ‘overwhelmingly depict the daily grind of the bank 
clerk and the management style of his superiors’ (McKinlay 2002, p.613).  The portrait 
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 The hippie culture of the 1960s, for instance, is identifiable as a culture but not a tradition, 
because by definition it did not persist into the 1970s.  Even if it influenced later cultures, it was 
not handed on as a distinct culture.  Blues and jazz, on the other hand, are arguably traditions in 
music, since they are handed on from one generation of musicians to another through teaching, 
playing together, recording and so on. 
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is distinctly unflattering to management, but still recognisably the same culture as the 
one evident in my conversations in 2013, with a core emphasis on morality, attention to 
detail, routine and stability.  As McKinlay (2002, p.609) puts it: ‘Maintaining the 
continuity and absolute clarity of banking procedures was morally cleansing.’ 
Two key questions arise in this context.  If tradition is a handing on of something and 
old banking was a tradition, then who is handing on what?  And is new banking really a 
tradition? 
There is an assumption in MacIntyre’s work that one tradition is composed broadly of 
one set of people, while any rival tradition would be composed of a different set.  He 
sometimes refers to these groups as ‘adherents of different traditions’ (MacIntyre, 
1990, p.151).  The boundaries between traditions are porous, and this is important for 
MacIntyre’s thinking, that some people should be able to migrate from one tradition to 
another and that some should live in a borderland between two traditions (McIntyre, 
1989).  But such talk of moving across or living in borderlands rests on the assumption 
nevertheless of separate and broadly stable groups, and the idea of two distinct 
traditions only makes sense as long as the people migrating or the people living in the 
borderlands are in a sufficiently small minority.  If there are too many migrants and 
border-dwellers, the distinction between Tradition A and Tradition B becomes too 
blurred. 
Such a blurring of boundaries in terms of membership might be expected at a time 
when one tradition is defeated by another, and this is possibly what is being witnessed 
in Scottish banking.  Of the group of ten participants in this research, only one 
appeared to speak unequivocally with the voice of old banking, and only one similarly 
with the voice of new banking.  Most speak with an emphasis of one voice and an 
admixture of the other.  In a qualitative study of a limited group such as this, no 
conclusions can be drawn about any wider membership, but we can say that in this 
small group at least, the boundaries are blurred but not obliterated.  It is clear for the 
majority of the speakers where their loyalties lie – to Tradition A or to Tradition B – 
even if their reasoning sometimes borrows from the one or the other.  P7, for instance, 
whose story of constancy (S5.12) leaves no room for doubt about his ultimate loyalties, 
is nevertheless capable of stepping into a sequence of reasoning which is very ‘new 
banking’, including praise for entrepreneurial chief executives (C7: 134). 
The doubtful status of new banking 
Another key boundary is provided by time. Traditions have beginnings and endings.  
They ‘begin in and from some condition of pure historical contingency, from the beliefs, 
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institutions and practices of some particular community…’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p.354); 
and a tradition may end or radically change through being defeated, or ‘in the splitting 
apart of a tradition or integration of what have hitherto been disparate or even hostile 
traditions’  (MacIntyre, 1998d, p.107).  There are signs that old banking may be ending 
as a tradition; certainly it has suffered a kind of hiatus in practice, as is evident from the 
overall chronological narrative.  But it is too early to form a clear view of the fate of the 
tradition itself.  At the same time as there are signs of decline and defeat in these 
conversations, there are also signs of resistance and tenacity.  What is clear with old 
banking is that it has been a tradition and that its demise, if that is what is happening, is 
self-aware; the members of that tradition know that they are members and they are 
strongly aware that their own tradition has been losing a contest, perhaps fatally.  With 
new banking it is not so clear.  These research conversations may be witness to the 
birth of a new tradition, or equally, new banking as it is portrayed here might turn out to 
be short-lived. 
Although new banking has been explored above as if it were a tradition in order to draw 
a boundary to old banking, it is not at all clear that new banking is a genuine tradition in 
the sense in which old banking appears to be.  This is for two reasons.  The first and 
weaker reason is the question of time. New banking is too young to be counted a 
tradition at this time, and in any case, within its brief history it has been radically 
disrupted on its own terms by the crisis of 2007/8.  The second and stronger reason is 
that the culture of new banking is spoken of in these conversations primarily as a 
foreign invasion.  External and global forces have been at work in the establishment of 
new banking, including the rise of the generic business manager, the western joint 
stock model, the red brace boys, the consultants, the City analysts and so on.  If new 
banking is in any sense a tradition it is only part of a much larger one, which MacIntyre 
(2007, p.262) might describe as ‘advanced capitalism’. 
As an alien culture, new banking appears close to the enterprise culture of the 1980s 
described by Keat (1991), who highlights in it processes of structural reform to move 
institutions closer to commercial enterprise models, together with attendant 
enterprising qualities of individuals (including boldness, self-reliance and the 
willingness to take risks).  This culture, developed actively in Britain by the Thatcher 
government, was advanced further under New Labour in the 1990s, with a large 
emphasis on the finance sector, rapid re-engineering of organisations and a prevailing 
interest in rising share prices, not simply profit (Rutherford, 2008). 
The implication, which necessarily lies outside the scope of the current research, is that 
new banking is not a tradition at all but only a scion of a much larger socio-economic 
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phenomenon.  From this point forward, there is therefore no further discussion in this 
thesis of new banking as a coherent tradition in its own right. 
Coherence in the tradition of old banking 
Old banking by contrast was very clearly a tradition, and it was also reasonably clear 
who the inhabitants of that tradition were because membership was largely formalised 
by membership of the Chartered Institute.32.  If it is clear who was doing the handing on 
of the tradition, then what was the content of that tradition: what was being handed on?  
In the context of MacIntyrean traditions of enquiry, the answer in general terms is that 
what is handed over from one set of members to the next is a set of beliefs and 
assumptions, and a language in which to express them.  MacIntyrean traditions of 
enquiry, we might say, are epistemological and linguistic in content.  The same is not 
necessarily true, however, of traditions in a broader sense.  Fly fishing, to take 
Nicholas’ (2012) example, is a tradition carrying with it particular beliefs and 
assumptions about nature and the value of fishing in a certain way and a particular 
language that goes with it (Snyder 2007).  But most of all, what is handed on in this 
case from one generation of fly fishers to the next is the practice of fly fishing. 
This serves as a partial model for old banking.  Old banking was a practice-bearing 
tradition (MacIntyre, 2007) (see the further discussion below at S6.7).  However, this 
tradition did not only hand on a practice, it also handed on a number of other things 
including a social order and, of course, banks.   
The diagram at Figure 4 above draws attention to a number of elements of Tradition A, 
though not the practice of banking, and we will need to return to this point.  These 
include goods and structures which form a coherent set.  The goods of old banking 
themselves are coherent in the sense that they reinforce and depend on one another.  
The virtues of old banking, including the cardinal virtues as understood in that tradition 
and those particular virtues of patience and truthfulness which are characteristic of it, 
form a set which fits with the central importance of the customer relationship, both in 
terms of custodianship of deposits and the provision of advice.  In what ways do these 
elements of characteristic relationships and characteristic virtues cohere? 
For Aristotle, friendship ‘is a virtue or involves virtue, and is an absolute necessity of 
life’ (NE, VIII.1), and he goes on in Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics to describe his 
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 This is of course a broad approximation for neatness.  It would be more accurate to say that 
the authority of the tradition was supplied by the core membership defined by the Institute.  
However, many others also  played their part in the tradition, including large numbers of life-long 
bank workers who never made it to the exalted status of fully qualified banker. 
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understanding of the connection between friendship and virtue in detail.  He regards 
business relationships as a form of friendship and regards the best kind of friendship 
as that between good people ‘who are alike in their virtue’ (NE, VIII.3).  For traditional 
Scottish bankers, the customer relationship was valued in itself, and the characteristic 
virtues of old banking were there in part because they served that relationship.  The 
operation of justice and courage, for instance, in old banking served to recognise and 
protect the interests of people who had entrusted their savings to the banker (S5.9).  
Other goods were part of the same coherent set: the provision of security of deposits or 
of advice to customers requires expertise (techne), and respect was awarded to the 
banker on the basis of the fulfilment of this relationship of trust (S4.2).  These goods 
together with the goods of cooperation and stability were only possible in the context of 
the structures which support them, and those structures similarly worked together to 
provide a framework in which those goods made sense. 
Coherence in this context was more than simply a theoretical consistency, it was 
practical, a self-supporting system which lent consistency to lives lived as a unity and 
in a context.  An outstanding example of this is seen in P7’s narrative of constancy 
shown above at 5.12.  It is striking, for instance, that in constructing his own reasoning 
at a critical point in his own career, he appeals to two types of relationship (types of 
friendship in Aristotle’s terminology), his relationship with his family, particularly his 
mother and his relationship with his customers.  In both cases he appeals to a notional 
conversation which depends on the idea that virtue is supported by the relationship.  
Other speakers have similar ways of thinking, linking their practical reasoning through 
cohesive structures of family, school, Kirk or youth clubs, and customers are portrayed 
as situated within these communities.  P6, the most senior executive in the group, 
makes judgements about customer care and the ethics of banking explicitly with 
reference to his mother (C6: 113-114); he views the customer relationship in the same 
frame as this family relationship, which gives him an ability to see customers as 
vulnerable others, rather than as resources in the marketplace. 
We might then describe this kind of coherence as an enabling one, where the goods of 
the tradition form a consistent set alongside its structures, such that each reinforces 
the other.  Cooperation is a vital component of this picture: the social structures and 
the individuals situated in them act in cooperation to enable the goods which they 
mutually value. 
In this exploration of old banking as a tradition it has been suggested that it can be 
regarded as a tradition which handed on a practice, rather than one which handed on a 
form of enquiry.  If this is so, then a number of questions deserve to be addressed in 
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some detail, questions such as what that practice was, whether it was recognisably a 
practice in the sense used by MacIntyre, what the implications of regarding it as such a 
practice are, and how a practice in this context fits with the idea of a tradition. 
 6.5 The claim that old banking was a practice 
Up to this point I have avoided tackling head-on the question of whether old banking as 
described in these conversations was a practice in MacIntyre’s specialised sense of 
the term (S5.5).  There have been good reasons for deferring the issue.  Similar 
questions about other occupations, for instance teaching (Dunne, 2003) or managerial 
work (Beabout, 2012), have attracted heated debate, and it is not always clear what 
their practical outcome is.  If traditional bankers think they were engaged in a practice, 
and they talk and act like they were engaged in a practice, then it is perhaps incumbent 
on the theorist not only to have very clear theoretical reasons why that claim should be 
rejected but also to have some good practical reasons, for instance:  Does denying old 
banking as a practice explain anything significant regarding its history or help to 
understand its current state or possible futures?  This section is an attempt to show 
that there is much to be gained by accepting that the practice-like talk of these bankers 
is indeed talk of a practice, and little to be gained by denying it.  Once this discussion is 
in place, we can turn to the question of how practice and tradition relate to one another. 
That the narratives of traditional bankers concern something practice-like should by 
now require no further argument, only a quick summary of the way in which such 
practice-like talk has already emerged in the findings of this research.  Old banking 
was coherent, complex and cooperative in the sense that it required an identifiable 
group to develop and maintain a well-defined set of complex skills and knowledge, 
which worked together to meet similarly well-defined practical objectives such as the 
safe keeping of depositors’ savings and the provision of good advice.  Those who 
speak on its behalf are able to explain the goods of the practice, its standards of 
excellence and the way in which those standards were developed and pursued.  They 
are able to articulate the school-like characteristics of their profession, the way that 
apprentices were socialised into that way of life, learning those standards of excellence 
which gave the profession its identity.  Most persuasively, these traditional bankers are 
able to articulate the virtues of their profession.  They even articulate them in 
Aristotelian ways, if in their own language, with clear understandings of the operation of 
justice and practical wisdom in traditional banking. 
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Denying the practice 
What good reasons then might there be for driving a wedge between this practice-like 
talk and the idea that old banking really was a practice?  One possible reason might 
suggest itself because MacIntyre himself is hostile to capitalism and to the finance 
industry at large (MacIntyre, 1994b).  Some, in a spirit of solidarity with MacIntyre, 
might find the idea of banking as a practice somehow abhorrent.  This line of thinking is 
problematic in two ways.   
First it raises the question of MacIntyre’s reluctance in After Virtue to assert that there 
could be no such thing as an evil practice33.  To reject banking as a practice on the 
basis that it is evil entails some severe judgements about the participants to these 
conversations, including denying that the internal goods which they describe really are 
goods.  As MacIntyre (2007, p.196) puts it: ‘my thesis has empirical content in another 
way; it does entail that without the virtues there could be a recognition only of what I 
have called external goods and not at all of internal goods in the context of practices’.  
Or, putting it another way, if we find good evidence of an appreciation of internal 
goods, then we have evidence also of the operation of the virtues. 
Second, the kind of activities which MacIntyre berates in the financial sector at large 
are also the kind of activities which these traditional bankers berate.  Both sides are 
appalled by the greed, the lack of truthfulness and the manipulation of others that 
characterise advanced capitalism in general and new banking in particular (MacIntyre, 
1994b) (S4.4, C3: 55, C6: 124, C6: 127).  We therefore need to be wary of lumping 
together the kind of traditional service provision described by these bankers with 
casino banking and programmes of mis-selling.   
More technical reasons could be brought forward for denying that traditional Scottish 
banking was a practice.  Perhaps it could be shown that it was really a pseudo-practice 
because, for instance, it lacked coherence.  To argue each of these kinds of possible 
objection (that old banking was insufficiently coherent, insufficiently cooperative or 
complex and so on) would be an unhelpful detour here, and I cannot counter a 
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 The question of whether a practice can be evil (MacIntyre, 2007) has caused some 
discussion, and Lutz (2004 and 2012) thinks that there are no such things as evil practices, 
partly because ‘evil pseudo-practices cannot have internal goods’. Part of the problem here is in 
making a judgement that there are no internal goods to an activity over against the views of 
those involved in the activity.  MacIntyre refutes the idea that money management can be a 
practice (MacIntyre, 1994b), but I argue here for an understanding of traditional banking in 
Scotland as a distinct activity from the kind of money management to which MacIntyre refers.  
There does not seem to be a similar question surrounding traditions.  To take an extreme 
example, a religious tradition involving human sacrifice may be a bad tradition, but a tradition 
nonetheless.   
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potentially long list of arguments not yet made, but there is nevertheless an underlying 
objection to a broad feature of such arguments.  All such arguments for old banking as 
a pseudo-practice rely on a denial of the common language claims of traditional 
bankers that they were part of a practice, and so the wedge that must be driven will be 
either between their claims and their understanding of what they are claiming, or 
between their claims and reality. 
These traditional bankers claim in their own term of profession34 (van de Ven, 2011) to 
have been part of a practice by articulating the practice-like features of old banking in 
detail and as a whole.  One means of driving the wedge would be to argue that, when 
they are claiming standards of excellence and articulating these in terms of a coherent 
set of technical skills and virtues, they do not fully understand the nature of their 
claims: perhaps the goods that they claim or the coherence that they claim are not 
properly goods or not properly coherence.  Such an argument is, I think, inherently 
implausible if we take seriously MacIntyre’s idea that practical reasoning is indeed 
practice based, because such a notion of practical reasoning automatically privileges 
the practitioner.  If a group of lifelong turnip planters35 were to be found who could 
articulate their way of life as a practice, with all its complexity and its ranking of goods, 
its internal standards of excellence and arduous apprenticeships, then MacIntyre 
himself might need to recant his judgement of turnip planting as a non-practice, for the 
very good reason that those who are inside the practice are in a position to understand 
its goods in the way that those who are outside it are not.  This is not to say that 
contestation of those goods is not possible from the perspective of some other practice 
or some other tradition, but it does imply that for an outsider to deny the claims of 
insiders that they are participating in a practice at all requires an appeal to the ways of 
life of those same insiders; their claims must be in some way self-negating. 
The second place to drive a wedge is between their claims and reality.  The argument 
would be that these people talk a good talk - a practice-like talk - but the reality of their 
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 Their preferred usage is the word profession.  When the word practice is used explicitly, this 
is in the context of the matrix management structures of new banking (C9: 168), and is in fact 
symptomatic of the fragmentation of the practice in a MacIntyrean sense. 
35
 ‘Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p.187).  The point of this and 
other examples in the same passage is that turnip planting is a relatively simple component of a 
complex practice.  Whilst recognising that there are limits to the concept of a practice, I think 
claims that this or that activity is in or out of the category should be approached with caution.  
Within the overall practice of farming, shepherding would seem to be quite acceptable as a 
practice, and if shepherding, then so swineherding.  If swineherding, then also the raising and 
keeping of chickens and so on.  My argument is just that outsiders need to be careful how they 
draw such lines contra the claims of insiders. 
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own history was quite different: they didn’t really do the things they said they did, and 
the internal standards of excellence that they claim to have observed are a self-
justifying fiction.  This argument is a substantive one and needs to be taken seriously: it 
could indeed be the case that a core group of traditional bankers have been 
refashioning their history in a possibly unconscious programme of rehabilitating their 
own past, picking out occasional stories of virtuous behaviours and discarding those 
stories which show their professional lives to have been chaotic and competitive, 
without genuine goods, skills or virtues.  However, to engage in such an argument or to 
counter it would be beyond the remit of this study, since it would require reference to a 
second set of counter-narratives or other reliable empirical evidence.  As things stand 
there is only the evidence of these ten separate conversations, and these ten are 
consistent with each other.  It should also be noted that although the practice of 
traditional banking in Scotland is largely a thing of the past and it is narrated in this 
thesis in the past tense, there are places where it survives, and one participant at least, 
P2, was speaking as the Chief Executive of a small savings bank where the practice 
was still alive as a community good (Smith 1999).  ‘We still cling onto that here’ (C2: 
36). 
The above discussion is aimed at countering some possible reasons for wishing to 
deny the claims of old banking to be a practice.  However, much the best argument for 
accepting old banking in Scotland as a practice is to see how it functioned as one, and 
this is the substance of the next section. 
6.6 Old banking: internal goods, virtues and excellence 
In discussing how old banking was a practice, the interest at this point is not to 
describe how it fits MacIntyre’s description of a practice; that task is already done at 
length in Chapter 5, which details the goods of old banking in a way which is readily 
comparable to a range of other more paradigmatic occupational practices such as 
fishing, sailing, soldiering, medicine, law, farming and so on.  Rather the interest here 
is to ask how treating old banking as a MacIntyrean practice illuminates it.  Does 
exploring it as a practice enable understandings of old banking which would otherwise 
not be available?  To which the answer is yes, and there are immediately three 
features which are thrown into relief.  Those who speak on behalf of old banking 
articulate the difference between the internal and external goods of the practice, they 
are able to understand the virtues which enable and are habituated by the practice, 




The internal goods of the practice of old banking are clear in these conversations.  
They consist of a set of relationships and capabilities.  The defining relationship of old 
banking is that between the banker and the customer, and this is expressed repeatedly 
by the participants in a number of different ways, particularly in response to the 
question, ‘Why do banking?’  This relationship only makes sense however in the 
context of the wider community of which both banker and customer are part, and it 
involves quite directly a number of virtues and skills.   
The central and pre-eminent good of old banking is the customer relationship (S4.2, 
S5.7).  It is used by these bankers not only to define their own practice, but also to 
delineate it from other activities with which it might be confused, such as investment 
banking.  Investment bankers did not understand the customer relationship: ‘They treat 
people completely differently.  […] The whole language to people is aggressive.  
[Traditional bankers] don’t see a pound sign on that person, they see a person.  And 
[investment bankers]  just didn’t get that’ (C6: 126).  Good customer relations are also 
available in other practices, such as baking or boat building, but this particular 
relationship, in which the customer bought nothing at all, but only came and entrusted 
the money to the banker on the basis of a promise that the banker would return it with 
interest when required, was a mode of relationship only available in banking or 
something very like it. 
Technical skills and knowledge were also goods and were developed to serve the 
customer (S5.7).  When challenged with a question like, ‘What would be worthwhile 
about going into banking?’ (C6: 142), those who are committed to old banking answer 
with reference to the customer relationship, including business customers and the 
enjoyment of enabling new businesses to grow (C6: 125).  But it is also clear from their 
broader conversations that they derived enjoyment from the exercise of a number of 
capacities and skills which are specific to retail banking.  These included an ability to 
maintain accurate systems (S5: 10), to understand complex financial problems (C8: 
152-153), to innovate (C3: 49) and to make sound judgements (C3: 62).   
Trust and respect in the community were internal goods which were the product of 
occupying a particular role in the community and acting in a trustworthy way (S4.2).  
This respect was earned partly through maintaining these relationships of trust and 
partly through the exercise of professional skill and knowledge (C7: 136). 
All of these goods were internal in the sense that they were available in quite specific 
ways in the life of a traditional banker.  They were unavailable in these particular ways 
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to other professions, and more poignantly, many of these goods subsequently became 
unavailable to the bankers themselves as their way of life was replaced by new 
banking. 
The role of the virtues 
The goods of old banking included the exercise and habituation of certain virtues.  In 
what sense are these goods which are either internal or external to the practice?  At 
this point we encounter some apparent difficulties in MacIntyre’s explanation of internal 
and external goods given in After Virtue (S2.4), and consideration of the case of old 
banking might help us to understand and perhaps to resolve them.  MacIntyre offers a 
tentative definition of virtue as ‘an acquired human quality the possession and exercise 
of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and 
the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods’ (MacIntyre, 
2007, p.191, italics in original).  This implies that the virtues are not among the internal 
goods of the practice, but that they play a supporting role. Later on in After Virtue 
MacIntyre further develops his theme by locating the virtues as not only enabling the 
internal goods of practices, but also in enabling the good for a person’s whole life, and 
not only enabling the good of individual persons, but also of the specific communities 
and traditions in which they find themselves. 
This creates a framework for the relationship between virtues, practices and traditions, 
but meantime creates also the difficulty of deciding how they are placed relative to the 
internal or external goods of the practice.  Virtues are spoken of here and elsewhere in 
After Virtue as enabling us to achieve goods internal to practices, but not as goods 
which are themselves internal to practices.  Virtues are also a product of the 
achievement of the internal goods of the practice; ‘practices are the schools of the 
virtues’ (Knight 1998), but virtues are not spoken of as goods external to practices 
along with the usual examples of money, status, power and so on (Knight, 1998; 
MacIntyre, 2007) which also may be products of the achievement of the internal goods.  
This is not to say that virtues are somehow not located in MacIntyre’s scheme – they 
are clearly located in complete human lives lived in political communities – but it does 
create some doubt about how they are located relative to practices. 
One possible solution is to keep virtues conceptually separate from this notion of goods 
internal or external to practices, so that virtues are goods which are neither internal nor 
external to practices.  MacIntyre (2007, p.196) seems to indicate something like this 
when he refers to virtues standing ‘in a different relationship to external and to internal 
goods’ (that they enable the latter, but not necessarily the former). 
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Another possible solution is to regard the virtues as related to practices both internally 
and externally, and this appears to work in the example of old banking.   
The modal nature of virtues in a practice: particularity and insider perspective 
It is reasonably clear, in the case of old banking, how virtues are in a sense external to 
the practice.  On the one hand virtues were required in order to achieve the internal 
goods of the practice and on the other were developed as a result of achieving those 
same internal goods.   
In order to be able to flourish in the practice of banking and to achieve its characteristic 
goods such as good relationships with one’s customers and the development and 
exercise of a complex set of skills and knowledge, entrants to old banking needed to 
come equipped with some core virtues and attendant qualities already established.  
They needed to be quick learners but also to have patience and self-control (S5:11).  
They needed to be good communicators and sociable (C8: 165) and also to 
understand the notions of trust in a business relationship (S4.2) and to show suitable 
humility in dealing with senior bankers (C2: 27)36. 
Once embarked on a career in old banking, if apprentices made good progress, these 
qualities were enhanced and developed.  For instance, patience was developed 
through a long apprenticeship and by adherence to admittedly tedious routines for 
manual record keeping (S5.11).  Truthfulness was developed through painstaking 
attention to detail and the maintenance of accurate records (S5.10).  Practical wisdom 
was developed in a number of respects related not only to financial prudence and the 
understanding of complex systems including economic cycles, but also to judgements 
of character and the trustworthiness of others (S5.9). 
However, it also seems, from the evidence of these traditional Scottish bankers, that 
they valued some of these virtues as themselves goods internal to the practice. 
MacIntyre is specific about what he means by goods ‘internal to the practice’: 
‘We call them internal for two reasons: first, as I have already suggested, 
because we can only specify them in terms of chess or some other game of 
that specific kind and by means of examples from such games (otherwise 
the meagreness of our vocabulary for speaking of such goods forces us 
into such devices as my own resort to writing of 'a certain highly particular 
kind of'); and secondly because they can only be identified and recognized 
by the experience of participating in the practice in question. Those who 
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  ‘He said to me on my first day there, he said, “Look, we’ve had graduates in here before and 
they’ve sat around and they’ve read the FT and they’ve sort of looked as if they’re too important 
to make a cup of coffee for anybody sort of thing.  So, just don’t do that.”’ (C2: 27) 
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lack the relevant experience are incompetent thereby as judges of internal 
goods.’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp.188-189) 
Let us call these the conditions of particularity (Smith, 2011) and insider perspective 
(Tinker and Armstrong, 2008).  First, we find that the particularity of virtues to old 
banking is best understood as modal.  Justice, for instance, is available as a good of 
many practices, but was only available in the particular mode of acting as custodian of 
deposits in the practice of old banking or something very like it.  Courage understood 
as a virtually zero tolerance to risk was available in a very specific way in old banking, 
so much so that some practices which require a much higher tolerance of risk (horse 
riding, for instance, or mountaineering) might not recognise it as a virtue at all.  The 
same is true of other virtues such as patience and truthfulness (S5.9-5.12).  What was 
particular and internal to old banking was not the virtues as such, but the way in which 
those virtues were understood and practiced in that profession.  This extends also to 
the Aristotelian idea of friendship, and in this context it is vital to understand with 
Aristotle how close the connection is between virtue and friendship.  Traditional 
bankers valued the customer relationship as the foremost internal good of their 
practice, and that relationship was internal and modal in just the same sense as the 
virtues, relying on particular forms of promising and trust.  Moreover this relationship, 
particular as it was in old banking, required and enabled the specific modes of the 
virtues which we have sketched out.  It was specifically because the banker was 
entrusted with someone’s life savings on the basis of a promise to return them that the 
virtues of justice and courage applied in the practice of old banking in the particular 
way that they did. 
Once the particularity of virtues and friendships to the practice is understood as modal 
in this way, then it is much easier to understand also the idea of insider perspective.  
On the basis of their perspective from inside the practice, participants in these research 
conversations make judgements on outsiders which are often negative because those 
outsiders did not share an understanding of the goods of the practice or did not behave 
according to such an understanding.  This is true of investment bankers and generic 
business managers.  Some leaders did not have a right attitude to risk (S5.9), or were 
impatient (C2: 32), or lacked wisdom, because they did not understand banking (C3: 
56). 
What is being judged here is not so much an individual’s lack of one virtue or another 
in some general sense (although those judgements also are made on occasion) but 
rather their lack of a particular mode of application of a virtue.  The accusation that 
investment bankers don’t get the customer relationship is not intended to accuse them 
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of being incapable of forming friendships as such, only to say that this mode of 
friendship is not known to them.  The idea that supermarket chief executives are not 
well-placed to lead banks is not to accuse them of a lack of wisdom as such, only to 
say that they lack the particular kind of practical wisdom required for old banking. 
The conclusion to all this must be that the virtues occupy a somewhat peculiar space in 
respect of the goods of a practice.  They are required in advance to some degree in 
order to achieve the internal goods of the practice and they are in turn developed as a 
result of progress in the practice, but they are also internal goods of the practice 
themselves,.  When we return below to the question of the corruption of a practice, one 
feature of such corruption will be the way in which this virtuous circle breaks down. 
External goods 
If this is a coherent account of the way that traditional bankers speak of the internal 
goods of their practice, do they also speak of external goods, and do they regard them 
as distinct? 
One of the striking things about the narratives of traditional banking in Scotland is how 
closely they map to the contours of MacIntyre’s account of the alignment of internal 
goods with practices and external goods with institutions, and the potential for conflict 
between them.  Much of this runs explicitly throughout the conversations as the conflict 
between a service culture based on the internal goods of the customer relationship and 
justice, and a sales or bonus culture based on the external goods of institutional profit 
or personal wealth.  These contrasts are so consistently evident in Chapter 4 (S4.3, 
S4.4) that there is no need to rehearse them at length here.  All of those participants 
who have a clear understanding of old banking also have a clear understanding of the 
difference and the tension between the internal goods which define their profession 
and those external goods which might undermine them.   
Perhaps one of the reasons that they can be so clear about the tension between 
internal and external goods is that their practice has in fact been undermined by just 
the process of institutional acquisitiveness which MacIntyre (2007) describes37. The 
institutions which were originally created to support the practice of old banking 
destroyed it in their pursuit of external goods.  These bankers have seen this 
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 ‘… institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal order in which the ideals 
and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, 
in which the cooperative care for common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the 
competitiveness of the institution’  (MacIntyre, 2007, p.194), the full passage is quoted above at 
S 2.5. 
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happening at first hand, and in most cases have been directly involved in the process.  
Some appear to have actively resisted the pressure of their institutions, others appear 
to have participated in enabling new banking to replace old banking, and many have 
over the course of their careers done both at different times.   
Clarity seems to have been available often only retrospectively, when particular goods 
or standards have already been lost:  ‘it would have been challenging - to articulate 
[the ethos and culture of banking] thirty years ago, because it’s only now that you kind 
of realise that that was the way it was, because it changed so much in the meantime’  
(C2: 34). 
Excellence and effectiveness 
Does this mean that they also understand the distinction between excellence and 
effectiveness (MacIntyre, 1988) in relation to their practice?  The answer appears to be 
that they do, and that this distinction advanced in stages during their careers in 
response to various transformations in banking. 
They understand excellence and effectiveness to have been unified in the heyday of 
old banking.  In other words, traditional Scottish bankers look back to a time when 
banking was a practice in good order, and there was no discernible difference between 
doing well morally and doing well in banking.  This unity was provided not only by the 
coherence of banking as a practice, but also by the coherence of the social structures 
of community and Kirk of which the bank was a part (S5.2, S5.5).  This was a time 
when there was no obvious gap between the terms banking, banker and bank.  It is 
only much later on that it makes sense for an outsider to ask difficult questions about 
the difference between banker in the sense of ‘belongs to an identifiable profession’ 
and banker in the sense of ‘works for a bank’ (C9: 174).  In old banking, these were 
obviously one and the same thing. 
They also understand that there came a time when excellence and effectiveness 
began to part company for reasons which were at the time beyond their control and to 
some degree beyond their ken.  They understand that in the 1990s old banking was in 
crisis because the institutional forms which had served it well for many decades were 
failing.  This was not a failure of excellence in the practice of old banking so much as a 
systemic failure of effectiveness inflicted by a competitive marketplace.  It was known 
at the time that without institutional reform the banks would collapse by making 
repeated annual losses.  Traditional bankers did not have the resources themselves 
within their own practice to deal with these crises and they turned to consultants and 
generic business management to reform their institutions. (C2: 29) 
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What then ensued was a period in which excellence and effectiveness parted company 
more radically.  The structures and standards which supported excellence in old 
banking began to be dismantled and began to be replaced with other structures and 
standards, referred to by this group broadly as the sales culture or bonus culture.  
In the same way as this division of standards became clearer to these participants as 
their own practice was eroded by the ascendancy of new banking, so the collapse in 
turn of new banking in the crisis of 2007/8 has allowed traditional bankers to come to a 
further understanding of the relationship between excellence and effectiveness.  From 
their perspective after 2007/8, traditional bankers can not only see clearly how 
excellence and effectiveness parted company during the 1990s; they can also see how 
the short lived effectiveness of new banking was illusory.  This theme is explored 
further below at S6.9. 
One of the features of this which is of particular interest to MacIntyrean enquiry is that 
early in the history of this group the differences between excellence and effectiveness 
are not at all obvious and that they become more obvious over time.  This prompts the 
thought that if we investigate a practice or some combination of practice and institution, 
we have access only to a partial perspective of its goods.  To have a more rounded 
understanding, we need also to explore its relationship to the history of the tradition in 
which it is located. 
6.7 Practice, tradition and social structures 
In After Virtue, MacIntyre gives a broad description of how he sees the relationship 
between practices and traditions.  ‘To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship 
not only with its contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have preceded us 
in the practice’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p.194).  A practice is the achievement of a tradition.  
These traditions ‘through which particular practices are transmitted and reshaped 
never exist in isolation [from] larger social traditions’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p.221).  
Institutions are seen by MacIntyre as bearers of traditions as well as practices, and 
when they are working well those institutions are engaged in the kind of ‘arguments 
about […] goods’ which also characterise traditions (MacIntyre, 2007, p.222). 
In these passages MacIntyre articulates fully the nature of the relationship between 
institutions and practices.  He is very clear, for instance, that although they form a 
single causal order, practices are not to be confused with institutions; there is no sense 
in which an institution can be an element of a practice.  He does not so fully describe 
the relationship between institutions and traditions.  In the following paragraphs I 
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attempt to elaborate this latter relationship, suggesting that an institution can in fact be 
an integral part of a tradition.38 
For the purposes of the current discussion, I have taken the liberty of proposing a 
relationship between institution and tradition in a way which extends beyond what 
MacIntyre has set out in After Virtue.  I have configured institutions as possible 
elements of traditions, because I have characterised tradition as something handed on.  
This does not of course exclude the idea that an institution should be the bearer of a 
tradition; very often institutions are created by traditions just for that purpose.  
However, it does mean that the relationship between institution and tradition is rather 
different from that between institution and practice.  It means that institutions are often 
an integral element of the traditions which they bear.  So, for instance, in the case of 
Christian churches, Moore (2011) can investigate the practices of faith and the 
institutions of the churches as related but discrete: practices are activities and 
institutions are structures.  The same separation would not hold between tradition and 
institution; the institutions of any particular church are not only a means of handing on, 
they are also characterising elements of what is handed on.  Insomuch as traditions 
are socially embodied, they comprise not only activities (including practices), but also 
narratives, artefacts and social structures. 
Two kinds of institution 
In the current research we have access to thick descriptions of the tradition of banking 
in Scotland, complete with narratives and social structures.  Some of those structures 
are elements of that wider Scottish social tradition in which the lesser tradition of 
banking was located, and some are elements specifically of the tradition of banking.  
Core structures in Scottish banking included formal institutions of two main types, the 
banks themselves and the Chartered Banker Institute.  The two have different functions 
and different histories. 
The banks were set up specifically to conduct banking, and the practice of banking 
could not be conducted in their absence.  The narratives of the decline of old banking 
are also narratives of the transformation and loss of those institutions.  Scottish banks 
were not imported.  They grew up in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as a 
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 This separation holds even where the practice concerned is ‘the making and sustaining of 
forms of human community — and therefore of institutions’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p.194).  This 
distinction seems relatively straightforward if we consider practice as a kind of activity and 
institution as a kind of structure.  My argument for the inclusion of institutions as potential 
elements of traditions depends partly on the idea that traditions, unlike practices, are not only 
activities, they also imply structures, including structures of authority as well as a range of wider 
social structures. 
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specifically Scottish phenomenon, objects of national pride for the Scots and 
admiration for other nations including the English (Munn, 1981).  They were set up by 
the tradition, and the handing on of the banks from one generation of Scottish bankers 
to the next was a core part of what the tradition involved.  Those banks came to be run 
in the late twentieth century by people who were not traditional bankers and often not 
Scottish.  This not only threatened the integrity of the practice of banking; it also 
threatened that the banks would be lost to the tradition which had created them in the 
first place.  And this does seem to be what happened.  The mainstream banks became 
multinational diversified financial conglomerates, rather than banks in the traditional 
sense.  In the course of this transformation, these large institutions transferred their 
allegiance to different overarching social structures, which were not Scottish but UK 
wide and global.  Originally embedded in the social structures of Scottish cities and 
towns, communities and Kirk, the major Scottish banks are now embedded in the 
structures of international stock markets, institutional investors and industry regulators. 
The Chartered Institute was founded in 1875 not to conduct the practice of banking, but 
to hand on the tradition through education and qualifications and socialisation:  ‘to 
encourage the highest standards of professionalism and conduct amongst [its] 
members in the public interest’ (Chartered Banker Institute, 2014).   A key part of what 
the Institute did was to define the core membership of the profession, and this was also 
to define the membership of the tradition. It was originally a specifically Scottish 
institution, but took on a UK wide remit with the arrival of deregulation and the 
abandonment of the separation of Scottish from English banking systems in the 1980s 
(C1: 2, C4: 86).   
A number of views of the Institute are offered by several participants in these 
conversations, some of them critical.  Since several of the participants are also closely 
connected with the Institute at a senior level, it is not possible to offer both sides of 
these views supported by detailed evidence from the primary data without breach of 
confidentiality.  However, a brief summary of the arguments is still possible. 
The Chartered Institute as a pivot point for the tradition 
Without mechanisms by which one generation can hand over to the next, a tradition 
cannot continue.  This may account for some of the anxiety which is evident 
concerning qualifications and the Institute.  Talk of ‘lost generations’ (C5: 95) and 
depleted cohorts (C8: 146), the proliferation of people who are not qualified bankers in 
management positions (C5: 97, C3: 72), and the feeling that there are few real bankers 
left (C6: 128, C8: 145) all convey a sense of anxiety about the continuation of the 
tradition of banking, and this sits behind the more obvious anxiety concerning the 
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image of the industry.  The problem is not just that it is unclear how banking can 
recover, it is much worse than that: there is soon going to be no one around who will 
be capable of leading such a recovery because no one will understand how to conduct 
proper banking: the tradition will have died. 
The great advantage of the Chartered Institute in the context of old banking was that it 
drew together leaders in Scottish banking for the purpose of maintaining professional 
standards; it acted as a pivot for the tradition.  There was a general, unwritten 
agreement that attainment of the full Member’s examination was a requirement in order 
to pass to senior levels of the profession.  There was also an understanding that all the 
Scottish banks contributed to the upkeep and the governance of the Institute (C1: 1) 
and that they encouraged all potential future managers to take the Institute exams (C2: 
45).  Inclusion in this professional body through formal examination was what 
separated bankers from non-bankers, together with the informal processes of 
apprenticeship and experience.  These delineations had a central place in identifying 
the profession. 
This unanimity began to break up at the same time as the banks began restructuring in 
the 1990s.  The assumption that all potential managers would be encouraged to gain 
the banking exams was abandoned, and the Institute lost the automatic support of 
senior bank leaders (C1: 4).  This process went hand in hand with the abandonment of 
the assumption that senior bank leaders had to be bankers ‘born and bred’.  Numbers 
taking up the qualifications and attaining full membership fell away.  There were 
internal tensions within the Institute over these changes, because the Institute was 
dependent on the banks for funding, which meant that structurally it was not in a strong 
position to take an independent line from the banks (C3: 72-73).  Despite this structural 
tension, the Institute remains that body which more than any other seeks to uphold the 
traditional standards of banking, and it has been proactive in establishing a 
Professional Standards Board (Chartered Banker Institute, 2011a). 
When we consider the possible futures for banking in Scotland below (S6.11), the 
Chartered Institute clearly has a central role to play.  At this point it is worth noting 
some key differences between the way that the banks have changed compared to the 
Institute.  What occurred with the banks was that the largest became larger or merged 
with other institutions to become fully ‘new bank’, operating on an international stage.  
A new breed of leaders, not of the tradition, took over key posts, and institutional 
structures changed so that as they are now these institutions are very clearly no longer 
part of the tradition of old banking in Scotland.  The banks became to a large extent 
lost to the tradition.  This in itself is, if not conclusive evidence of the end of the 
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tradition, at least a clear sign of its dramatic decline; a tradition of banking without 
banks to hand on would be a rather theoretical version of its previously practice-based 
form. 
Grounding of the tradition in social goods 
If this idea is plausible, that a key part of what was handed on in the tradition of old 
banking in Scotland was its institutions, then it becomes somewhat clearer how the 
relationship between tradition and practice appears to work.  The tradition handed on a 
particular practice of banking, together with the banks which supported the practice 
and the Institute which bore the tradition and upheld the standards of the practice.  The 
Chartered Banker Institute became the central mechanism by which the standards of 
the practice and the formal learning on which they depended were handed on, whilst 
the banks provided the actual locus for the practice itself. 
The tradition also provided other things for the practice through these processes.  It 
provided a set of social goods (Gore, 199739) which the practice pursued, and which 
were expressed in terms of relationships and virtues.  These social goods did not 
spring fully formed out of the tradition itself, but were transmitted by the tradition of old 
banking from larger traditions of kirk and community.  So the goods of cooperative 
business relationships, respect in the community, the preservation of wealth, honesty 
in business dealings, accuracy and justice and so on, were all dependent on the larger 
social structures from which the tradition of banking developed. 
This leads to the observation that the practice itself could potentially vary quite 
markedly over time without loss of coherence so long as the tradition was intact and 
still linked to the wider tradition of which it was a part.  For instance, new technologies 
such as computers capable of taking over and then making obsolete the manual 
clerking duties on which old banking depended necessarily changed the practice, but 
they were not enough in themselves to account for the radical shift from old to new 
banking.  For that shift to occur, there had to be a more fundamental move away from 
the goods of the tradition on which the practice originally depended.  This could have 
occurred in more than one way.  One possibility is that the background social 
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 Gore (1997) follows Charles Taylor’s coining of the phrase ‘irreducibly social goods’ to mean 
those goods which cannot be reduced to individual ones.  The distinction is helpful, but I intend 
here a weaker version of the idea of social goods, meaning those goods which imply and are 
founded on social structures, and which cannot be understood in their absence;  but they can 
still be attributed to an individual, so long as that person remains located in his or her social 
setting.  For instance, the good of respect in the community is social in this sense, and cannot 
be understood in the absence of the social setting in which it is bestowed, but it also rightly 
pertains to an individual in that setting.   
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structures of the political community in Scotland changed quite radically, with the result 
that the wider basis for the goods of the tradition of old banking no longer pertained, 
and the tradition itself gradually weakened.  A second possibility is that the practice of 
banking was forcibly wrested from the control of the tradition; it didn’t so much suffer an 
epistemological crisis as a crisis of property. 
From the evidence of these conversations it appears likely that both of these things 
happened.  Changes in the background of Scottish society weakened the basis on 
which the tradition depended, so that when an influx of new forms of the practice of 
banking entered the field in the 1980s and 1990s, old banking quite suddenly gave 
way, and the larger banks passed over to an entirely different tradition or culture.  As 
well as using the terms sales culture and bonus culture some of the participants 
identify this new culture as a new form of capitalism, international and aggressively 
competitive (C1: 13, C5: 101, C8: 156).40 
This picture may be arguable in its detail, but the overall point seems to be clear, that 
in old banking there was an intimate dependency between practice and tradition.  Their 
goods were one and the same, and they depended in turn on the wider social tradition 
from which old banking developed.  When this is understood, then a number of 
questions regarding virtues, goods and the corruption of the practice become easier to 
approach. 
6.8 The unity of the virtues 
The idea of the unity of the virtues (S2.10) is often regarded as unworkable in practice 
from the viewpoint of moral psychology (Wolf, 2007) or from the point of view of 
common sense (Irwin, 1996).  It is therefore of some interest to see it working quite 
well as an explanation of the thinking of these bankers.  The idea that the virtues are 
dependent on one another operates in two ways in these research conversations.  It 
gives coherence to the idea of traditional banking as good banking, and it provides an 
account of the decline of banking as a coherent practice leading to the collapse of the 
banks in 2007/8. 
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 This view of the passage from old banking to new banking may give some comfort to those 
participants who have a sense of doubt about their own role in facilitating those changes in the 
practice, for instance by developing new technologies or new systems of credit control.  Whilst it 
may appear that the introduction of new technologies and new systems were partly to blame for 
the transformation from old banking to new banking, they are not enough to account for the loss 
of the underlying goods which were championed by the tradition of old banking. 
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The connectedness of the virtues of old banking 
The scheme given above at Figure 4 provides an abbreviated picture of the virtues of 
old banking.  We can restate these as follows.  Old banking in Scotland had embodied 
a coherent set of virtues, which can be described in terms of the four cardinal virtues of 
justice, courage, self-control and practical wisdom, together with other closely related 
virtues such as patience and truthfulness.  Truthfulness in turn had two components of 
accuracy and sincerity, each indispensable if truthfulness was to be attained.  In the 
tradition of old banking, these virtues were founded on the wider social structures in 
which the tradition developed and on the more specific social structures of the practice, 
particularly the customer relationship.  These social structures gave point to the goods 
of the practice, and the specific function of the practice in various communities made 
for a distinctive mode of application of the virtues, especially the cardinal virtues. 
These virtues worked as a distinctive set which characterised and made possible the 
practice of old banking.  Moreover, they worked together in a way which was 
connected and interdependent.  Patience was essential for the kind of long 
apprenticeship necessary to learn the right attitude to risk and painstaking accuracy.  
Accuracy was essential for truthfulness, and truthfulness was essential for justice.  
Without practical wisdom, the systems for the safekeeping of depositors’ funds and 
properly prudential arrangements for lending on those funds could not have been 
developed and maintained.  Such practical wisdom was hard earned, a product of 
natural intellect, hard work and the acquisition of the right moral virtues combined with 
expert knowledge.  The way that these virtues interdepend is an important element of 
what I have described above (S6.6) as the modal particularity of virtue in the practice of 
old banking.  The way that practical wisdom directed the application of courage, for 
instance, in the life of the banker might be quite different from the way that it would 
direct the application of courage in the life of his customer if that person was the 
skipper of a fishing boat. 
Viewed at the level of the practice, rather than the individual, the idea that these virtues 
were a coherent and connected set seems clear.  The practice of old banking required 
not just some of these virtues operating, but all of them.  That is not to say that an 
alternative practice is not conceivable (something more like new banking, say) in which 
a quite different set of virtues or quasi-virtues might operate, but what made old 
banking in Scotland what it was was exactly that set of virtues necessary for its full 
functioning.  What gave those virtues their coherence was not only their 
connectedness, but also their ultimate point.  They were directed towards goods which 
were defined by the tradition and its social structures of branch, customer and 
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colleagues, and beyond that by the wider social tradition and its structures of 
community, family and Kirk. 
It might be objected here that this paints too bright a picture of a practice which was 
based on a form of capitalism, albeit an old one.  The objection might run: What were 
the goods in question, really?  Were they not simply the preservation of money in a sort 
of equilibrium that protected the interests of those who already had money?  There 
seems nothing here of the creativity of practices as described by MacIntyre. 
There are a number of responses to such an objection.  First one would need to admit 
that the system of old banking was not perfect, and the participants to these research 
conversations do in fact voice its failings.  ‘And you have to say, “Well, was it wonderful 
when banking was a cartel, when most people didn’t have access to banking?”’ (C4: 
84)41.  But then one would also need to say that the imperfection of a practice does not 
disqualify it as a practice.  It only means that it is a practice in need of improvement.  
Nor  should we discount the validity of money and the preservation of money as a 
good.  The idea of keeping someone else’s money safe for them is not necessarily a 
more humble good than looking after their teeth or getting fish for them or making their 
shoes.  The point is that the goods in question were defined by the social structures 
within which old banking arose, and we should not forget that the goods of the practice 
as these traditional bankers saw it extended far beyond the simple preservation of 
money.  They included the customer relationship, the acquisition of expertise and the 
respect that attended the honest exercise of their profession. 
Disintegration 
The way that the coherence of these virtues could disintegrate is clear in accounts of 
the decline of old banking and the crisis in new banking.  Key leaders fell, and their 
banks with them, because of specific personal flaws, variously cited as arrogance, 
recklessness, or a lack of understanding of banking (C1: 19, C3: 54, C9: 180).  Such 
failings of character or wisdom are generally seen by traditional bankers as the result 
of not having the right upbringing; bankers born and bred would not have made such 
mistakes.   
One of the striking things about the accounts given of the decline of old banking by 
traditional bankers is the way that the loss of specific virtues is enough to bring down 
the whole structure.  Patience is an excellent example (S5.11).  The new banking 
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 The reference is to a time when banks charged fees for current accounts and their services 
were mainly for higher income households. 
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leaders saw no need of patience themselves and they saw no need to encourage a 
system of long slow apprenticeship before the brightest young entrants were able to 
rise to managerial positions.  In new banking, patience was, if not a vice, then at least a 
possible drawback when pursuing the more important qualities of speed and 
adaptability.  The loss of this one virtue on a system wide basis was then enough to 
bring down the other virtues, because the necessary apprenticeship structures to 
develop them could no longer be maintained.  Without the time served apprenticeship 
of old banking and its attendant qualifications, there was every opportunity for leaders 
to come to the fore in new banking who had not developed other necessary virtues, 
who were, for instance, reckless or unwise.  Failures of practical wisdom, including a 
lack of understanding of the true value of the customer relationship, then led to 
systematic injustice, including mis-selling of products and, worst of all, a large scale 
failure of custodianship. 
The above sketch shows how virtues formed a coherent set for the practice of old 
banking, and shows how they could unravel if key strands of that set were lost.  The 
idea of the connectedness of the virtues therefore seems to make some sense in terms 
of this empiric evidence, at least at the level of the practice.  It helps with another 
potential difficulty with Aristotelian virtue ethics which is the distinction between virtues 
and skills. 
6.9 Virtues and skills 
This thesis is not intended to address the problems of separating out virtue from skill in 
Aristotelian theory, only to see how they relate in the context of the practice of old 
banking.  A brief discussion of theory relating to virtue and skill is given at S2.10.  For 
the purposes of the current section, the key distinctions between skills and virtues are 
that virtue engages the will (motive is integral to virtue in a way that it is not for skill) 
and that virtue is dispositional (virtue is a question of settled character where skill is 
not).  I argue in this section for a third distinction, that skills are not unified in the same 
way that virtues are.  I treat both virtue and skill here as forms of human capability, and 
I refer in this section to virtue on the one hand and technical capability or skill on the 
other. 
Integration of virtues and skills in old banking 
When traditional bankers talk of old banking as a way of life, they tend to run skills and 
virtues together.  A good example of this is the virtue of truthfulness, of which 
painstaking accuracy is an essential component.  The kind of painstaking accuracy 
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required for truthfulness in old banking is clear in one banker’s story of how he saved a 
banking division from further and potentially disastrous losses by diagnosing an 
accounting problem which no one else had been able to detect (C3: 57)(S5.11), a 
process which required the uncompromising pursuit of accuracy.  In this context, there 
was no dividing line to be drawn between skill and virtue.  This was partly because the 
overall unity of the practice required both skills and virtues.  In the role of traditional 
bankers, the virtue of truthfulness itself was not possible without the corresponding 
technical capabilities which made accuracy possible. The same was true of practical 
wisdom and technical knowledge.  Without a thoroughly grounded technical knowledge 
of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of banking (C2: 26), practical wisdom was not possible. 
Is this apparent coherence more than just the coherence necessary for an organisation 
or group of organisations – banks in this case – to make progress?  When MacIntyre 
(2007, p.193) writes of ‘institutions and technical skills mobilized for a unified end’, he 
is describing organisational activity which lacks a basis in a practice.  However, if I am 
right in claiming that for these bankers old banking in Scotland was a practice, then I 
am committed also to the claim that there is a more fundamental teleology in play than 
simply the pursuit of organisational goals, and that this teleology is directly related to 
the good life for a human being and the internal goods of the practice42, over and 
above the goods of the institution. 
These further claims are supported by the evidence of these conversations.  As 
Chapters 4 and 5 of the current thesis make clear, the goods and ends of old banking 
were much more than any set of organisational goals.  The internal goods of the 
practice are spoken of throughout these conversations (S5.7), and they are directly 
related to broader ideas of a good life lived in a community (S6.3).  They were the 
goods of business relationships of cooperation and trust, based in community 
structures, combined with a clear sense of what good character meant and how this 
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 MacIntyre’s articulation of this in After Virtue is a little hard to pin down, when he says:   ‘What 
is distinctive in a practice is in part the way in which conceptions of the relevant goods and ends 
which the technical skills serve — and every practice does require the exercise of technical 
skills — are transformed and enriched by these extensions of human powers and by that regard 
for its own internal goods which are partially definitive of each particular practice or type of 
practice’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p.193).  I have taken him to mean that the goods and ends in view 
for a practice are qualitatively different from the ends and goods of the institution, and that the 
difference is partly a question of the telos of a human life (the extension of human powers) and 
partly a question of the pursuit of the internal goods of the practice.  However, this interpretation 
does not save the passage from a degree of circularity which relies on the internal goods of the 
practice as a means of distinguishing practice from non-practice.  This latter distinction is of little 
use in refuting, for instance, a generalist institutional manager who claims that the development 
of his or her organisation is an internal good of the practice of organisational management 
(Brewer, 1997). 
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was developed through old banking as a stable way of life.  These claims are so much 
the clearer because the practice is reported as the focus of a tradition, and that 
tradition itself is spoken of as grounded in a wider social tradition.  In other words, in 
the context of old banking, the unified goods and ends of both virtues and technical 
skills went far beyond the goals of any institution, to the pursuit of a comprehensive 
notion of a good life lived in community.  
When the practice of old banking was in good order, technical capabilities and virtues 
were aligned and approved together. Good bankers were both knowledgeable and 
wise, skilled and honest, good with business and good with people.  One leader is 
lauded as: 
‘a terrific man, very clever fellow, and very much endowed with not just the 
traditional way of doing things but he wasn’t averse to change in any sense, 
but he wasn’t going to drive his bank along the road that it was 
subsequently driven, and he was clearly a highly respected man’ (C1: 7). 
The division of the inheritance of old banking 
In Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre offers a narrative of the post-Homeric 
period in Athens, which he calls the division of the post-Homeric inheritance.  He 
explains the goods of excellence with reference to ‘systematic activities’ which were 
represented in the Homeric and post-Homeric literature, activities such as ‘warfare and 
combat, seamanship; athletic and gymnastic activity; epic, lyric and dramatic poetry’.  
These activities provide concepts of the good and the best ‘towards which those who 
participate in [them] move’ (MacIntyre, 1988, pp. 30 and 31), which in turn provide an 
idea of the standards of excellence particular to them.  The goods of effectiveness by 
contrast are the goods of winning: external rewards such as ‘riches, power, status and 
prestige’ (MacIntyre, 1988, pp. 32).  Excellence may bring with it the goods of 
effectiveness also, but equally, winning by other means is always possible, so that the 
goods of effectiveness and excellence may diverge.  In the post-Homeric inheritance, 
that tension between excellence and effectiveness which was latent and largely 
unacknowledged in the Homeric poems then became explicitly debated in Greek 
drama and philosophy.   
A similar process seems to have occurred in banking in Scotland.  In old banking as 
recalled by these research conversations, technical capabilities could certainly have 
been used to a bad end, and no doubt sometimes were, but there is no talk of it from 
these traditional bankers.  In old banking as narrated here the tension between virtue 
and technical capability remains latent in just the same way as does the tension 
between excellence and effectiveness.  However, in the conflict between old and new 
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banking, and most of all in the ascendency of new banking, clear distinctions emerged 
between them.  Increasingly sharp divisions occurred between what was required for 
institutional and career success, and what had previously been required by the 
standards of professional excellence (S4.3, S5.4, S5.7 and S5.8). 
At this point, it also needs to be acknowledged that are some resemblances between 
the kind of justice that MacIntyre describes in Homeric society and the kind of justice 
that I have described here in old banking.  ‘Thus, where the justice of cooperative 
effectiveness prevails, it will always be as if justice was the outcome of a contract, an 
episode of explicit negotiation’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p.37).  This raises the possibility that 
what I have here portrayed as a unity of conception between skills and virtues, 
effectiveness and excellence, may rather be what MacIntyre describes as a kind of 
indeterminacy of allegiance.  Speaking of the goods of excellence compared to the 
goods of effectiveness, MacIntyre (1998, p.35) indicates a kind of social order in which 
‘not only was recognition accorded to both sets of goods, but it was often enough 
accorded in a way that left it indeterminate where the fundamental allegiance of those 
who inhabited that social order lay’.   
We therefore face the question:  Is the kind of unanimity between skills and virtues and 
between excellence and effectiveness apparent in old banking a feature of a well-
ordered tradition working towards coherent goods of excellence, or is it rather a 
consequence of indeterminacy of allegiance?  A satisfactory attempt to answer to this 
question would tell us much about the operation of financial justice in Scotland prior to 
the 1980s, particularly in relation to the conception of justice developed by the Church 
of Scotland and its influence on the Scottish banking system.  However, it would 
require an extended argument well beyond the remit of this thesis.  For current 
purposes and in the absence of such an argument, this thesis takes the position that, 
whatever the reality of Scottish society at the time (and exactly at what time would be a 
moot point), in the recollection of these bankers questions of allegiance were 
reasonably clear, and they included allegiance to the justice of Kirk, community and 
family, not just to the contractual justice of banking. 
The separation of skills and virtues 
Even if virtues and skills were seen as aligned in old banking, there is no doubting the 
ability of these bankers to understand the difference between the two and to draw out 
the distinction when the practice began to fragment.  The symptoms of this separation 
are multifaceted, but at the risk of over-simplifying the issues, there seem to be the 
following broad trends which emerged during the processes of conflict and decline.  
The originally unified skill set of old banking began to change and fragment, new skills 
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became necessary, old skills fell away, and fewer and fewer people had the required 
comprehensive understanding and experience of banking systems to run them 
successfully.  Leaders in new banking lacked the practical wisdom essential to their 
positions.  Sometimes this was because they did not have the required virtues of 
character despite having the technical capabilities (C2: 32), and sometimes this was 
because, whether they were of good character or not, they did not have the required 
technical understanding of banking (C3: 53).  All failures of leadership at the most 
senior levels were failures in some respect to understand and pursue the goods and 
purposes of banking.  Where leaders of old banking understood the goods and 
purposes of banking to be generated by the role of custodian of deposits and good 
adviser (S5.7), leaders of new banking pursued alternative and incompatible purposes 
of growth and acquisition which were generated by the role of corporate entrepreneur 
(S4.4). 
As the skill sets required for new banking changed and the role of good advisor began 
to be replaced with the role of productive sales person, the virtues of old banking 
began to be increasingly differentiated from these new skills.  For instance ‘sales skills’ 
(C7: 136) displaced a broader range of people skills, and this was a reorientation in 
skills which implied a rejection of the virtues involved in the customer relationships of 
old banking, viz. truthfulness, justice, practical wisdom.  A key feature of practical 
wisdom in old banking had been not only the ability to judge risk, to create and 
maintain stable financial systems and so on, but also the ability to judge character.  
Trustworthiness in the customer relationship was a two way process (C3: 62), and one 
of the things that the revolution in computerised processing of creditworthiness 
achieved was to replace the exercise of judgement about another person’s character 
with technical capabilities in numeracy and computing. 
Virtues of conflict 
The fundamental basis of the virtues of old banking remained the same, even through 
these changes, because they served the traditional goods of the customer relationship 
and the standing of the banker in the community.  But the exercise of those virtues 
changed in response to the conflict created by the ascendancy of new banking.  
Constancy emerged, not as a new virtue, but one which had been little needed until 
conflict arose (S5.12).  With constancy, a demand for a form of courage also emerged 
which was very different from the need to avoid recklessness which was characteristic 
of old banking when in good order.  However, these new features of virtue were directly 
consistent with the tradition.  Constancy could only be exercised as a virtue in 
conjunction with practical wisdom, because without it there is no guarantee of good 
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purpose: what might have been an act of constancy becomes in the absence of 
wisdom simply an act of intransigence. 
This theme of purposeful resistance is significant for an understanding of virtue as 
rational disposition (Beadle, 2014), compared to skill as a capacity (Beadle, 2011; Foot 
2002).  When traditional bankers recall their own paths of resistance to new banking, 
they do not only recall their acts they also discuss the purposes of those acts, justifying 
them frequently in terms of the customer relationship.  In doing so, they rehearse for 
themselves and for their listener the goods and the structures of the tradition of old 
banking and its wider social context.  So when explaining his motives for resistance, P7 
is in conversation with both his family (C7: 139) and his customers (C7: 137).  His 
notion of justice, and therefore the limits to flexibility set by it, is unified throughout 
these two spheres of social interaction, and grounded in the tradition of old banking.  
This is exactly the reverse of what MacIntyre terms compartmentalisation, in which 
different standards operate in different spheres of an agent’s life (MacIntyre, 1999). 
At the same time as this process of resistance occurred during the conflict between old 
and new banking, there was also a process of compliance.  Senior bankers lent their 
technical competences to new banking and in doing so experienced tensions.  They 
also experienced the fragmentation, or ‘disaggregation’ of what was originally a unified 
profession (C5: 103).  People in banking became specialists in information technology, 
marketing, HR, communications or change management, rather than generalist 
bankers (C8: 164-165).  Some who were not very committed to old banking in the first 
place took to new banking as offering a series of possibilities to develop first one skill 
set and then another (C9: 182). 
Volition and unity as distinguishing features of virtues 
These themes of resistance and fragmentation illustrate two key differences between 
skills and virtues in respect of volition and unity (S2.10).  The theme of resistance 
shows how virtues imply volition in a way that skills do not.  If someone possesses a 
skill, they remain in possession of it even though on any particular occasion they may 
choose not to exercise it, but a virtue such as constancy clearly cannot be possessed if 
it is not exercised when called for.  The theme of fragmentation illustrates how virtues 
operate as a complete set in a way that skills do not.  Skills in marketing remain skills 
in marketing whether they are also linked to skills in information technology, and 
specific sets and sub-sets of skills and specialist knowledge can be developed, 
organised and deployed in the service of business goals.  The same is not true of the 
virtues if the arguments for the connectedness of the virtues made by Aquinas and 
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Aristotle are accepted.  Virtues which are fragmented or compartmentalised are no 
longer virtues. 
To illustrate this latter point, we can use some of the evidence provided by these 
bankers to critique Williams on the virtue of truthfulness. Williams (2002) considers the 
virtue of truthfulness to be a combination of the virtues of accuracy and sincerity, and 
he is consistent in this usage, that sincerity and accuracy are themselves to be 
considered virtues.  However, it is clear from the narratives of these bankers that 
accuracy appears virtue-like only when linked to the virtue of truthfulness by sincerity.  
So in P3’s paradigmatic story of the importance of accuracy in rescuing a banking 
division (S5.10 and C3: 57), accuracy is pivotal to his vindication of the combined skills 
and virtues of old banking.  However, this does not mean that accuracy could not be 
used to a bad end, even in old banking; it would be possible to exercise accuracy as a 
technical skill in order to commit fraud.  Accuracy on its own, without sincerity, is still 
accuracy, but does not amount to a virtue. 
From virtue to skill: the loss of unity 
This observation would not be especially interesting if it only served to challenge 
Williams’s usage of the word virtue here, but there are two implications of the 
distinction between virtue and skill here which are more substantive. 
First, from the point of view of the empirical evidence, we can then further observe how 
qualities such as accuracy, which might have formerly been considered virtues in old 
banking as part of a unified pattern of virtues, separate out to become only a skill in the 
context of new banking.  One leader, who is discussed by most of the participants as a 
very public symbol of the failure of new banking, is characterised as having an 
extraordinary intellectual capacity for grasping and retaining detail (C1:12, C5: 100); his 
capability with respect to accuracy is unquestioned.  However, he is also characterised 
as arrogant and reckless (C9: 180 and S5.9).  His character flaws and his lack of 
grounding in the goods of old banking meant that no degree of calculative intellect or 
technical skill was enough to save him and his bank from disaster.  The final action of 
this Chief Executive which caused the collapse of his bank in the crisis of 2007/8 was 
the acquisition of a large overseas bank – the last in a long succession of ambitious 
takeovers – which turned out to have disastrous levels of toxic debt. The twist in this 
story is that this last acquisition was seen by many as a failure of due diligence (C1: 
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19) 43, a failure, in fact, to ensure that a sufficient standard of accuracy was attained in 
the decision making process. 
Second, from the point of view of virtue theory, this same story provides a good 
example of the theme of the unity of the virtues.  Because this leader was reckless and 
arrogant, because he lacked virtues of character, he lacked also practical wisdom;  he 
was not able to judge well the risks of the acquisition which was being considered.  
Because of his excessive drive to lead the largest bank - let us call this a lack of self-
control - he failed to exercise proper attention to detail.  In these circumstances, the 
extraordinary intellect of this Chief Executive proved fruitless because he lacked the 
required virtues of character to pursue wise ends. Likewise, because he lacked 
practical wisdom and was arrogant, he was not in a position to be able to either make 
himself or seek from others the necessary critique of his own character to be able to 
detect his own failings. 
Of course this particular banking disaster was not solely the achievement of this one 
banking leader.  Whilst he did bear direct responsibility in the accounts of these 
participants, it is also true that he was acting in a way consistent with a much wider 
pattern of behaviour, a culture of aggressive capitalism in which he had hitherto been 
spectacularly successful.  Some flavour of this wider pattern and its disordering of 
goods emerges from a consideration of the question of the corruption of the practice of 
old banking. 
6.10 Corruption of a practice 
Section 5.8 poses the question of whether the process of corruption of the practice of 
banking, described there as breaking down or loss of goods and purposes, amounts 
also to moral corruption.  First it might be helpful to say what is not intended here by 
the phrase ‘moral corruption’.  For corruption the Oxford Dictionary of English (2010) 
gives as usage 1, ‘dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically 
involving bribery’.  It is not in this or similar common language senses that the phrase 
moral corruption is used here.  Rather, the intention is to explore what the process of 
corruption might mean for a practice in the context of virtue ethics and more specifically 
as used by MacIntyre in After Virtue.  There he refers to practices resisting (or not) ‘the 
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 One participant makes the point that full due diligence was impossible in the context of a 
hostile takeover (C6: 120), but of course the point remains that the Chief Executive in question 
had to judge in the first place the wisdom of a hostile takeover at this time, on this scale and so 
on.  His judgement remains in question. 
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corrupting power of institutions’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p.194).  But it is not only practices 
which can be corrupted in the absence of virtue: 
 ‘The virtues find their point and purpose not only in sustaining those 
relationships necessary if the variety of goods internal to practices are to be 
achieved and not only in sustaining the form of an individual life in which 
that individual may seek out his or her good as the good of his or her whole 
life, but also in sustaining those traditions which provide both practices and 
individual lives with their necessary historical context. Lack of justice, lack 
of truthfulness, lack of courage, lack of the relevant intellectual virtues — 
these corrupt traditions, just as they do those institutions and practices 
which derive their life from the traditions of which they are the 
contemporary embodiments.’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p.223) 
The meaning of corruption 
Without overstating the case, we might perhaps say that insofar as it makes sense to 
talk about institutions and practices being part of a single causal order, it makes sense 
to speak of practices and institutions also forming a causal order together with 
traditions, at least in respect of the causes of moral corruption.  We can say that any or 
all of these three elements can be subject to corruption and that the root cause of such 
corruption is vice or the lack of virtue.  Further, we can say that the corrupting influence 
of vice on a practice, institution or tradition is an opposite movement from the influence 
of virtue which is to sustain their integrity (MacIntyre, 2007).  This returns us to the 
original characterisation of corruption given at 5.8 as loss or breakage, and we can 
perhaps firm up here a notion of moral corruption in an institution, practice or tradition 
as the loss of integrity of a social system such that the coherence between its goods 
and virtues is dissolved. 
If this description is anywhere near the mark, we can note several features.  Integrity 
here pertains to a social system, applicable at the level of practices or traditions, but 
not at the level of the individual; a similar concept would also be applicable at the 
individual level, but we are not directly concerned with it here.  For a system to lose 
integrity, it must have integrity in the first place.  If a social activity has never had 
coherence of the relevant kind, then it cannot be corrupted: thieving might be an 
example, as indeed might shopping. But this requirement of coherence must be less 
strong than the requirement for something to count as a practice.  The social 
convention of gift giving at Christmas can hardly count as a practice in MacIntyre’s 
sense, but it still could have, or could have had at one time, coherence of the relevant 
kind, and it makes perfectly good sense to debate whether it is a convention which has 
been corrupted.  Lastly, this idea of corruption places some weight on the idea of 
coherence between goods and virtues. 
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Is Scottish banking a corrupted practice in this sense?  It seems patent from the 
argument so far that the integrity of goods and virtues which was apparent in old 
banking, as I have called it, has been lost.  This is not only clear from the discussions 
above throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6, but it is directly evident in the language of those 
participants most closely associated with old banking, who continually talk in terms of 
fragmentation and loss of skills (C5: 93), virtues (C3: 63), relationships (C5: 101), 
respect (C8: 144), qualifications (C1: 2), standards (C1: 5) and so on. More interesting 
questions arise once the fact of corruption is recognised, the first of which might be: 
What does it imply, to say that banking in Scotland is a corrupted practice? 
Consequences and causes 
The implications in the case of Scottish banking are far reaching.  The practice of old 
banking in Scotland has largely disappeared, or at least has been so marginalised that 
it is no longer a feature of mainstream high street and commercial banking in Scotland. 
The institutions have also changed radically, and it was institutional pressure which 
changed the practice, so that we have to consider the corruption of the practice and its 
institutions together with the tradition of banking in Scotland as elements of the same 
causal system.  So we are presented with the question of the corruption not just of the 
practice but also of the tradition and its institutions. 
What corruption implies in the case of banking in Scotland then becomes very clear, 
because the loss of integrity extended across the whole system.  The larger banks in 
Scotland became larger again, either acquiring other banks, or merging or being 
themselves acquired, so that the allegiances of these banks were no longer to the 
tradition of Scottish banking, but to a new form of capitalism.  ‘The leaders of the banks 
became people who were looking after the western economy joint stock model’ (C5: 
101).  This separation of banks and the leaders of banks from the tradition was 
perhaps the most fundamental disruption to coherence, and it implied loss of authority; 
the tradition lost authority over the banks, because the leaders of these new large 
diversified financial institutions were no longer traditional bankers.  The practice itself 
became ‘disaggregated’ (C5: 103), as the overall competence of the generalist bank 
manager was split up into specialist skills sets (C8: 161) and redistributed within the 
bureaucracies of these new larger international institutions.  Working environments 
were thereby created in which these specialised skills sets were regrouped into project 
teams and newly defined ‘practice teams’ (C9: 168) within matrix management 
structures provided by the organisation, rather than by the profession. 
The participants in this research speak explicitly about a new and aggressive form of 
capitalism and its hostility to their profession (C1: 2, C8: 156) (S4.4).  Keat (2008a and 
178 
2008b) diagnoses the problem of hostility to practices as one which is particularly 
characteristic of Anglo-American ‘liberal’ market economies (LMEs) and ‘impatient 
capital’, in contrast to ‘coordinated’ market economies and ‘patient capital’ which are 
more supportive of practices.  He also acknowledges that rather than speaking of very 
broad categories of types of capitalism, it may be more helpful to speak of a particular 
type in a particular country in a particular period.  The findings of the current research 
seem to corroborate some of this thinking.  It is striking how quickly the character of the 
market for financial services in Scotland changed over the period 1980 to 2000, and 
how this had an immediate impact on old banking as a practice.  
MacIntyre himself seems less interested in distinctions between forms of capitalism in 
this way.  Whilst acknowledging that there are differences of economic and 
bureaucratic culture between Anglo-American capitalism and some European models, 
MacIntyre (2007, p.86) nevertheless believes that ‘in every case the rise of managerial 
expertise would have to be the same central theme’.  This also is true to the 
experience of the participants in this research, for whom the rise of the generalist 
manager was part and parcel of the same transformation. 
Moral incoherence in new banking 
When new banking displaced old banking, it prioritised new goods, with quantitative 
targets for corporate growth, sales and profitability replacing the ends of social 
relationships valued by old banking (S4.3 and S4.4).  Because these new goods were 
external goods (the goods of the institution rather than any practice), there was an 
automatic disruption to the coherence between goods and virtues.  Many of the virtues 
of old banking such as truthfulness, patience and the ability to form stable customer 
relationships were no longer valued by new banking.  Instead, qualities such as 
flexibility and ambition were required, and new skills were encouraged including the 
skills of selling and manipulation. 
The breakdown of the coherence originally provided by old banking in this narrative 
seems very clear, but what also emerges is a bleak view of new banking, because it 
appears that new banking itself has no similar coherence of its own to offer.  This view 
needs to be stated with a degree of caution, because no effort has been made in this 
research to seek a positive view of new banking, and the sample used for the research 
conversations has emphasised the voice of old banking.  Nevertheless, at least from 
the perspective of these Scottish banking leaders, this lack of coherence is marked.  Its 
symptoms in new banking include the following: the virtues of leadership were lacking, 
so that not only did individual leaders of new banking lack crucial virtues (S5.9) but the 
banking system itself encouraged the corresponding vices of recklessness (P10: 200), 
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greed (C3: 49) and dishonesty44 (C2: 30); new quasi-virtues sprang up, qualities such 
as flexibility (C9: 177), speed (C10: 191), adaptability (C9: 184), authenticity (C10: 192) 
and charisma (C5: 100);  and there was a deliberate move to distance the new banks 
from the tradition, both culturally and structurally (C1: 2, C3: 57).  It is also worth noting 
the large fact that as an enterprise new banking proved itself to be incoherent by its 
own standards within a remarkably short space of time.  It took less than twenty years 
for the new structures to be established, for their aims and objectives to become clear, 
and for the leading banks to destroy themselves.  Their standards of success and 
failure were a matter not of human relationships but of metrics (C3: 49) – the metrics of 
corporate size and profitability – and by exactly those measures they failed 
catastrophically (C10: 203). 
From the point of view of MacIntyrean enquiry, the heart of the problem is that, in new 
banking, there is a gap where the practice of banking should be. The coherence of old 
banking was achieved not just by an overall theory of banking or even by the pursuit of 
a practice, but by the integration of social structures, practice, institutions and tradition.  
So when the question is put in a range of different ways in these research 
conversations, ‘What was it like to be a banker?’, there is a unanimous response from 
all those who qualified as full members of the Chartered Institute under old banking45.  
The details and circumstances of their different stories vary, but the core picture that 
they paint of a coherent profession – which I have argued amounted to a practice – is 
the same; they are all able to articulate the goods, virtues, skills and structures of their 
working lives in ways which clearly convey that it is one profession which is being 
talked about.   
This is not the case with new banking.  New banking is characterised by a wide range 
of different skills and specialisms coordinated by general managerial control to work 
towards the goals of organisational effectiveness (C9: 168).  Workers within this 
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 It may seem a severe judgement to say that new banking encouraged dishonesty on a 
systematic basis, rather than simply saying that dishonesty was rife.  This latter position might 
perhaps be argued in some cases of mis-selling, and one of the participants does argue in this 
way, suggesting that rampant mis-selling was somehow not a failure of senior bank leadership, 
but rather the fault of a broad swathe of middle managers acting in their own interests.  
However, even if that particular argument was to be believed, there are plenty of other practices 
in new banking which absolutely require the hiding of information in order to be successful.  
These include systems for the trading of securitised debt on a competitive basis where winning 
requires that one is able to outwit one’s opponents, by knowing better than they do the nature of 
the risks contained in highly complex instruments or by calculating the odds more quickly than 
them (C6: 120, C8: 156). 
45
 That is, eight out of the ten participants.  One participant is not a banker by training, and one 
is not a full member of the Institute. 
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system may be drawn from a range of professions such as HR, legal, IT change 
management and so on (C9: 182), and including more than one profession under the 
banner of banking (C4: 83).  This latter group of professions or profession-like activities 
include retail banking, investment banking, and a range of other finance related 
functions and sub-functions such as risk management, credit control and foreign 
exchange dealing, and extending into investment management, insurance, pensions 
management etc.  There is no unifying practice at the heart of new banking. 
We have now at least a partial answer to the question framed earlier (S2.9) in 
response to Annas (1989):  ‘To what extent did the institutions of banking in Scotland 
stand or fall with the coherence of the reasoning that the tradition of banking 
produced?’  It seems in the case of banking in Scotland, the two stood and fell together 
and that this was a closely connected process in which rationality and the structures in 
which it was embodied affected each other.  It is particularly the idea of traditions as 
socially embodied in practices, institutions and wider social structures which allows us 
to articulate these connections. 
6.11 The future 
The primary concern of policy in Britain regarding the banking sector is the restoration 
of public trust in the system (Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, 2013; 
YouGov-Cambridge, 2013).  What are the chances of re-establishing some central 
practice of banking in Scotland which could recapture at least some of the values of the 
tradition which has been described here?  And is this kind of re-establishment 
something to aspire to? 
If MacIntyre is right about the importance of practices and traditions in the pursuit of 
human goods and the corrupting power of institutions, then clearly some return to a 
core practice of banking is going to be needed if human powers to seek the good are to 
be realisable through the life of a banker.  But MacIntyre’s way of thinking about ethics 
is not everyone’s, and this prompts a further question.  Should the focus for developing 
stronger ethics in the banking sector be on the behaviour of institutions, or on banking 
as a way of life?  In other words, there are two possible ways of thinking about 
repairing trust in banking.  One is to focus on the banks, their structures, internal 
controls, ethos, objectives and so on.  Another is to focus on banking and bankers as a 
professional way of life.  These two of course are not incompatible, but MacIntyre 
would clearly have us prioritise the latter, since virtuous organisations are those which 
serve practices and traditions.  It cannot work the other way round, since it is traditions 
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and practices which supply the expression of human goods and virtues, and it is those 
same goods and virtues which must in turn supply the goals and standards of the 
institution.  Institutions are incapable of creating worthwhile goods and standards of 
their own, in the absence of traditions or practices which they serve. 
The effort to restore trust 
The Chartered Banker Institute’s flagship initiative to restore trust in banking is the 
Professional Standards Board established in December 2010, and the language of its 
pamphlet on commitment reflects closely the language of traditionalists in banking: 
‘Our customers, colleagues, regulators and shareholders rightly want to see 
a banking industry built on a solid foundation of ethical professionalism. 
They want to see banks and bankers supporting customers whilst lending 
responsibly, acting as trusted advisers to individuals and businesses, and 
playing a positive role in the community.’ (Chartered Banker Institute, 
2011b, p.1) 
This emphasis on customers, responsible lending, the role of trusted advisor and a 
place in the community are all consistent with an effort by traditional bankers to 
reassert the goods of their practice.  The intention here is unsurprising in the sense 
that there is still a close association between the group of traditional bankers who 
participated in the current research and those involved in the governance of the 
Institute.  What is perhaps more surprising is that the intention has been effective in 
carrying through these commitments in the Professional Standards Board, since that 
body is populated not by those same traditional bankers, but by leaders in new 
banking, including, as a founding member, Antonio Horta-Osario, Group Chief 
Executive of Lloyds Banking Group (Chartered Banker Institute, 2011b).  This is not to 
try to guess at the personal affiliation of these Board members to old or new banking, 
but to observe that, structurally speaking, they occupy senior leadership positions in 
large diversified international banks, i.e. new banking. 
Barriers to restoring trust 
There is no doubting the intentions of the Chartered Institute to attempt to recapture 
the standards of professional life which once characterised banking in Scotland.  
However, there are structural barriers to that effort, which a MacIntyrean perspective 
makes clear. 
The original standards of old banking were generated by a Scottish tradition, and this 
unique tradition is unrecoverable without a return to national boundaries which are now 
neither likely nor very obviously desirable.  This is perhaps the least critical barrier, 
because there does seem to be a degree of cultural alignment between retail banking 
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traditions in Scotland, England and elsewhere in Europe, not least because models of 
Scottish banking were exported to England and other countries in the nineteenth 
century (Munn, 1981). 
The idea of ‘playing a positive role in the community’ (Chartered Banker Institute, 
2011b, p.1, quoted above) is clearly a worthwhile good, but raises the issue of what 
community is being talked about.  It is clear from the evidence of these research 
conversations that the original community structures which gave rise to old banking are 
largely gone, and some participants are explicit that the community role of old banking 
cannot be recovered as a result (P5: 102-103).  The word ‘disaggregation’ applied by 
one speaker to the fragmentation of skills is applied by another to the displacement of 
channels of direct communication with customers by on-line banking, ATMs and so on 
(C8: 163). 
The new banks are so structured that they cannot be practice-led – in other words the 
the profession of banking as understood by traditional bankers is necessarily 
subordinated to the wider institutional goals of the banks.  There seem to be two main 
reasons for this.  First, a number of practices are vying for priority within the large 
diversified financial institutions which now dominate the banking sector, so much so 
that it is not only the public and the press who are confused about what the word 
‘banker’ means, but also the people who work in the banks (C9: 174).  Unless it is clear 
either which practice leads, or how the competing claims of various kinds of goods are 
to be resolved, there is no prospect of a solution to this problem.  Second, there is no 
basis for resolving the competing claims of these various kinds of goods within current 
structures except with reference to the overarching goals of institutions operating in the 
global marketplace.  The basis for ranking of goods in such organisations then 
automatically rests on the goods of effectiveness rather than the goods of excellence.  
The best that can be achieved by the virtues of any practice in such circumstances is 
the limitation of excess (Moore, 2012b). 
The goals of such diversified financial institutions are defined by the interests of 
shareholders, not by the goods of any practice.  Since there is no obvious prospect of 
banks being split once again into, for instance, retail banks and investment banks in 
the near future, and no appetite from the banks for such change (Browne, 2013), this 
seems to be the most significant barrier, and its implications for the future are 




Some possible futures, including a return to the pre-eminence of old banking as it was, 
complete with a functioning unity of purpose between tradition, practice and institution, 
are ruled out because the underlying social and organisational structures have 
changed to a degree which makes such a return impossible.  Three main possible 
futures then appear to remain: 
1. The profession of banking will re-assert itself, supported as a discrete practice 
by a dedicated professional body, but separately from the banks themselves.  
The term ‘banker’ will refer for this group to someone who possesses a given 
set of professional qualifications, skills and standards, regardless of what 
organisation they work for, and will not refer simply to anyone who works in a 
bank.  This will require a clear separation of professions between retail and 
commercial banking on the one hand, and, say, investment banking (C10: 199), 
securities trading or hedge fund management on the other. 
2. Retail banking will maintain itself as a marginal but still significant practice with 
its own network of institutions which are dedicated to the purpose of supporting 
the practice.  This will maintain some unity between practice, tradition and 
institution, but at the price of ceding the centre ground of the financial 
marketplace to the large diversified institutions of new banking.  Those 
customers who are sufficiently well informed and resourceful will be able to find 
their way through to this more restricted form of banking, but it will not form a 
universal service, it may not be free at the point of delivery (C6: 127), and it will 
always be at risk of disappearing altogether because it lacks a central authority 
with sufficient critical mass. 
3. The goods and purposes of traditional banking will continue to occupy a place 
in the broader professional milieu of old banking, but the role of those goods 
and purposes will be to temper and limit the activities of organisations which are 
not dedicated to the ideals of that tradition.  It therefore will always be fighting a 
defensive action, in potential or actual conflict with the organisational goals of 
the banks.  To a degree this will be a continuation of the status quo, but with the 
very significant problem that as the memory of old banking fades, there will be 
no tradition to draw on and the goods and purposes of old banking will no 
longer have sufficient presence to meaningfully limit or influence the pursuit of 
the goals of the banks. 
These possible futures are envisaged from the point of view of the practice and 
tradition of banking.  Other possible futures are of course available from the point of 
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view of the banks.  For an organisation such as Tesco’s as a supermarket chain with 
some banking services, there can be no question of serving the goods of the practice 
of banking.  From Tesco’s perspective the best future might be for banking to be 
available as a specialised skills set, and for ethics in the organisation to be governed 
by other mechanisms entirely, such as mechanisms of corporate social responsibility 
which do not rely on any practice for their standards.  Those standards in turn will not 
meet the requirements of coherence that MacIntyre articulates, because they will not 
be founded on a recognisable practice or practice-bearing tradition. 
The three possible futures listed above do not amount to policy options, but can be 
used to reflect on practical implications for the effort to re-establish public trust in the 
banking sector.  This question is pursued further in the final chapter.  At this point it 
should be noted that possible future no. 2 above may look like an admission of failure, 
but is perhaps closest to what MacIntyre would regard as a viable context in which to 
retain or recreate a practice.  He is sufficiently pessimistic about the ‘characteristics of 
mainstream economic and social order’ to believe that ‘institutions and practices which 
are successful in embodying such tradition-informed social relationships, flourish only 
among groups who are marginal and deviant—who live a life of failure—from the 
dominant standpoint of modernity’ (MacIntyre, 1992, p.198). 
6.12 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter has extended the themes of tradition, practice and virtue which arose in 
Chapters 4 and 5, and has reflected on both theory and practice in the light of those 
themes. 
‘Old banking’ has been explored as a practice-bearing tradition with a coherent set of 
goods founded on wider social structures.  The differences between old and new 
banking have been explored further, including a discussion of different conceptions of 
justice which appear to underlie these distinct ways of thinking about banking.  A 
similar exercise has been conducted with regard to banking as a practice.  It has been 
argued that old banking was a practice in MacIntyre’s sense of that word in a way that 
new banking is not.  Once this is accepted it helps to explain a number of features of 
old banking as a way of life; it also helps to explain how virtues operate in practices as 
unified sets and how they can be distinguished from skills. 
The idea that banking is a corrupted practice has been explored and the possible 
implications of this for the future of the sector introduced.  
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion and contributions 
7.1 Summary of the argument 
This thesis has argued that the ethics of banking in Scotland have changed 
considerably over the last 30 years.  Alasdair MacIntyre’s moral philosophy has been 
used to provide a theoretical framework through which to explore this history as it was 
told in conversation by long-standing leaders in Scottish banking.  A narrative has 
emerged of the decline of a distinctively Scottish tradition of banking orientated towards 
serving customers in their communities, and the ascendency in its place of a new 
culture of international banking orientated towards corporate growth.  In the course of 
articulating this narrative, a range of concepts in virtue ethics has emerged as 
significant, and MacIntyre’s ideas of tradition and practice have been shown to be 
fruitful in understanding the stories of  these bankers.  The structure of the argument of 
the thesis is summarised below.   
Chapter 1 gave the aims and objectives of the thesis, its context and rationale.  The 
structure of the thesis was outlined. 
Chapter 2 explained the reasons for basing this Aristotelian enquiry on MacIntyre’s 
work.  An overview of some of his most relevant and central ideas was provided, 
particularly with regard to practices, traditions and social structures.  The chapter 
outlined MacIntyre’s position as an Aristotelian and discussed some criticisms of his 
work by other Aristotelians.  Finally the current state of empirical research in 
MacIntyrean enquiry was summarised, with particular attention to its relevance for 
banking. 
Chapter 3 explained the epistemological justification for the research method used in 
the study.  The relationship between Gadamer’s hermeneutics and MacIntyre’s 
tradition-constituted enquiry was explored and six principles of enquiry were proposed 
based on a reading of both philosophers: 
 Tradition-constituted enquiry  Moral enquiry as narrative  Plain persons and moral philosophers  The provisional status of claims to truth  Prejudgement  Conversation 
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Taken together, these six principles yielded a method of enquiry which is hermeneutic, 
narrative and tradition-constituted. 
Chapters 4 and 5 gave the empirical findings of the research through two different 
kinds of narrative.  Chapter 4 provided a chronological narrative of the recollections of 
the group given as far as possible in the language of the participants themselves, with 
a minimum of dependence on explicit theory.  It began with recollections of banking 
before the impact of the deregulation of UK banking in the 1980s and charted the 
transition from traditional banking in Scotland – ‘old banking’– to a new style of banking 
which developed in the 1990s, followed by the crisis in ‘new banking’.  What emerged 
was a story of conflict and decline for old banking, and a brief period of rapid 
development in new banking before its partial collapse in 2007/8.  The account of this 
conflict threw into relief the contrasting values and assumptions of these two cultures. 
Chapter 5 provided a number of interpretive narratives of the same material, this time 
based on key themes of MacIntyre’s moral philosophy:  tradition, practice and virtue.    
Old banking was shown as a coherent social structure which carried with it a basis for 
practical rationality, a structure which was itself part of the fabric of towns and cities 
including family, Kirk and school.  Old banking emerged as a practice in MacIntyre’s 
sense of that word in a way that new banking did not.  In old banking the internal goods 
of the practice were clear and were based on the central good of the customer 
relationship.  The practice of old banking was shown to be located in a tradition; this 
gave it coherence in respect of the community structures which it served and the 
virtues required for the practice in that context.  The virtues of old banking were 
described as particular applications of the cardinal virtues of courage, self-control, 
justice and practical wisdom, together with truthfulness, patience and, in the context of 
conflict, constancy. 
Chapter 6 discussed the implications of viewing old banking as a practice-bearing 
tradition and compared this with the situation of new banking.  This included the 
question of what sort of tradition was in view, its boundaries and its content.  The topic 
of the corruption of the practice of old banking was explored together with the possible 
futures which appear to be available to the tradition.  In the process of these 
discussions the empirical evidence of the research was used to explore and critique 
key elements of Aristotelian and MacIntyrean theory, such as the question of the unity 
of the virtues, the distinction between virtues and skills, and the relationship between 
the internal goods of a practice and the virtues. 
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The body of the current chapter, Chapter 7, reflects on contributions made by the 
thesis.  These include the following proposals: 
 Tradition can be considered the ground of MacIntyrean empirical enquiry;  Gadamer’s understanding of understanding can usefully complement 
MacIntyre’s and vice versa;  MacIntyre is vindicated as a constructive critic of the economic mainstream;  With the decline of ‘old banking’ in Scotland, a morally coherent form of 
financial activity was lost;  New banking appears to lack a central practice and is ill-equipped to regain 
public trust. 
Finally, the limitations of this study are discussed together with indications for future 
research.  
7.2 Scope of contributions 
This research project aimed to explore the moral narratives of Leaders in Scottish 
banking from the perspective of MacIntyre’s Aristotelian philosophy.  The objectives of 
the research included proposing practical contributions to policy concerning 
professional ethics in banking based on Aristotelian premises, and examining whether 
empirical findings may contribute to the development of MacIntyrean enquiry. 
The research has followed the objective of contributing to policy debate concerning 
professional ethics in banking by bringing banking leaders into conversation with 
MacIntyre’s moral philosophy.  This process of bringing into conversation, based on 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, has been a distinctive feature of the research.  Rich 
narratives were provided by the participants and MacIntyre’s Aristotelian moral 
philosophy has been used to interpret these through themes of tradition, practice and 
virtue. 
One of the benefits of this process is that the thesis has been able to disentangle the 
current structural forms of banking from the tradition of banking in Scotland, to show 
how the ethics of banking went wrong, and how the banking system in 2007/8 suffered 
a moral failure and not just a technical one.  These contributions are outlined below in 
Sections 7.6 and 7.7.  It then becomes possible to indicate some practical implications 
for ethics in banking, which are not simply more of the same kinds of solutions which 
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have already been tried through regulatory bodies, ethics committees or corporate 
social responsibility policies46.  Section 7.8 explores these implications. 
The research has followed the objective of contributing to the development of 
MacIntyrean enquiry by taking up MacIntyre’s (2007, p.196) own challenge, that his 
kind of ‘conceptual account has strong empirical implications; it provides an 
explanatory scheme which can be tested in particular cases.’  In the current research 
project this ‘testing’ cannot be of a positivistic nature (Willis, 2007), but through the 
process of hermeneutic conversation which this research has used, his account can 
nevertheless be ‘put to the question’ (MacIntyre, 1988). 
A more conventional word for this empirical process of questioning in an interpretive 
method is the term exploration (Hammersley, 2012).  Exploration of MacIntyre’s 
account means at least two things here.  It means allowing his ideas to be challenged 
by the empirical data, and it means reflecting on the empirical data to better 
understand those ideas.  This process of exploration has produced some clear results.  
It has confirmed much of MacIntyre’s thinking on practices and the role of virtues in 
practices, at least in this research context, and it reinforces the importance of seeing 
practices in their wider context of traditions and social structures.  It has opened up 
some new ways of thinking about MacIntyrean enquiry in the context of hermeneutics, 
and particularly in relation to Gadamer’s thinking about tradition.  And it has challenged 
some of MacIntyre’s assumptions about banking and capitalism. 
The following sections summarise the contributions of this research, first to the 
theoretical basis of MacIntyrean enquiry, and second to the practical policy context of 
ethics in the banking sector. 
7.3 Tradition as the ground of MacIntyrean empirical enquiry 
Knight (2008a) shows how MacIntyre’s thinking leads him to dig through the bedrock of 
practice to find a footing for the ultimate ends of human action in a naturalist account of 
human beings as embodied and rational animals.  This represents a return to a form of 
metaphysical naturalism which he had rejected in After Virtue, but which then finds 
                                               
46
 Sotorrío and Sánchez (2008) list the Royal Bank of Scotland among the forty most reputable 
American and European firms for corporate social responsibility in 2003/4.  My point here is not 
that such institutional systems of external control are unnecessary, only that they are 
insufficient, and that they need to work to support rather than to supplant practice-based 
systems of control which are internal to the profession. 
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detailed expression in Dependent Rational Animals. 47  However, one of the 
conclusions of the research process for the current thesis must be that for empirical 
research in social science48, tradition gives a more appropriate grounding for 
MacIntyrean empirical research than either practices or human metaphysical biology. 
To claim in the context of empirical sociological research that tradition provides a 
ground for empirical enquiry could be interpreted as a larger claim than is intended.  I 
do not mean here that there is no reality worth seeking beyond tradition, or that 
traditions rather than practices or institutions are the only legitimate objects of such 
enquiry, only that we cannot fully understand such phenomena as practices and 
institutions unless we also have some idea of the traditions in which they arise.  More 
specifically, we should be mindful that if we are looking for the rationality (in an 
Aristotelian and MacIntyrean sense) of a practice, then it is to the tradition of which 
some current practice is an instantiation that we should look.  If MacIntyre (1998 and 
1990) is right, there is no ground for the rationality of a practice except in some 
tradition. 
Practices remain a fruitful focus for empirical enquiry (and so it has been with the 
current research), but if we are seeking narrative accounts of a practice, some of those 
narratives should shed light on the tradition, answering questions such as ‘How did you 
learn this?’, ‘Who taught you?’ ‘How did this practice develop?’  Practices can expand 
and develop the goods of traditions, but any observable practice at any given time is 
always dependent on some tradition for its conception of goods.  In other words, the 
internal goods of a practice do not spring into being within the context of practice, 
without being adaptations of or subsets of the goods of a tradition.  If we were to 
                                               
47
 There is discussion of this at S2.4.  Naturalism as understood here challenges standard 
versions of fact-value distinction (Jacobs, 2014).  As Geach (1977, p.17) puts it, ‘Men need 
virtues as bees need stings’.  Within two years of each other, Foot (2001) in Natural Goodness 
and MacIntyre (1999) in Dependent Rational Animals returned to the basic question of why 
human beings need the virtues from a naturalistic standpoint. 
48
 Following a fruitful discussion with Kelvin Knight, for which I am grateful, I need to clarify here 
that I am only discussing the limits of empirical enquiry in social science, not the wider context 
of philosophical enquiry.  When I say that tradition provides a ground for empirical research, I 
hope this is not inconsistent with accepting human nature as a legitimate goal for moral enquiry.  
The key difference is one of procedure appropriate to content.  An individual researcher in 
social science might reasonably expect to be able to identify and describe a tradition through 
empirical enquiry; this is a descriptive enquiry within defined limits.  Normative enquiry, on the 
other hand, is a matter of shared deliberation (MacIntyre, 2009), and a reasonable goal of such 
deliberation might well be an answer to the question, ‘What sort of animals are we, and what is 
our characteristic good?’  These two kinds of enquiry are closely interdependent in an 
Aristotelian scheme, and one link is that the empirical enquiry attempts to provide information to 
support the normative one. 
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encounter goods internal to a practice which we could in no way relate to a tradition, 
we would again have to doubt the rationality of those goods. 
So, this thesis claims that our thinking in empirical research should not stop at the level 
of practice or institution but should be mindful of the deeper level of tradition on which 
they rest.  Claiming that this level of tradition forms a ground for such enquiry has a 
further consequence for the role of metaphysical biology; in effect it rules it out as a 
direct object of empirical research.  In MacIntyre’s later thinking, the rationalities of 
traditions are answerable to the condition of human beings as rational animals, so we 
are justified in trying to decide between two rival traditions on the basis of their rival 
claims about human nature.  However, we have no means of direct appeal to the 
condition of human nature in sociological research, because human nature is not 
directly observable.  Rather it is through observation of traditions and practices that we 
begin to understand the human condition.  When we collect narratives of ways of life in 
MacIntyrean empirical enquiry, we do not collect scientific data regarding metaphysical 
biology, we collect histories of practices and traditions which allow us to understand the 
notions of human goods as handed on by them. 
The current thesis demonstrates the value of focusing on traditions in MacIntyrean 
empirical enquiry.  This is not instead of exploring questions of practice, but in addition.  
It opens up for further debate the idea of practice-bearing traditions and argues that 
these are valuable in achieving an understanding of practices, and indispensable in 
understanding any coherent way of life.  It shifts the MacIntyrean lens to look not only 
at tension between practice and institution, but also at conflict within and between 
traditions, and explores the question of what elements make up traditions as 
observable phenomena. 
7.4 MacIntyre and Gadamer 
This thesis considers MacIntyre’s thinking on tradition alongside Gadamer’s, and finds 
that they provide two complementary accounts of understanding as movement towards 
truth.  MacIntyre emphasises a movement through conflict within and between 
traditions, and his language is predominantly of rivalry and confrontation, victory and 
defeat.  The narratives of After Virtue, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, and Three 
Rival Versions are all in this mode.  Gadamer, on the other hand, emphasises a 
movement through agreement.  One of his key innovations is to reconfigure 
‘understanding’ (verstehen) as coming to an understanding with another, reaching 
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agreement (Grondin, 2002), and this gives rise to his ideas of conversation and the 
fusion of horizons. 
Taken together, these two movements show how criticism of traditions is possible and 
how resolutions can be made in progress towards truth, so that, in MacIntyre’s 
phrasing, greater adequacy of mind to its objects can be achieved.  In the context of 
this thesis, this dual movement is applied to empirical research, emphasising 
Gadamer’s movement towards agreement in the initial gathering of data and allowing 
MacIntyre’s emphasis on conflict to emerge in analysis.  The principal contribution here 
is not so much an exploration of how the different epistemologies of these two 
philosophers agree or disagree (some work has been done on this already by Machura 
(2007)) but rather a demonstration in practice of the way that these two movements 
towards conflict and towards agreement can be brought together in the development of 
empirical research.  In this respect the current research breaks new ground. 
Gadamer’s ideas of genuine conversation and fusion of horizons as processes of 
coming to an understanding have been used in this research to justify and to design a 
method of data gathering which is explicitly hermeneutic and which consciously uses 
Gadamer’s articulation of conversation as a method of engaging with participants.  This 
process has been successful in generating some rich data, and has allowed a degree 
of interaction with each participant which would not have been possible on some 
conventional models of interview technique such as semi-structured interviews (Bloom 
and Crabtree, 2006).  This has been consistent with MacIntyre’s emphasis on the place 
of the researcher (MacIntyre, 1990), and my own position as a researcher in a 
particular tradition is explicit in the conversations.  The pursuit of Gadamer’s notion of 
conversation also extends beyond the natural conversations between researcher and 
participant to the process of analysis.  In analysing the data, a process of hermeneutic 
conversation has been followed, allowing for successive cycles of interpretation at a 
range of different levels, as the researcher is first brought in to conversation with texts 
in the academic literature, then with interview transcripts as texts, then again with 
further literature and so on.  This process has been exhaustive and has included the 
completion of a detailed interpretive commentary on each transcript which preceded 
the writing of the thesis (see Appendix 3). 
MacIntyre’s approach to tradition as focused on conflict and contest (a stance which 
would have been unhelpful in conducting interviews) has then come to the foreground 
in the presentation of findings.  In particular, the researcher has been interested in 
stories of conflict and has used MacIntyre’s understanding of tension in the practice-
institution combination and conflict within and between traditions as a framework for 
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reading the narratives presented by the participants and in turn presenting the findings 
as narratives of conflict.  MacIntyre’s thinking has been particularly influential in helping 
to understand what these conflicts are about, because it poses key questions for the 
researcher to follow, questions concerning what goods are in dispute or what 
pressures conflict with which virtues. 
This combination of Gadamer’s thinking on tradition with MacIntyre’s has proven 
productive, yielding a rich data set and a coherent and fruitful means of interpreting 
that data. 
7.5 The usefulness of MacIntyre and some challenges 
MacIntyre’s philosophy has been shown to have explanatory power in understanding 
the causes of the banking crisis as a moral rather than only a technical problem.  It 
helps to explain some of the reasons why managerialism – the rise of the professional 
manager as an expert in generic business systems applicable to any domain49 – was 
so disastrous in the case of banking.  It explains how ethics and practical decision 
making were linked or unlinked at the most senior leadership levels.  It clarifies the way 
in which one system of ethics in banking was overthrown and replaced by something 
much less adequate.  It offers a diagnosis of why ethics in banking have continued to 
fail under current structures, and offers a constructive commentary on current policy 
issues. 
This explanatory power is not in itself a new discovery.  Several other researchers 
have found a similar applicability (Beadle, 2013; Moore 2012; Kempster, Jackson and 
Conroy, 2011).  What is perhaps new about this research is the remarkable degree to 
which many of the participants spoke in MacIntyrean ways, particularly with regard to 
tradition.  It is important to recall that the researcher did not embark on the research by 
asking the participants about tradition, but rather by asking about their careers.  It was 
the first participant who raised the topic and it became thereafter a recurring theme of 
the conversations.  What the participants then did for the most part was narrate the 
decline of their own tradition. 
                                               
49 Hopper and Hopper (2007, p.133) trace the origins of the financial collapse of 2007/8 to the 
‘Cult of the (so-called) Expert’, the rise of professional managers who were free of any real 
expertise in specific occupations or business sectors.  They do not refer to MacIntyre, yet their 
description of generic, domain-free management as a form of illusionary pseudo-science is 
remarkably close to MacIntyre’s in After Virtue. 
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Where talk of the tradition of old banking is strongest in the primary data, so is talk of 
virtues and the goods of excellence.  This research has involved bringing MacIntyre’s 
philosophy into conversation with bankers’ stories of their working lives, and the 
language used by each side of those conversations is often different.  Where one side 
speaks of practice and institution or practical wisdom and justice, the other side speaks 
of profession and bank or good sense and good advice.  However, there is also a 
remarkable consonance in speech between the two sides, certainly more so than I as 
the researcher had assumed before engaging in these conversations (Appendix 3).  
Both sides speak of the importance of community structures, family life and the church 
in forming moral judgements, both sides use the language of virtues to describe what it 
means to live a good life, and both see a close connection between the virtues and 
practical outcomes.  For all the bankers in these conversations, the collapse of banking 
in 2007/8 is a morality tale, and the moral of that story is shaped mostly in MacIntyrean 
terms around the disintegration of virtues, practice and tradition, to a lesser degree in 
Kantian terms concerning the breaking of moral rules, and very little in terms of 
consequentialist thinking, except occasionally to defend some of the activity that was 
responsible for the collapse (C7: 134). 
One of the signs that MacIntyre’s philosophy genuinely engages with the narratives of 
these bankers, is that it is also challenged by them in places.  One area of challenge is 
with the idea of banking itself.  MacIntyre (1994) is hostile to modern banking partly 
because it embodies much that is wrong with capitalism and partly because it depends 
on trading systems that have no place for the virtues (Cornwell, 2010).  The 
participants in these research conversations offer a challenge to this very broad 
ranging criticism, whilst supporting some aspects of it.  Many of these bankers see 
themselves as the victims of a new and virulent form of capitalism which combined with 
new forms of entrepreneurial leadership to destroy their profession. 
Some support emerges from these conversations for the view that MacIntyre’s hostility 
to the banking sector is too simplistic and too extreme.  However, against this, we 
would also need to point out that MacIntyre has for many years been writing as a critic 
of a particular form of capitalism in ‘advanced countries’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p.34), and 
the role of the manager as he has seen it developing in the United States.  Scottish 
bankers were, on their own admission, in something of a protected enclave, which did 
not feel the full force of international banking and the ‘western economy joint stock 
model’ (C5: 101) until the 1990s.  MacIntyre in this sense has acted as a predictor of 
decline.  If Scottish banking was a coherent practice-bearing tradition up until the 
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1980s then it fell victim to exactly those forces of advanced modernity that he has 
articulated. 
7.6 Ethics in the tradition of Scottish banking 
MacIntyre’s understanding of practices and traditions, and the goods and virtues which 
they may support, has enabled an understanding of the recent history of the ethics of 
Scottish banking which is detailed and thoroughgoing.  The picture which emerges is of 
a practice-bearing tradition which was rooted in community structures and which had 
its own coherent set of goods and virtues which characterised Scottish banking as a 
particular way of life.  Those goods included a set of human relationships based in 
community structures and centred on the relationship between banker and customer in 
which the banker acted primarily as custodian of deposits and good advisor.  The 
virtues required for this way of life were consistent with those required for the 
community as a whole, and they included the virtues of justice, practical wisdom and 
truthfulness.  Traditional banking was also characterised by disapprobation of certain 
specific vices including recklessness, greed and impatience.  The tradition of banking 
in Scotland was supported by institutional structures which the tradition itself had 
developed and these included the banks which carried on the practice directly and the 
Chartered Institute which supported the handing on of the tradition through formal 
training, qualification and membership. 
The tradition of banking in Scotland was in no sense perfect, but it was at least stable 
and coherent, with a view of goods and virtues which was consistent with the 
communities which it sought to serve; this in turn offered a coherent way of life for the 
banker. 
The evidence of this thesis shows how the tradition of banking in Scotland as it 
developed up until the 1980s was disrupted in the move to new banking.  It shows how 
banking was reduced and marginalised as a coherent profession and as a way of life.  
The processes through which this happened included the fragmentation of the 
profession itself, the loss of qualification structures, the growth of large diversified 
institutions and the loss of underlying social structures. 
The ethics of the conduct of banking in Scotland as understood by traditional bankers 
collapsed long before the banking system itself did in 2007/8.  The service culture of 
old banking was replaced by the sales culture of new banking, and skills such as 
selling and entrepreneurship replaced virtues such as truthfulness and good sense.  
This is not to say that the ethics of traditional bankers themselves also collapsed, and 
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there are several stories to show that bankers who were ‘born and bred’ in old banking 
were able to exercise constancy in resisting the institutional pressures of new banking, 
by adhering to the standards of their tradition.  However, It is clear that resistance from 
traditional bankers was neither strong enough nor unanimous enough to prevent a very 
rapid erosion of standards.50 
7.7 Ethics in the situation of new banking 
Just as MacIntyre’s thinking about goods and virtues in the context of practices and 
traditions gives a useful platform for an understanding of the ethics of the tradition of 
banking in Scotland, so it also gives a basis for understanding the corruption of the 
practice.  During the 1990s, banking in Scotland fragmented as a practice, and the way 
of life of the traditional banker disappeared. The goods of excellence were displaced by 
the goods of effectiveness, and this process of displacement is understood as such by 
the participants to the research conversations.   
It is in part understood by them as the corrupting power of institutions, but never in the 
absence of other causes.  Whereas for MacIntyre practices are vulnerable to the 
inherent acquisitiveness of the institutions created to support them, for this group of 
participants there was no inherent tension between traditional banks and traditional 
banking.  They acknowledge that corrosive power has been transmitted through 
organisations, but they look for its origins elsewhere.  Most see it as an invasion of new 
ideas from outside the banks, whether that be new kinds of generic business managers 
running banks, or the influence of consultants or investment bankers, politicians or 
regulators. 
What is not in dispute among those who are committed to traditional banking is that the 
erosion of ethics in banking was caused by the arrival of new banking, a term which 
has been adopted in this thesis following the usage by P1 of the phrases ‘old bank’ 
                                               
50
 This raises the question of why the tradition of old banking in Scotland capitulated so 
completely in the space of around 15 years (c.1986 – c.2001).  An investigation of the wider 
social and economic causes of that collapse is beyond the scope of this study, but there are 
clues even within the findings presented here as to why this might have happened.  The 
tradition of banking in Scotland appears to have already been in a weakened state before it 
encountered the full force of new banking.  Old banking had developed within and relied on 
social structures of community and kirk which themselves were already greatly changed before 
the 1990s.  The historic ‘Agreement of Understandings’ (C1:13), which had previously kept 
Scottish banking largely separate from English banking, had to some extent insulated Scottish 
banking from new forms of international capitalism up until the deregulation of the UK banking 
system 1986, which made traditional banking impossible to sustain by the early 1990s (Section 
4.3). 
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‘new bank’.  New banking consists of an entirely new way of doing banking such that 
banks became entrepreneurial, risk-taking businesses, the profession of banking was 
subordinated to managerial prerogative, and banks themselves became large 
multinational diversified financial groups, rather than anything recognisable as retail 
banks in the traditional sense. 
Borrowing MacIntyre’s language, we might say that in the context of advanced 
capitalism, where banks are run as competitive diversified businesses which 
subordinate what was once a coherent practice to their own institutional goals, it is not 
surprising that those banks should fail to provide anything resembling coherent ethics.  
And this, in a slightly different language, is also how the adherents of old banking 
speak of it.  For them, the ethical failures of new banking are multi-layered and self-
reinforcing.  The bonus culture, the sales culture, an obsession with growth, an 
ignorance of the nuts and bolts of banking at the most senior levels, an ignorance of 
the nature and value of the customer relationship, loss of professional coherence, loss 
of qualifications and status, recklessness, greed and impatience:  all these go hand in 
hand to describe a system which is systematically unethical by the standards of the 
tradition of old banking in Scotland. 
7.8 Practical implications 
The tradition of Scottish banking which is described in this thesis as ‘old banking’ is an 
important source of moral philosophy in practice, for instance with regard to the virtues 
of justice, truthfulness and patience, which rested on what was once a coherent system 
of social structures and a clear idea of the goods of the communities which it served 
(Sections 5.9 - 5.12 and Section 6.6).  This former moral framework has been largely 
dismantled as a live practice, and appears to be only active at the margins of the 
finance industry.  Nevertheless, the virtues which the tradition embodied remain 
important if an ethically robust banking system is to be re-established.   
By contrast, it is difficult to see how new banking can supply an alternative to this moral 
framework.  The problems of new banking are large scale and structural.  There is no 
unifying professional practice either at the heart of the large diversified international 
banks or in charge of them, and correspondingly there is no reliable means of 
inculcating future leaders of those banks with the virtues necessary to avoid further 
ethical failures.  Although there is interest from the larger banks in trying to re-establish 
trust and reputation, it is clear from the current thesis that the reputation of old banking 
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was dependent on a well-ordered tradition which new banking cannot replicate in its 
current form.   
This implies that the re-establishment of the authority of the tradition is essential to 
rebuilding ethics in banking.  The work of trying to re-establish this kind of authority – 
one  which is very different from the structural authority of chief executives – may best 
be pursued by senior members of the profession championing robust training and 
standards through bodies such as the Chartered Banker Institute.  However, it is also 
clear from this study that currently there is a power imbalance in the sector, which 
continues to subordinate the authority of the tradition to the goals of the largest 
financial institutions.  So long as the finance industry is dominated by large diversified 
corporations driven first and foremost by the need to grow the profits of their 
shareholders rather than the desire to pursue excellence in customer service, this 
power imbalance will remain an obstacle.  This is not in itself an argument for reform of 
the legal constitution of the banks, but it does clearly call for a shift in the balance of 
power, so that the profession itself is no longer dominated by impatient capital. 
Another key implication of the study concerns the role of the generalist manager.  That 
banks came to be run by people who were not bankers emerges as a major contributor 
to the ethical problems experienced in the sector and to the lack of good leadership.  
The research has demonstrated that in the context of Scottish banking a close 
connection between ‘technical and moral excellence’ in leadership (Ciulla, 2005) was 
essential to the stability of the sector as it was up until the 1980s.  Thereafter the two 
began to diverge, and the new leaders of banks in the 1990s and 2000s increasingly 
lacked both technical and moral excellence.  This trend not only concerned outsiders 
who lacked adequate understandings of banking systems moving into leadership 
positions.  It also concerned the fast-tracking of generalist managers who lacked an 
adequate moral grounding in the practice through apprenticeship. 
The point about the ascendency of the expert generalist manager over the time-served 
professional leader is related to the culture of entrepreneurial capitalism, but is also 
distinct from it.  MacIntyre (2007) sees the problem of managerialism as a central 
theme across a wide range of national organisational and bureaucratic cultures.  In 
2013 the Co-op Bank in the UK announced a capital shortfall of £1.5bn, a crisis largely 
of its own making which was due to failings in leadership (Kelly, 2014).  This near 
failure of a large national bank, constituted as a mutual, is ample warning that the 
prevalence of the western economy joint stock model is not the only problem. 
This observation about the role of leadership in the disintegration of banking means 
that there are significant distinctions to be drawn between the functions of generic 
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management and the exercise of leadership in positions of power.  There is recognition 
by participants in this study that generic management skills are needed for the 
administration of complex organisations; it is not in this sense that generic 
organisational management was a key contributor the banking crisis.  It was the role of 
the generalist manager as senior leader that created the problem.  The idea that 
people can be trained not only to be managers in a generic sense, but also to be 
leaders in that same sense, has become a central assumption of many business 
schools51.  It is an assumption which has been a large contributor to the financial crisis. 
The current thesis may have implications for areas of public life beyond banking.  In the 
area of policing, the UK government (Home Office, 2014) proposes changing the rules 
for promotion in the police force to allow direct entry by general managers to the rank 
of superintendent, bypassing the current system of developing leaders within the 
profession.  The government aims thereby to ‘enable modern management practices in 
line with practices elsewhere in the public sector and wider economy’ (Home Office, 
2014, p.7).  The conclusions of this research indicate that this may be unwise. 
7.9 Limitations of the study 
This study has pursued a MacIntyrean enquiry, and this implies certain important 
limitations in respect of method and findings. 
This research makes use of the idea of traditions at a number of levels, including the 
commitment that the current enquiry itself is tradition-constituted.  This entails an 
explicit stance within a particular tradition from which the enquiry is conducted, and, 
since the actual tradition concerned is a MacIntyrean one52 and not, for instance a 
genealogical one, my own stance as the researcher is also explicit.  I have approached 
all aspects of the research as a student of an Aristotelian tradition, and have made no 
attempt to step outside of it.  One consequence of this is that I have consciously set 
aside a range of alternative traditions of enquiry which could have been followed.  For 
instance, this research has not attempted to pursue contemporary leadership theories 
such as authentic leadership or transformational leadership, only to acknowledge their 
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 Harvard Business School (2014) give their mission as: ‘We educate leaders who make a 
difference in the world’. 
52
 This is not to impose on MacIntyre the idea that there is such a thing as the MacIntyrean 
tradition, only to claim to be working within an Aristotelian tradition mediated by MacIntyre, one 
which is well enough defined for others in the field to explicitly recognise and pursue 
‘MacIntyrean enquiry’. 
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appearance in the conversations where appropriate, nor has there been any attempt to 
pursue alternative traditions in ethics, such as deontological or consequentialist ones. 
This research is interpretive in a sense of interpretation which owes much to Gadamer.  
One potential criticism of Gadamer’s picture of interpretation is that there is no 
anchoring of truth in reality; it is interpretation ‘all the way down’ (Wachterhauser, 2002, 
p.53).  MacIntyre is less vulnerable to such a complaint, and the epistemology of this 
research holds to the idea that there is an external reality to which all our 
interpretations are answerable.  Nevertheless, it is a clear limitation of this study that it 
is dependent on acts of interpretation in repeated turns of the hermeneutic circle.  The 
key external points of reference for approaching the truth in the context of this study 
are on the one hand the Aristotelian literature, and on the other the speech of the 
participants in the research conversations.  At all stages, this process depends on the 
interpretation of the researcher, and at all stages other interpretations by other 
researchers would have been possible.  In Gadamer’s terms, I am identified and limited 
by my own assumptions, and those assumptions form the basis for my acts of 
interpretation. 
Ten interview transcripts form the empirical data which is the subject of this interpretive 
process.  Those ten conversations have been conducted with  participants who have 
been self-selecting in response to informal enquiries made by the researcher.  There 
has been no attempt to produce data which is quantifiable or statistically significant, 
and it has been an explicit aim of the research to speak to people who are either long-
standing Scottish bankers or who are closely connected with their professional body.  A 
number of different routes were taken to finding people willing to spend time in 
conversation, and there is variability in the sample in terms of, for instance, career 
histories and degrees of affiliation to traditional banking in Scotland.  However, the 
group remains self-defining, and no claims are made about the ability of this group to 
represent any wider population. 
A final limitation of this research is that its conclusions must remain provisional and 
incomplete.  This limitation is inescapable in hermeneutic and interpretive research.  It 
is also in keeping with MacIntyre’s understanding of the limitations of social science.  
This research aims to provide a characterising narrative of Scottish banking which is 
persuasive, but open to challenge.  Counter-narratives could be produced, for instance 
by talking to different groups, or by approaching the same group from a different 
theoretical perspective. 
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7.10 Indications for future research 
A number of potential directions for future research are suggested by the contributions 
of the current thesis.  Three in particular may be fruitful: further exploration of the link 
between Gadamer’s and MacIntyre’s philosophical works; further exploration of the 
notion of tradition in empirical enquiry in organisation theory; and the investigation of 
the problem of managerialism disconnected from practice. 
This research has attempted to develop MacIntyrean enquiry by combining his thinking 
on the procedures of moral philosophy with Gadamer’s thinking on the procedures of 
hermeneutics.  This has yielded some valuable insights in practice for the conduct of 
this research.  However, the linking of these two different philosophies is provisional 
and tentative.  It is suggested that this line of enquiry should be continued, particularly 
from a theoretical perspective, in order to establish some wider agreement on the value 
of such a programme in dialogue with other students of MacIntyre and Gadamer. 
This thesis has demonstrated the value of focusing on the central place of tradition in 
MacIntyre’s philosophy when conducting empirical enquiry.  This contribution has the 
potential to enhance current work in organisation studies by drawing attention to the 
need to understand practices and institutions in the con  text of their histories and wider 
social structures.  Further empirical work could continue this development, seeking 
ways to locate current practices in their relevant traditions. 
The thesis has identified the rise of the general manager as problematic in the 
leadership of banking; one of the recurring themes of the decline of standards of 
professional practice in banking in Scotland has been that leaders who were not fully 
grounded in the profession lacked the necessary practical wisdom and technical 
capabilities to lead well and that these deficiencies contributed directly to ethical and 
financial failure.  If this has been true of banking in Scotland, it suggests the possibility 
of investigating whether other occupational sectors such as policing, medicine, law or 




Appendix 1:  Interview plan 
 
[This appendix illustrates the framework used in interviews.  Interviews here are best 
characterised as conversations, in line with methodology developed from Gadamer.  
However, an initial structure is nevertheless provided, which acts as a basic guide for 
the conversation.  The structure represented here is the result of a sequence of 
developments beginning with initial scoping of a structure with detailed questions, 
piloting of this structure in three full interviews, and review with the supervision team.  
As a result of this piloting and review process, together with further reading of 





The interview framework fall into four main sections:  Career history  Admired / un-admired leaders  Ethical challenges  Looking to the future 
 
The timing and sequencing of these sections is flexible, though it is anticipated that 
career history will be a natural place to start.  The direction of the questioning will 
depend on the position of the participant, for instance on whether he or she is retired or 
not.   This applies throughout, but mainly to the first and last sections.  The following 
sub-questions are for illustration purposes and are not intended to be asked verbatim. 
 
Career History 
Could you begin by giving me a brief outline of your career to date? or  
Could you begin by giving me a brief outline of your career? 
 
Follow up questions and prompts: 
What were your reasons for x (such and such a career move or action or decision)? 
What were you trying to achieve at that time? 
What made x a good thing (or a bad thing or right or wrong)? 
Were you happy doing x? 
In what ways has yours been a rewarding career? 
In what ways have you developed that you couldn’t have done in other kinds of jobs? 
How important was organisational position to you compared to the nature of the work? 
Do you feel you could have been similarly successful in some other walk of life? 
 
Admired / un-admired leaders 
Can you think of a leader or leaders who you have worked with who you have 
particularly admired?  (And / or can you think of one who you particularly did not 
admire?) 
 
Follow up questions and prompts: 
What was it about them that you admired (or didn’t)? 
Do you think other people felt the same way about them as you did? 
How has that affected your own leadership? 




Thinking about your role as a leader, have there been times that you have faced ethical 
challenges?  (Or what regrets do you have?) 
 
Follow up questions and prompts: 
Have there been occasions when others - the company perhaps - or Board members 
or other managers - were asking you to do something you thought was wrong? 
How did you deal with this? 
How did you weigh things up?  What reasons did you have for acting in the way that 
you did? 
Or were there times you thought you were doing something particularly right - a good 
thing to do - something you are proud of? 
Is there a difference for you between doing something successfully and doing it well? 
What do you think makes for ethical leadership? (Or what do you think makes a leader 
good rather than just effective?) 
 
Looking to the future 
Where do you plan to go from here?  Or what do you think the future holds for your 
organisation / banking. 
 
Follow up questions and prompts: 
Why do you think that might be valuable? 
Why do you think that might happen? 
What barriers do you foresee? 
 
 
Offering views in a real conversation 
Because this interview format is based on Gadamer’s idea of a genuine conversation, 
the above questions are only provisional, and equally important is the way that the 
researcher follows through on topics raised by the research participant.  These are 
often in the form of further questions not listed above, or in the form of views offered by 
the researcher.  In either case, it is explicit that the researcher takes seriously the 
views offered by the participant and offers views in return.  In this way the conversation 




Appendix 2:  Coding samples 
[The following diagrams show provisional mapping of sub-themes to overarching 
themes.  These structures predate the final analysis in the thesis, and are shown onlyto 
illustrate process.] 
 

















Decline of practice 
Disaggregation of practice 
Institution 
Internal and external goods 
Poiesis (innovation) 
Practice gap 
Practices (moving between them) 
Qualifications 
Resistance 















Conflict and decline 
Confusion and contradiction (borderlands?) 
Crisis in tradition (sales culture) 
Decline and defeat of tradition 
Disillusionment 
Sales culture 



































































Conflict and decline 
Sales culture 
Decline of practice 
Constancy 
Discomfort 
Disaggregation of practice 
Institution 
Poiesis (innovation) 
Practices (moving between them) 
Resistance 













Confusion and contradiction (borderlands?) 
Crisis in tradition (sales culture) 
Decline and defeat of tradition 
Disillusionment 









Internal and external goods 










[The following table shows the format for coding transcripts of primary data. The 
master document from which this sample is taken runs to 205 pages, 104,426 words.] 
 
 
P: But I wouldn’t say that any of these guys did anything like 
what’s expected of leaders today in terms of; you must put up 
great big slogans on the wall and say:  “This bank is wonderful, 
so repeat after me, this bank is wonderful,” you know.  They just 
kind of did it.  The best way to describe it is probably it was 
intuitive.  And I think that was a consequence of the way 
everybody was kind of brought through the ranks in those days.  
It just was all part of the culture, and that was the way people 
were.  Some people were a wee bit more aloof as I say than 
others, but generally speaking everyone was of the same sort of 
ilk, and would approach things in the same sort of way and from 
the same sort of background.  And I think that - over a period of 
time you just absorbed all that, and you took these messages, as 
whether they were more subliminal than overt, but you actually 
just took them, and that’s the way you kind of behaved as a 
result.  You kind of knew what was - a sense of what was right 

















R: Yes.  You described the first manager there as not being 
traditional banking stock, but they all share a similar approach, 
they all share idea of what banking’s about.  So that’s really more 
kind of socially he’s not from the usual group. 
 
P: Yes.  
R: And does that come to an end at a given point, that sort of 
run of senior leaders who are … 
Leadership 
 
P: Yes, yes it does.  Yes, I think that’s a very good question.  
That hits the nail on the head.  I think the … I think I would 
probably characterise it a slightly different way, in a way that you 
can sort of, I can see and feel in the way things were being dealt 
with.  I mean for example when I was working in that first branch 
and thereafter, the whole ethos as far as the customers were 
concerned was that you respond to what the customer’s asking 
for.  And it was when it switched from not just that, but let’s 
actually persuade the customer that they would really quite like 
something that they hadn’t thought that they would want before 
they came in.  That’s the sea change at that stage.  And that just 
happened to coincide with a change in the make-up of leadership, 
if you like, in the organisation at the top level, from those who had 




















Appendix 3:  Sample interpretive commentaries 
[The sample pages of interpretive commentary shown here are taken from two 
conversations.  They are intended to illustrate the kind of process undertaken in 
producing the commentaries, including the way that the themes which are articulated 
here influenced the final interpretation shown in the main text of the thesis.  A 
commentary was produced for each conversation and line referenced to the original 
transcripts.  (These line references are not used in the thesis and have been removed 
from this exerpt.)  The total length of the commentaries runs to 128 pages, 71,940 
words.] 
 
Sample from C1: 3 
P1 regards ‘non-bankers’ running banks as a major problem.  It is not always clear 
which of three possible things ‘non-banker’ means: someone who does not hold a 
formal Chartered Institute qualification; someone who is not a banker ‘born and bred’ - 
who hasn’t spent a sufficient apprenticeship in banking;  or someone who does not 
understand banking from the inside.  These latter two categories are closely tied to the 
MacIntyrean notion of a practitioner; someone who is a member of a practice is so, not 
because of any formal qualification although a qualification or other right of passage 
might be an outward sign of membership, but because they are sufficiently immersed 
in the practice to understand the goods internal to it.  There are good reasons why 
these distinctions should be fuzzy in the speech of P1 and other senior figures in the 
Institute, not least because to acknowledge that someone can hold the Institute’s 
qualifications and have a poor understanding of the goods of banking might be thought 
to undermine the value of those qualifications. 
 
The contrast between real bankers on the one hand and MBAs / chartered accountants 
on the other is clear for P1.  It is of course a huge over-simplification (see for instance 
the interview with J1, himself a good example of someone who is a graduate of a 
business degree, very clearly a ‘full fat’ banker, and also holds an MBA).  The phrase 
‘they brought the chartered accountants and masters of business administration’ 
begins to be mocking in tone.  ‘Masters of business administration’ in particular, could 
have been put in a number of other ways (‘MBAs’, or ‘business school graduates’ etc.) 
which do not so vividly recall popular business book titles including the phrase ‘masters 
of the universe’ or the more recent book ‘Masters of Nothing’. (C1: 3) 
 
Attempts by the researcher here and elsewhere to have a real conversation are at 
times clumsy, but are at least genuine, and help to build some rapport.  Gadamer, 
MacIntyre, and Kerr and Robinson occur at several points in the conversation.  P1’s 
interest in any of them is only polite.  The researcher’s purpose in mentioning them at 
various points is partly deferential and partly defensive: he is acknowledging P1’s 
superior academic standing, and also insulating himself from criticism by reciting 
sources.  The article by Kerr and Robinson (2011) is broadly relevant here, and 
becomes more particularly relevant later.  In terms of Gadamer’s notion of a real 
conversation, the researcher is being explicit about his prejudgements and offering 
them for rebuttal, albeit with a degree of defensive protection.  P1 does not in fact rebut 
the basic assessment of cultural change as being the erosion of the ‘conservative old 
guard - traditional Scottish bankers’.  One of the consequences of the researcher’s 
contribution at this point is to establish a level of agreement on this basic account, 
which frees P1 to elaborate further on the point. (C1: 3) 
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P1 is free in his criticism of business school mindsets and jargon.  His account of the 
arrival of the ‘chartered accountants and masters of business administration’ has 
several interesting elements:  it is pejorative in tone - ‘they were big into all this stuff…’;  
part of the defence at the time in introducing these outsiders was that they would 
contribute and then go away again; there was a more or less explicit antipathy between 
‘old bank’ and ‘new bank’; and that hostility (at least as felt by P1) was partly based on 
suspicion on both sides.  P1 does not articulate it very clearly, but as the two cultures 
begin to create friction between them, both groups are suspicious of each other and 
each group regards the other group as possessed of an expertise that they do not 
understand or do not value.  From P1’s point of view, this results in an undermining of 
the Institute and the professional ethics which it represents.  He does not particularly 
distinguish between the organisational priorities of the institution (the Institute), the 
needs of the profession, the needs of the banks and ethics.  For him good ethics and 
professionalism go hand in hand, and both are upheld by the Institute, whose function 
it is to do so. 
 
Sample from C1: 33-36 
The researcher challenges the tenor of J’s account, in particular the idea that P2 
appears not to blame key leaders for the focus on institutional effectiveness at the 
expense of the goods of the practice.   
 
J’s response is to emphasise that this was a collective approach.  Leadership is not 
dismissed, but particular leaders are not regarded as an originating cause.  Rather 
there were inevitable forces at play which implied change and which were taken 
forward by a wide range of players over an extended period of time.  From the point of 
view of the apparent disintegration of a tradition, this could be explained as 
symptomatic of tradition dynamics:  insomuch as a tradition is a complex social 
convention extended over generations with an assumption of practice and with some 
guiding authority at its core, then the dismantling of a tradition cannot be accomplished 
by one or two individuals, but rather must be accomplished over an extended period 
and comprise a large number of people and groups from within as well as from without 
the tradition.  This is something that is perhaps not greatly articulated in MacIntyre’s 
work:  that when a tradition accepts that it does not have adequate resources to 
answer its own problems and therefore adopts solutions from outside of itself, it might 
thereby ingest the seeds of its own disintegration, rather than, as it were, taking a 
restorative remedy. 
 
P2 gives a key description of the way that the ‘ethical cultural things of banking’ were 
transmitted.  They had never been explicitly stated.  This is not only because they 
didn’t need to be (they were not then seriously challenged within the practice), but in a 
sense they couldn’t be, because they were assumed.  (Cf. Gadamer; it is our 
assumptions which make us who we are and none more so, one might add, than those 
assumptions which are most unconscious, least explicit.)  It is only in the light of a later 
different culture, that the old culture could be articulated, as it is extinguished.  In 
articulating this, P2 also articulates the sense of practice gap:  ‘I haven’t actually been 
challenged - it would have been challenging - to articulate that thirty years ago, 
because it’s only now that you kind of realise that that was the way it was, because it 
changed so much in the meantime.’  What was lost is now made apparent by its 
absence. 
 
The researcher, in putting the next question, also asks for confirmation of a view of the 
practice gap, that the ‘tradition of banking as a profession and as a way of life … has 
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largely been dismantled…’  P2 confirms the diagnosis, and in doing so expresses what 
appears to be the core of his own idea of leadership. 
 
The kind of leadership which P2 now looks for might best be described as ‘prohairetic’.  
In his own words:  ‘you’d actually have to make some quite distinctive decisions, make 
some quite clear choices about things’.  And he locates the issue of sales culture as 
the battleground.  There is an emphasis on decision and will.  ‘If a given bank just said; 
as from Monday, all these things will cease to be…’  P2 returns to this theme and tone 
on p.11. 
 
He describes the problem in terms of strife, referring to difficulties created by the scale 
of the institutions concerned and the socialisation of a whole generation into the sales 
culture (i.e. a culture of effectiveness).  He sees this as a conflict between sales culture 
and service culture, and thinks that the protagonists of the sales culture need to be 
defeated.  Leadership here requires the re-establishment of authority on behalf of the 
practice and the tradition, in order to cut through the forces generated by target driven 
behaviours. 
 
The researcher turns to the question of community goods.  This is a theme which has 
lain in the background for much of J’s account so far, and the researcher asks a 
relatively provocative question  -  the people who set up the ASB had a clear sense of 
purpose and the good of the community:  ‘There’s no sense of that is there now really?’  
P2 rises to this and insists that here at least (at ASB) this ethic is still alive.  There is a 
clear service culture, based on customer relationships. 
 
P2 now embarks on not only a defence of his own institution and its championing of the 
practice of banking, but also describes the goods of banking and does so largely in 
terms of the good of the community.  This articulation comprises a number of features 
which can be listed: 
• the basic idea of the goods and purposes of banking as a practice were held in 
common by bankers who are brought up in the tradition; 
• bankers were there to serve the customer and not take any risks; 
• they strictly delimited their areas of competence - not equity, not mortgages, not 
life assurance, etc.; 
• banking was there to provide a safe home for people’s money, to lend people 
money on a sensible basis, and to help with trade; 
In articulating the goods of banking in this way, he acknowledges that one of the 
reasons that ASB has held on to this notion of goods is the close connection between 
the Board of Trustees and the local community.  The scale of the operation is seen as 





Appendix 4:  Sample reflective log 
[A reflective log was kept from April 2013 to May 2014 in order to record the 
researcher’s thoughts on the primary data, on the literature and on the research 
process itself.  Activity in the log was variable, and it was less used during those 
periods when more intensive writing was being undertaken in other documents, such 
as the interpretive commentaries or writing and re-rewriting of the thesis itself.  The 
sample entries from the log shown here (17 November 2013 to 17 January 2014) 
illustrate some of the ways that ideas were formulated in the processes of interpreting 
and comparing key authors.  The total length of the log runs to 35 pages, 21,349 
words.  The style of writing is informal and referencing is not always to standard.] 
 
17 Nov 
Charles (1984) on Aristotle’s practical syllogism.  See also Irwin’s critique of MacIntyre.  
I’m not convinced by Charles’ argument at p.91 ff.  He seems to dismiss the possibility 
that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is both a proposition and an action.  He 
comes down on the side (and he admits that it’s a close run thing) of favouring the 
interpretation that the conclusion to a practical syllogism according to Aristotle is a 
proposition and not an action.  This seems to do violence to both streams of quotations 
which he uses on either side of the argument.  It seems clear that what Aristotle is 
interested in is an attempted action which is the result of the practical syllogism.  A 
practical syllogism which does not result in attempted action is clearly incomplete.  
Charles solves this by saying that the proposition may mean either the proposition or 
the content (subject) of the proposition, but it seems a rather specious distinction.  
Perhaps Aristotle was struggling with the language somewhat, but if it lacks the minute 
precision required by Charles, then Aristotle himself has warned us against trying to be 
over-precise.  The point Aristotle is making clear from the examples given:  the 
conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action, unless that action is hindered or 
frustrated by some external force.  In other words it is the attempt at the action which 
counts.  Let’s say I decide to murder Eric with a shotgun.  I have the gun, I aim, I pull 
the trigger, but for some reason the gun doesn’t go off or someone jogs my arm and I 
miss.  The practical syllogism is unaffected; I attempted murder and that’s what counts 
as the outcome of the practical syllogism.  This is quite different from the case where I 
decide to shoot Eric, I get my gun and drive to his house, but on the way think better of 
it, and turn back.  In this case the practical syllogism has turned out differently: I have 
not attempted murder.  The proposition ‘I’m going to murder Eric’ might have been 
uttered or thought in either case, but the conclusion of the practical syllogism is 
different in the first case compared to the second.  The action, or attempted action is 
what counts, not the proposition. 
 
So I am with MacIntyre on this contra Irwin. 
 
It has consequences for research method and particularly for analysis.  What we are 
interested in is particularly stories of actions taken or attempted, even if those stories 
are in the background.  So where one banker has actually moved companies or 
changed jobs in order to preserve the goods of the practice in preference to pursuing 
the goods of the institution, this duly concluded practical syllogism carries weight of a 
quite different order from verbalised propositions such as, ‘I don’t think we should be 
doing that sort of thing.’ 
 
26 Nov 
Hackman (2003):  helpful stuff about levels, but the really interesting thing is the idea of 
‘grand reductionism’ which is ‘the bedrock of science’.  This is the idea that there are 
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simple universal laws to which all other laws may be reduced.  Ouch!  It appears then 
that I’m not doing social science. 
 
27 Nov 
Here’s a problem with internal goods of the practice….   
“We call them internal for two reasons: first, as I have already suggested, because we 
can only specify them in terms of chess or some other game of that specific kind and 
by means of examples from such games (otherwise the meagreness of our vocabulary 
for speaking of such goods forces us into such devices as my own resort to writing of 'a 
certain highly particular kind of'); and secondly because they can only be identified and 
recognized by the experience of participating in the practice in question. Those who 
lack the relevant experience are incompetent thereby as judges of internal goods.” 
(MacIntyre, 2007, 188-9) 
 
If the virtues can be gained from sailing or farming or family life or any one of a number 
of other virtues, then they cannot be internal goods of this sort.  Surely we want to be 
able to say that courage, for instance, is a virtue which not only can be acquired in all 
manner of different practices (of like kinds or not), but which is also recognisable as a 
good by other people from different practices.  This means that virtues are not internal 
goods of the sort which MacIntyre describes.  But they are not typical external goods 
either, since they are not competitive goods. 
 
There is a similar difficulty on the other side.  We know that winning Wimbledon is a 
competitive good, but it is also internal to the practice, insomuch as the Wimbledon 
trophy is a good which cannot possibly be acquired through anything other than 
excellence in the practice of tennis, assuming that Wimbledon is a well-regulated agon.  
We can distinguish here between excellence and the trophy, by saying that the trophy 
is an outward sign of the excellence of the best player, but that presupposes that we 
already understand the idea of ‘outward’. 
 
1 Dec 
Solomon’s ideas of Aristotelian ethics and the firm are somewhat similar and 
somewhat different to MacIntyre’s.  This needs to be synthesised properly for the lit 
review, but initial thoughts are: 
‘Community’ needs to be reintroduced as a theme, perhaps as part of social structures.  
Solomon rightly makes the argument that firms are communities; if we need convincing 
of this, then we need only look at the literature on corporate culture.  However, the 
question will then arise between Solomon and MacIntyre as to what sort of community.  
Solomon is warm and fuzzy on this question, MacIntyre more pessimistic and more 
clear.  Solomon does not begin to make the distinction between practices and 
institutions, and his portrait seems at times overly optimistic.  Would a slave plantation 
count as a community?  My feeling would be not.  Community might develop on the 
one side among the slaves, and on the other side among the slavers; but there can be 
no overall community of the plantation to include both, because a community cannot be 
founded on coercion or exploitation. 
Solomon regards business as a practice.  In doing so, he is not following MacIntyre’s 
idea of practices of course, but he is still overly optimistic in viewing ‘business as a 
human institution in service to humans’ (p.1024).  The obvious question of exploitation 
arises:  who is in service and to whom?  S’s idea of business as community works fine 
for, say, a workers’ cooperative. 
I am more convinced by Solomon’s argument for the agency of the firm, not denying 
also the agency of individuals within the firm.  The point is that if the firm is without 
moral agency, then it is without moral responsibility.  Here’s a simple test.  Was Athens 
guilty of genocide in Miletus?  If the question makes sense, then the idea of Athens 
being guilty makes sense.  Oh I don’t know.  I don’t believe it.  Athens can’t feel guilty, 
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and neither can Proctor and Gamble.  Without moral sensibility, there can be no 
morality, likewise no morality without rationality.  RBS has no faculty of human 
rationality, compassion or remorse, it only has the decision making capacities and 
processes of various persons and groups at various times and places.  This comes 
down to metaphysics.  If one thinks that human beings are invested with a peculiar 
faculty which makes them moral agents because of that peculiar faculty (call it, say, 
human rationality) then only someone with that faculty can be a moral agent.  Again, I 
think MacIntyre has this better; communities are bearers of traditions, and as such 
create the social structures which make moral agency possible.  The link between 
agency and social structure is thus far clear; if we then think of social structures 
themselves as moral agents, then we again fall into confusion. 
Solomon emphasises trust as an essential ingredient of the community.  In doing so he 
elevates trust as well as trustworthiness to the status of a virtue.  This can’t be right.  
Trustworthiness is the virtue, trust the response.  Trust is essential, of course, but so is 
communication.  That doesn’t make it a virtue.  The nearest virtue would be something 
like ‘trustingness’,  a settled disposition to be trusting, but this would be a dubious 
virtue, as Solomon himself points out on p.1039. 
 
Foot on the virtues (Virtues and Vices, Ch 1) 
She has a number of interesting moves in this short chapter.  Best just to list them: 
• She tries to develop a more modern idea of virtue as moral virtue by relating it 
to the will; this is difficult, and only partially successful, I think. 
• Wisdom is contrasted with cleverness, because wisdom has only good ends in 
view, and, moreover ends for human life in general rather than ends of particular arts. 
• Further, wisdom must be attainable by anyone of any ordinary intellect, without 
special training, and this is a general principle of moral virtues.  People can be wise 
without being clever. 
• Virtues are different from skills, and there is a simple test.  In arts and skills, 
voluntary error is preferable to involuntary error, while in virtues it is the reverse. 
• This formulation is possible because skill is a faculty, while virtue is a settled 
disposition, and because virtue engages the will.  [This appears to be related to the 
idea that virtue cannot work to a bad end.  If a bad end is intentionally pursued, then 
this cannot be virtue operating.  The same is not true of a skill.  Think of match fixing, 
which takes great skill.] 
• Virtues are corrective; they help to correct inclinations which would lead us to 
excess or deficiency in some respects. 
• Virtues are shown through a kind of facility and easiness - the virtuous person 
does not constantly struggle to do the right thing.  But there are also situations in which 
struggle, including struggles of the will are an indicator of virtue. 
• Virtues operate in unity, and defects may operate to cancel each other out.  
[Her discussion of this seems incomplete, and she voices the thought that we often 
admire people who possess some virtues but not others.  I think this is easily 
answered.  We suspect those who appear perfect but forgive and accept those whose 
faults are clear.  In doing so, we recognise that judging others to be complete in virtue 
is a hazardous business, we also recognise that signs of virtue are possible even 
where perfect virtue is not achieved.] 
  
There is more to be said on this.  For instance, there is the idea that complete virtue is 
an ideal state, seldom encountered in others and never in ourselves.  There is also the 
idea that we can learn virtue from others no matter that they are flawed, otherwise we 
could never learn virtue at all.  So we are still in need of a good formulation of the unity 




Wittgenstein on analysis.  We are mistaken if we think that by analysing language into 
its component parts we achieve a form of expression which is more complete, more 
basic or more exact than the original.  Part of the mistake is to suppose that language 
automatically stands in need of analysis, to think: ‘If you only have the unanalysed form 
you miss the analysis’ (Wittgenstein 1967, §63), rather than recognising that the 
analysed form is a related but different form which stands to gain some things and lose 
others in comparison with the original.  If we are to maintain a hermeneutical process 
and a narrative one, then ‘analysis’ may not be appropriate since it implies the breaking 
down of the original text.  Rather we should speak of the interpretation of the text, and 
seek to maintain its unity.  This is not to say that we cannot identify themes associated 
with passages of text, but these must be related to the text as a whole as well as the 
parts of the text, and they offer only one possible interpretation amongst others. 
 
Procedure: 
1. Transcription to text (confidential) 
2. Interpretation with commentary (confidential) 
3. Themes and keywords in commentary 
4. Themes and keywords in text 
5. Grouping of keywords and themes to text 
6. Interpretation of text to themes 
 
The above process to be repeated for each text.  Stages 4-6 appear in Chapter 
‘Interpretation’, with each text showing separately.  Then: 
7. Interpretation of themes in dataset. 
 




Another thing from Wittgenstein.  He argues against atomism as an understanding of 
language, and alongside this argues against an excessive devotion to rules, in the 
sense that whilst rules can be formulated to help us to understand what’s going on, our 
use of language does not depend on them.  Rules, we might say, are after the fact. 
 
Surely something very similar is going on with ethics.  We cannot detach one particle of 
ethics and examine it absent all the rest, but we can only understand ethics in the 
contexts of whole lives, communities, histories, traditions and so on.  And alongside 
this, the rules of ethics are useful, but they are after the fact.  An inability to formulate a 
rule is not a sign of moral incoherence, and rules are only expressions of regularities in 
a complex practice, not an a priori requirement.   
 
So here is what we would say of rules.  Rules are our formulation of what is going on in 
ethics, but the ethics precede the rules.  To say that first principles are of the greatest 
importance is just to say that a good person holds these regularities of behaviour to be 





I ironed out with Johan a way of coding that would be robust, but it all looks shaky 
again now.  The problem is that coding is still a vague and unsatisfactory process, 
which has the feel of pseudoscience.  It’s not real language, because it breaks 
language up and ill-fits it’s parts, but it pretends to work with language and to make 
sense of narrative.  Imagine someone taking ten cars to pieces in an effort to 
understand how they work and what they have in common.  They number each part 
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with care, describing and classifying them, and the eventually end up with around 100 
categories of parts, which they file all separately in drawers crates and racks.  There 
are fifty tyres in one rack, and next to them the fifty wheels that the tyres came from, 
and somewhere in a box, fifty valves corresponding to them.  Elsewhere there are 
collections of hundreds of meters of electrical cabling, bulbs, switches and so on.  
Having disassembled, reassembled and catalogued all these parts, they are now ready 
to look across the whole collection and come to some judgements about these ten cars 
as a group, how they work and what they have in common.  What nonsense! 
 
29 Dec 
Go back and recode for JOY! (Particularly Ts 5 and 6.) 
 
13 Jan 
A helpful conversation with Sandra, which brought out the idea of ‘respect’.  See Clarke 
(2011) 
 
15  Jan 
A very helpful conversation with Julie Crumbley.  See her thesis.  There are significant 
areas of commonality, particularly in the process of trying to ensure rigour. 
 
17 Jan 
The frustrating thing about interview 10 is the same as the frustrating thing about most 
others.  It is just fantastic script, and it’s brilliance is almost bound to be lost in the 
overall analysis of data.  No meta-narrative can possibly do justice to the colour and 
depth of this one narrative. 
 
This potentially leads to a wider thought. 
 
All meta-narratives are poor substitutes for biographies.  By this I mean that an 
individual’s narrative (or that of a narrating group) is always richer and more true to life 
than any theory which purports to offer some aggregate view.  This is why the gospel 
narrative (for all it is higgledy piggledy and authored by different voices), being 
biography first and foremost, is more powerful and enduring than any of the theological 







Appendix 5:  Technical note on practice-bearing 
traditions 
Nicholas (2012) explores the idea of tradition in some depth and in doing so attempts 
to define the term tradition for the purposes of his discussion.  His procedure is to take 
extracts from After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? in order to achieve a 
six part analysis of the idea of tradition.  The following extended quotation from 
Nicholas includes the passage from MacIntyre given in this thesis at Section 2.6, but is 
worth quoting in full, because it makes Nicholas’ procedure clear: 
 
‘MacIntyre defines tradition in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (12) as 
“an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental 
agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two conflicts: those with 
critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least key 
parts of those fundamental agreements, and those internal, interpretative 
debates through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental 
agreements come to be expressed and by whose progress a tradition is 
constituted.”  A tradition includes several features then: (1) a historically 
and socially situated (2) argument (3) over fundamental agreements with 
(4) outsiders and (5) insiders, the latter of which can (6) define rational 
progress within the tradition.’ (Nicholas, 2012, p.92) 
Nicholas here sets out a baseline, which later brings him to disagree with MacIntyre on 
the topic of fly fishing.  Nicholas is not only committed to the idea of tradition as an 
argument over fundamental agreements, but he also holds that ‘all traditions reflect in 
some way a cosmology, even if in brief form’ (Nicholas, 2012, p.173).  Consequently, 
his use of the term tradition ‘may be more specialized than MacIntyre’s use when he 
refers to fly-fishing as a tradition without a cosmology’ (Nicholas, 2012, p.173)53. 
 
There are at least two moves which Nicholas has made which might partly account for 
the disagreement.  First, he takes the passage quoted from Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? as a definition of the term tradition, which it is clearly not. In general 
MacIntyre is not given to providing definitions, preferring to offer instead 
characterisations which are appropriate to the discussion in hand.  It seems clear that 
the passage in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is a case in point.  The immediate 
preamble to the quotation from MacIntyre above discusses conflict and concludes that 
the ‘history of any society is thus in key part the history of an extended conflict or set of 
conflicts.  And as it is with societies, so too it is with traditions.  A tradition is an 
argument extended through time…’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p.12).  MacIntyre’s description 
here is not intended as a definition of tradition, but as a characterisation of the key part 
played by conflict in the history of traditions. 
 
Second, Nicholas describes a tradition as an argument over fundamental agreements, 
which is not how MacIntyre describes it in the passage quoted.  MacIntyre is clearly 
interested in the way in which fundamental agreements come to be expressed, refined, 
developed or refuted through conflict, but there is no assumption here that conflict is 
over those agreements.  Conflict might be over all sorts of matters.  MacIntyre himself, 
                                               
53
 Oddly enough, Nicholas may here also be in dispute with fly fishers themselves, who speak of 
fly fishing in cosmological terms (Snyder 2007). 
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later in the same chapter of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, refers to the example 
of conflict in the Athenian Assembly in 427 BC over the fate of the Mytilenian 
democrats following the revolt of Mytilene from the Delian League.  This is not only a 
procedural detail, because it goes hand in hand with another key point in MacIntyre’s 
characterisation of conflict in traditions, that the nature of external conflict, where 
opposing parties might be in dispute over such fundamental agreements, are very 
different from internal conflicts, where opposing parties might not be similarly in 
dispute.  This of course has direct application in the case of banking in Scotland.  
External conflict is portrayed as fundamental disagreement over, amongst other things, 
the importance of the customer relationship compared to sales targets (service culture 
vs sales culture).  Internal conflict accepts the importance of the customer relationship 
as given, and there is no conflict over this fundamental agreement, only over how it can 
best be interpreted in the light of new technologies and social structures. 
 
One further difference between Nicholas and MacIntyre is of direct relevance.  
Nicholas articulates a distinction between traditions of enquiry and cultural traditions 
and goes on to explore the latter by contrasting Roman Catholicism, Zande witchcraft 
and Lakota conceptions of land ownership, and these are traditions which are 
representative to some degree of nations, tribes or peoples.  This is of interest in the 
context of the current thesis, because an occupational culture – Scottish banking - is 
being explored, and an essential part of it is just its Scottishness, even if this is often in 
the background rather than foreground of the investigation.  However, Nicholas here 
gives a different emphasis from MacIntyre, who is interested very much in disputes 
between traditions within particular societies.  He is interested in conflicts within 
Athens, within the Scottish enlightenment, or within medieval Roman Catholic Europe. 
 
The current thesis attempts to adhere as closely as possible to MacIntyre’s treatment 
of traditions, including his emphasis on conflict, whilst acknowledging that the tradition 
of Scottish banking which is the subject of the thesis is a tradition in a broader sense 
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